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This publication consists of ten separate studies on payment and 
settlement systems employing simulation techniques. Most of these 
were carried out using the payment and settlement system simulator 
BoF-PSS2 provided by the Bank of Finland. The preliminary versions 
were presented at the annual simulator seminars arranged by the Bank 
in 2007 and 2008. The main focus of the analyses is on continuity 
arrangements, operational stability, liquidity requirements, liquidity 
economising, gridlock resolution, transaction queuing arrangements, 
network features and network topologies. The studies examine 
systems in several countries and cover different kinds of payment 
systems and regimes. 
 
Keywords: simulation, payment and settlement system, liquidity, 
gridlock, systemic risk, network topology 
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Tiivistelmä 
Tämä julkaisu koostuu kymmenestä erillisestä maksu- ja selvitys-
järjestelmää koskevasta tutkimuksesta, jotka on tehty simulointi-
menetelmiä käyttäen. Useimmissa näistä tutkimuksista on käytetty 
Suomen Pankin maksu- ja selvitysjärjestelmäsimulaattoria BoF-PSS2. 
Alustavat versiot tutkimuksista on esitelty Suomen Pankin järjestä-
mien vuosittaisten simulaattoriseminaarien yhteydessä vuonna 2007 
tai 2008. Pääpaino tutkimuksissa on ollut poikkeustilanteiden ratkai-
suissa, toiminnallisessa vakaudessa, likviditeettitarpeiden selvittämi-
sessä, likviditeetin käytön tehostamisessa, lukkiutumistilanteissa ja 
niiden avaamiseen liittyvissä metodeissa, tapahtumien jonotuskäytän-
nöissä, maksuverkkojen ominaisuuksissa ja verkkotopologiassa. Tut-
kimukset koskevat eri maissa ja eri periaatteilla toimivia järjestelmiä. 
 
Asiasanat: simulointi, maksu- ja selvitysjärjestelmä, likviditeetti, 
lukkiutumistilanne, systeemiriski, maksuverkkotopologia 
 




Payment and settlement systems are an important and integral part of 
modern economies. With globalisation moving ahead, payment 
networks are expanding rapidly and the actors are becoming 
increasingly interdependent. The current financial turmoil clearly 
spotlights these interdependencies. Understanding the network 
characteristics of the expanding payment and settlement systems have 
become key issues for central bank oversight. The need for more 
international cooperation in payment network design, operations and 
oversight, in both normal and abnormal situations, has increased 
considerably. Both banks and authorities will face new types of 
continuity requirements in a complex network of business 
relationships. It is important to gain a good understanding of the 
systems and their interdependencies in order to increase their 
efficiency for all kinds of circumstances. 
  Payment and settlement systems have proven to be a complicated 
area, for which simulation techniques provide a good way to penetrate 
sufficiently deeply. Models can be built to closely replicate the actual 
operating environment and can be used for testing and observing 
scenarios not normally found in real operating environments. Two 
lessons from the current crisis are that even very extraordinary 
situations need to be stress-tested in simulation models and that 
participant interdependencies can have systemic consequences. The 
current crisis, at least so far, has proven that the work done during the 
last decade in improving the resiliency and stability of payment and 
settlement systems has been rewarding, as all major systems have 
been working without problems throughout these difficult times. 
  The Bank of Finland has a long tradition of economic research and 
economic modelling, and modern payment and settlement systems 
have been one of the focal areas. Research based on simulation 
models for payment systems was initiated around the time Finland 
was joining the Economic and Monetary Union, and it proved an 
excellent tool for studying the changing liquidity needs and system 
risks under the new EMU regime. Based on positive results and 
feedback, the Bank of Finland decided to develop a diversified 
simulator BoF-PSS2 especially for external use and international 
distribution. It was completed in spring 2004 and is available for 
research purposes free of charge. It is a service offer under continuous 
development and the most recent addition of this year has been a 
network analysis module. Currently, the simulator has over 70 users 
worldwide and on every continent. While the users are mainly central  
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banks, in recent years the interest in the simulator has increased 
among academics and private in-frastructure organisations. 
  The simulator investment and service attracted large international 
interest and a variety of research at various central banks. The Bank of 
Finland has arranged six yearly international payment and settlement 
seminars and workshops during the years 2003 to 2008 and the 
seventh seminar will be held later in 2009. The main goals of the 
seminars and workshops are to stimulate simulation-based payments 
and securities settlement research, to share research results and 
experiences among the user community, and to obtain new ideas and 
feedback regarding simulator development needs. The presentations of 
the first two seminars were published in the first simulator publication 
(BoF publication E31:2005), and those of the third and fourth 
seminars were published in the second publication on seminar 
proceedings (BoF Publication E39:2007). The presentations of the 
fifth and sixth seminars are included in this publication. 
  I would like to thank the authors for their contributions to this 
publication, which, I trust, will provide a good introduction to the 
simulation analysis of payment and settlement systems and will 
stimulate further research that will enhance our understanding and 
improve the models and methodologies in the years ahead. 
    I would like to thank all other contributors, sponsors, 
commentators and users of the simulator for all the help they have 
provided during the various stages of work on and with the simulator. 
  At the same time I would like to acknowledge Ville Ruoppi of 
MSG Software, who has been continuously involved in the IT aspects 
of the simulator. A detailed list of acknowledgements can be found on 
the simulator website and in the users’ manual for the simulator. 
  For the finalisation of the publication we are indebted to Päivi 
Nietosvaara for the text editing, Glenn Harma for English language 
revision and Teresa Magi for printing administration. We are also 
indebted to the editorial board of the publication, consisting of Harry 
Leinonen, Marianne Palva and Jouko Vilmunen. 
  I hope users of the simulator will continue to be active and that the 
simulator will attract new users and sponsors. It is a great pleasure for 
me to present, via this third simulation-related publication on seminar 
proceedings, the fruits of this continuing productive cooperation 
between central banks. 
 
 
Helsinki, June 2009 
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The current financial turmoil has, within a short time span, changed 
the focus of overseers and supervisors. It has also showed how 
interdependent the financial markets are. These clearly comprise the 
same kind of large interwoven network as the internet-web. All banks 
and payment systems are connected in some manner to each other in 
one large network. Changes in one part of this network can therefore 
affect other, even quite distant, parts. Local oversight will not be 
sufficient in such circumstances; the whole network will require 
attention and assessment with a special focus on the most critical parts 
and points of contagion. 
  Overseeing and supervising such a global web-network will 
require more cooperation among the national authorities, and perhaps 
even new types of international cooperation mechanisms and 
organisations. The key authorities for oversight cooperation – the 
payment system committee of G10 central banks (CPSS), the payment 
and settlement system committee of the Eurosystem (PSSC), and the 
working groups of the European Commission – will need to increase 
and deepen their cooperation in order to fulfil the task of overseeing 
the web of international payment systems. There is also a need to 
increase cooperation between oversight and supervision authorities. 
  The first payment system simulation studies in the mid and late 
1990s focused on settlement conventions and hidden credit and 
liquidity risk in individual and separated payment systems. In these 
studies, payment systems were mostly seen as static systems for 
booking interbank fund transfers. The network aspects and 
characteristics of payment systems have recently received more 
attention, as their importance has increased. The volumes in the 
international financial markets and across borders have increased in 
all types of international systems: exchanges, CCPs and CLS. In 
Europe the integration developments can be seen in TARGET2 and 
the SEPA undertaking – which result in regional, rather than national, 
infrastructures. We can also see a development towards multicurrency 
systems servicing several national currency areas. The payment 
system networks become more complex, and they will require new 
kinds of efforts from the researchers and new facilities from the tools 
employed. 
  The general ICT developments support the development of data 
‘crunching and mining-based’ approaches, as all necessary data are 
already in electronic formats and it is only necessary to bring it 
together within the processing of modern and efficient analysing tools.  
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Understanding the risks in payment and settlement systems requires 
studying the underlying payment flows and participant behaviour in 
different scenarios. 
  The Bank of Finland has hosted yearly simulator seminars since 
2003. This is the third publication of studies presented at these 
seminars, covering those in 2007 and 2008. The counterparty risks and 
interdependencies in payment systems are of continuous concern to 
central banks, and stress-testing systems are becoming a general tool 
for overseers. The financial crises will most likely increase the interest 
in different kinds of stress-testing of payment systems and their 
participants. Abnormal situations will also change participants’ 
behavioural patterns, resulting in new kinds of payment and liquidity 
flows. Payment networks will show different network characteristics 
when stressed. 
  The articles of this publication cover four main external elements, 
which affect the functioning of payment and settlement systems, as 
depicted in Figure 1.1. 
 




Operational shock & performance Liquidity shock & performance
Behaviouralchange Market linked change
2. Andersen & Madsen
3. Glaser & Haene
4. Lublóy & Tanai
6. Schmitz & Puhr
6. Schmitz & Puhr
5. Heijmans
5. Heijmans
7. Ercevik & Jackson
8. Galbiati & Soramäki
9. Hellqvist
9. Hellqvist
10. Wetherilt & al
10. Wetherilt & al




The chapters in the publication are ordered by starting with 
operational stress testing, continuing with articles on network features 
and liquidity issues, after which articles linking payments to intraday 
and overnight loan markets are presented; the final article presents an 
agent-based model of the payment systems. Each chapter (authors 
named) provides an individual stand-alone analysis, but some clearly 
build on earlier analyses.  
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  Chapter 2 (Andersen and Madsen) analyses the efficiency and 
need for contingency measures in RTGS systems. Operational 
incidents in the Danish RTGS system, Kronos, are simulated in order 
to identify critical values for recovery time, critical participants, 
contingency measures and stop-sending limitations. The simulations 
indicate that for Kronos resumption of normal settlement within four 
hours and a contingency capacity between five and ten per cent of 
average daily transaction volumes are sufficient to significantly reduce 
the negative impacts of operational incidents. 
  Chapter 3 (Glaser and Haene) shows that in an adverse scenario an 
operational disruption of a major participant in the Swiss large-value 
payment system, Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC), can lead to 
significant systemic liquidity effects. The study simulates suspension 
of a participant’s outgoing payments, which results in liquidity 
accumulations for the failing participant and liquidity shortages for 
other participants and thereby disrupts settlement of their payments. 
The work highlights the importance of measures aimed at preventing 
operational disruptions or limiting their negative effects on other 
participants, such as target times for resumption of operations, 
contingency systems, incentivising early input of transactions, 
extending intraday credits, developing liquidity optimising algorithms 
and enhancing interbank alarm systems and crisis organisations. 
  Chapter 4 (Lublóy and Tanai) explores the operational resilience 
of the Hungarian real time gross settlement system, known as VIBER, 
by simulating the ability of the system to withstand operational 
defaults of one or two of the most important participants. The system 
is stressed in six different scenarios. The concentration level, 
availability of liquidity, back-up procedures, reactions of non-
defaulted banks and structure of the money market are found to be the 
main factors affecting the value of unsettled transactions. Behavioural 
reactions of non-defaulted participants are found to be important. 
  Chapter 5 (Heijmans) presents an analysis of the sensitivity of the 
Dutch interbank payment system when stressed with liquidity shocks 
and operational incidents. The Dutch system is highly concentrated, 
with three large dominating banks and many rather small participants. 
A disruption of one of the large banks does not have a huge impact on 
the other large banks in the system. The small banks however do face 
more liquidity problems as a result of a disrupted (large) bank. 
  Chapter 6 (Schmitz and Puhr) investigates the interaction between 
structure and stability in payment systems. It quantifies the contagion 
impact of operational shocks at participants’ sites in the Austrian 
large-value payment system, ARTIS, by means of simulations. It finds 
that contagion displays large variations across days and across  
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scenarios. Based on a panel data approach, it then goes on to test 
whether structure can help explaining these variations. The paper 
captures structure by a set of network indicators. The main finding is 
that standard economic variables describing networks/nodes (such as 
liquidity, liquidity loss, value and volume of payments) can explain a 
substantial fraction of the variation studied. The structural indicators 
at the network level seem to add very little explanatory power, while 
those at the node level contribute somewhat to our understanding of 
the interaction between structure and stability in payment systems. 
  Chapter 7 (Ercevik and Jackson) quantifies the impact of 
introducing one particular type of ‘hybrid design’, a centralised 
receipt-reactive queue, on the liquidity demands faced by banks using 
large-value payment systems in the UK RTGS system, CHAPS.   
Significant liquidity savings are achievable if banks choose to enter a 
high proportion of their payments into the special queue. Liquidity 
savings are distributed unevenly; the largest users do not benefit 
significantly while the smaller users obtain significant savings. The 
level of liquidity recycling in the existing payment system is shown to 
be a key determinant of the impact of the hybrid design. 
  Chapter 8 (Galbiati and Soramäki) assesses the benefits of 
liquidity saving mechanisms in interbank payment systems by 
comparing two different payment system setups. The equilibrium 
choices in the two models are compared with each other and with the 
choices of a benevolent planner. Central queuing is found to be more 
efficient than decentralized queuing. The ‘mechanical’ advantages of 
a liquidity saving mechanism, at least the one assessed here, can be 
nullified by strategic behaviour, as there can exist ‘bad’ equilibria, 
with high liquidity usage and intensive use of the liquidity saving 
mechanism, and yet costs that exceed those of a system without saving 
mechanisms. These findings suggest that liquidity saving mechanisms 
are useful tools, but they may need some coordination device to 
ensure that banks arrive at a ‘good’ equilibrium. 
  Chapter 9 (Hellqvist) proposes an empirical method for identifying 
internal intraday counterparty limits of banks from payment system 
data. The method is tested with transaction data from Finnish RTGS 
system (BoF-RTGS) from years 2002–2007. The validity of the 
method is tested in two approaches, both based on the assumption that 
intraday liquidity management would reflect counterparty risk 
management: external market based measures and the magnitude of 
intraday versus overnight credit exposures. One possible observation 
from this study is that the difference between the uncollateralized and 
collateralized interbank interest rate may be positively correlated with 
the size of allowed intraday positions, at least during some time  
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periods. The overall level of intraday positions was found to vary 
greatly compared to overnight loan positions. New developments in 
LVPSs enable more advanced liquidity management within the 
centralized payment system.  
  Chapter 10 (Wetherilt, Zimmerman and Soramäki) analyses the 
unsecured overnight market in the UK as a network of relationships 
and examines how it has changed during the period of market turmoil. 
Using established network techniques, strong evidence is found for the 
existence of a ‘core’ of most-comprehensively connected banks. This 
core has become more important during the crisis, and the widened 
reserve target bands have allowed banks to exercise more discretion in 
forming relationships. However, when for a short time the core banks 
appeared risky, correspondents preferred to diversify and reduce their 
reliance on the core.  
  Chapter 11 (Galbiati and Soramäki) introduced agent-based 
modelling for a multi-agent, multi-period model of an RTGS payment 
system. Banks decide how much costly liquidity to allocate to the 
settlement process to execute an exogenous, random stream of 
payment orders. The analysis finds an equilibrium level of liquidity to 
be posted in the system, a liquidity demand curve which links liquidity 
to delay costs, and insights on the efficiency of alternative system 
configurations. For a wide range of costs, efficiency (measured by the 
netting ratio) could be enhanced if banks were to commit more 
liquidity than they do in equilibrium. This might constitute a rationale 
for imposing measures that encourage liquidity provision (eg 
throughput guidelines). Systems with fewer participants are found to 
be more liquidity-efficient than larger ones, due to the emergence of 
‘liquidity pooling’ effects. 
  These studies show that the simulator research network has 
considerably expanded and diversified over time. This has increased 
our knowledge of payment systems and of the internal and external 
factors and parameters that affect them. The cooperation has also 
resulted in exchange of experiences and knowledge among central 
banks, in which the tools and methods are used in several countries 
and with an increased level of sophistication. This has led to the 
implementation of new and more robust risk mitigation facilities in 
payments systems, resulting in increased systemic stability. The Bank 
of Finland is grateful for the rewarding cooperation that underlies this 
publication series. 
  Due to the positive feedback, the Bank of Finland has decided to 
increase simulator support services in the form of consultancy, 
education, helpdesk and analysis services. The Bank of Finland will 
also continue the development of the simulation tool itself. Supporting  
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the simulator research network via seminars and publications will also 
be a key objective. Network analysis studies, agent-based and other 
behavioural models, as well as market-linked payment flows are 
interesting emerging directions for research. The financial turmoil will 
probably also trigger a new brand of stability study that analyses 
payment system performance under exceptional financial conditions. 
It might be the case that the simulation tools will be employed and 
developed for more general stability analyses. We hope that this 
publication will stimulate new studies in this multidimensional 
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2  A quantitative assessment of 
international best practice for 
business continuity arrangements 
in payment systems 
Abstract 
In recent years several central banks have studied how operational 
incidents affect settlement in payment systems. We expand previous 
studies by explicitly taking account of international best practices for 
business continuity arrangements. Specifically, we simulate 
operational incidents in Danmarks Nationalbank’s RTGS payment 
system, Kronos, with the aim of identifying critical values vis-à-vis 
1) recovery time, 2) critical participants, 3) contingency measures and 
4) stop sending. 
  We find that oversight of payment systems can benefit from 
quantification of these critical values when assessing whether business 
continuity arrangements accord with international best practice. The 
simulations indicate that for Kronos resumption of normal settlement 
within 4 hours is sufficient and that a participant with a share of 1½–2 
per cent of turnover should be classified as critical. Likewise, the 
simulations show that a capacity for settling 5–10 per cent of average 
daily transaction volume in contingency mode would significantly 





In this section we introduce our study by presenting the questions we 
wish to address. In addition, we identify some aspects of business 
continuity where quantitative benchmarks for best practice can be 
established. This is followed by a brief survey in section 2.2 of 
previous research that assesses the impacts of operational incidents in 
payment systems. 
  Section 2.3 presents the key features of Danmarks Nationalbank’s 
RTGS payment system, Kronos, and the types of transaction settled in  
20 
the system. The section also gives an overview of incidents that have 
occurred in the system. 
  In sections 2.4 and 2.5 we present the results of the simulations, 
first for system-level incidents, then for participant-level incidents. 
  Section 2.6 concludes with the results of our simulations and 
especially interpretations of these in respect of international best 




Operational disruptions in payment systems can jeopardize financial 
stability. This is reflected in the core principles for systemically 
important payment systems issued by CPSS in January 2001.
1 In core 
principle no. 7, it is stated that payment systems ‘should ensure a high 
degree of … operational reliability and should have contingency 
arrangements for timely completion of daily processing’. 
  These high-level objectives are elaborated in the core principles 
report which includes a number of more detailed (but still only 
qualitative) payment-system objectives aimed at securing a robust 
environment for processing payments. Specifically, business 
continuity arrangements should be in place that 1) minimise the risk of 
disruptions, 2) enable settlement of urgent payments in contingency 
mode during disruptions and, 3) shorten the period for restarting the 
system, if necessary, at a second site. 
  But how can central banks’ oversight units be sure that a payment 
system’s business continuity arrangements are adequate? Is it 
reasonable to base such assurance on quantitative measures? If so, 
what are the critical values for these measures? In the end, do these 
critical values accord with observed international best practice for 
business continuity arrangements? 
  With this in mind we will address the following questions: 
 
•  How fast should settlement resume after an operational incident 
occurs? (When do the risks and costs caused by operational 
disruptions become unacceptable) 
•  Who are the critical participants of the system? (Are there 
participants that can seriously disrupt settlement if hit by an 
incident) 
                                          
1 See Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2001).  
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•  How many payments should the system operator be able to settle 
in contingency mode (eg by paper-based manual procedures before 
normal operations are resumed)? 
•  How fast should stop sending be applied on a participant unable to 
send payment orders? (ie to avoid that the participant absorb too 
much of the system’s liquidity). 
 
 
2.1.3  International best practice for business continuity 
According to the CPSS report on Core Principles for systemically 
important payment systems, the methods and tools employed in the 
management of operational risk and business continuity in payment 
systems are still mainly qualitative in nature. Best practice is thus 
more a question of employing the specific methods and tools that will 
ensure the best possible operational risk management. Although 
quantitative methods and tools are still in their infancy as regards 
management of operational risks and business continuity, both in 
general and in payment systems, a number of quantitative benchmarks 
have evolved in the last decade. 
  Today, a payment system’s disruption tolerance is typically 
defined in a service level agreement as the minimum acceptable 
availability during opening hours. Because central banks’ RTGS 
systems are vital for the stability of the overall financial system the 
minimum acceptable availability are typically set above 99.5 per cent 
per annum. 
  In addition, the maximum time allowed for resumption of a 
system’s normal operations should be based on the classification of 
(the severity of) operational disruptions in which the duration of the 
incident is an important (but not the only) factor. Eg, in Europe and 
USA systemically important payment systems should be able to 
recover and resume normal (or normal-like) operations within two 
hours after the occurrence of an incident.
2 
  Since the terrorist attacks in New York on 11 September 2001, 
central banks have acknowledged that disruptions for certain 
participants can have severe impacts on the smooth functioning of a 
payment system. Hence central banks have begun to identify and 
define specific business continuity objectives for critical participants, 
eg by requiring such participants to be able to resume operations 
within two hours after an incident occurs. 
                                          
2 See ECB (2006) and Federal Reserve et al (2003).  
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  Finally, the capacity of the payment operation department’s staff 
for settling payments in contingency mode should be based on the 
level of urgent payments that must be settled in a timely manner so as 
not to have a major impact on financial stability or otherwise severely 
disrupt the financial system. (The authors are not aware of published 
quantitative requirements on the capacity of settling transactions in 
contingency mode within a specified timeframe while a payment 
system is unable to operate normally.) 
 
 
2.2 Previous  research 
There are several studies that provide quantitative assessments of how 
operational incidents affect settlement in RTGS payment systems. 
Here we mention a few that in particular have motivated the research 
presented in this paper. However, none of the studies explicitly 
attempted to establish specific quantitative business continuity 
requirements for payment systems. 
 McAndrews  and  Potter
3 give a thorough presentation of the events 
following the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on 11 
September 2001. This tragedy made it possible to see how payment 
flows and liquidity holdings were affected for several days when 
several participants in a payment system in a financial centre were hit 
by a devastating incident. The attack caused a sharp drop in payments 
settled in the Federal Reserve RTGS system, Fedwire, on the day of 
the attack as well as a pronounced shift in the timing of settlements, 
due to delays in incoming payment orders, which led unexpectedly to 
participants’ liquidity shortages. On the days after 11 September, there 
were also wide deviations from the normal settlement pattern in 
Fedwire because resumption of normal payment operations progressed 
slowly for a number of participants with Manhattan operations and 
because the clean-up required a substantial increase in payment 
volume for several days after the attack. In addition, McAndrews and 
Potter describe how, shortly after the attack, the Federal Reserve 
secured the financial system and thereby the payment flows by 
providing ample liquidity to participants that ran of out liquid funds. 
  In studies by Bedford et al
4 and Enge and Øverli,
5 operational 
incidents in the English CHAPS system and Norwegian NBO system 
                                          
3 See McAndrews and Potter (2002). 
4 See Bedford et al (2004). 
5 See Enge and Øverli (2006).  
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were studied via simulations with varying degrees of participants’ 
liquidity holdings. Both studies found that participants’ actual 
liquidity holdings had to be reduced significantly before settlement 
was severely affected by incidents at one of the large participants. In 
Bedford et al even with multiple simultaneous incidents at several 
participants the CHAPS system seemed to be quite robust as 
participants typically had ample liquidity holdings exceeding the 
system’s upper bound of liquidity requirement. 
  Schmitz et al
6 studied the effect of operational incidents in the 
Austrian ARTIS system, in which both stop-sending rules and 
contingency measures were included in the simulations. The 
contingency measures envisaged included both transfers by the 
participant hit by an incident (using other means than the normal 
procedures, eg paper-based payment orders) and debit authorisations 
which allowed other participants to draw money from the account of 
the participant hit by the incident. Schmitz et al found that stop-
sending improved the settlement more than contingency measures. 
  Lublóy and Tanai
7 analysed the resilience of the Hungarian 
payment system, VIBER, in much the same way as Schmitz et al 
(2006), by including both stop-sending rules and contingency 
measures in the simulations. In addition, they studied the effects of 
incidents which only caused disruptions for part of the system’s 
opening hours. 
  As part of their research, Lublóy and Tanai made a very interesting 
comparison of VIBER with a number of other central banks’ RTGS 
systems based on similar studies. This comparison shows interesting 
similarities and differences across payment systems in which two 
factors seem to dominate the resilience of payments systems against 
operational disruption: size of participants’ liquidity holdings and the 
concentration of payments turnover in the systems. 
 
 
                                          
6 See Schmitz et al (2006). 
7 See Lublóy and Tanai (2008).  
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2.3  Payment settlement in Kronos 
2.3.1 System  features 
Kronos is Danmarks Nationalbank’s payment system, which has been 
operating since 19 November 2001.
8 The key features of the system 
are: 
 
Real-time gross settlement (RTGS) 
The system’s real-time gross settlement mechanism enables 
immediate settlement of a payment after reception of the payment 
order, provided there are sufficient funds on the participant’s RTGS 
account. 
  The system is open between 7:00 and 15:30 for interbank 
transactions, monetary policy operations and liquidity transfers to 
other systems; cf. section 3.2. 
  Liquidity transfers to the VP Settlement and the Sumclearing in 
preparation of the night settlement in these systems are executed 
between 16:00 and 16:30. 
 
Transaction queue 
A payment is placed in the systems’ transaction queue at reception if 
funds on the participant’s RTGS account are insufficient for 
immediate settlement. The standard release mechanism in the 
transaction queue is FIFO. 
  To handle situations where the first payment in the queue blocks 
subsequent (smaller) payments, participants can opt for a bypass 
function which allows settlement of subsequent payments if they do 
not exceed the available funds. 
  In addition, participants can manually, via the Kronos terminal, 
change the order of payments in the queue and cancel queued 
payments. 
  Payment orders in the transaction queue that are not settled before 
the system closes at 15:30 are deleted. Settlement will then only take 
place if participants retransmit the payment orders in question. 
 
Gridlock resolution mechanism 
Settlement can be effected in certain cases by activating the system’s 
gridlock resolution mechanism. This mechanism can simultaneously 
                                          
8 See Angelius and Henneberg (2002).  
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release several participants’ payments which are mutually awaiting 
each other’s settlement, provided that no participants’ accounts would 
subsequently be overdrawn. The gridlock resolution mechanism 
allows for settlement of an optimal subset of queued payments without 
violating the priorities of queued payments. 
  Due to the abundance of participants’ settlement assets, it has so 
far not been necessary to resolve any gridlocks via this mechanism. 
 
Standing orders 
Participants can enter standing orders that are transferred daily from 
participants’ RTGS accounts to settlement accounts for ancillary 
systems at preset times that match the settlement blocks in the 
ancillary systems. 
 
Value date queue 
Participants can enter payments into the system’s value date queue for 
settlement up to 14 banking days later. On a payment’s value date, it 
is automatically transferred to the transaction queue for settlement 
right after Kronos opens at 7:00. 
 
 
2.3.2  Transaction types, settlement assets and participants 
Kronos is used for large, time-critical payments in Danish kroner 
between banking institutions etc. In addition, the system is used for 
monetary-policy transactions, liquidity transfers to three ancillary 
systems – VP Settlement (securities), Sumclearing (retail payments) 
and the international currency-settlement system CLS.
9 Further, the 
system is used for cross-border transfers of collateral through the 
Scandinavian Cash Pool.
10 
  Participants’ settlement assets consist of funds on the participants’ 
RTGS accounts in Danmarks Nationalbank and intraday credit 
provided by Danmarks Nationalbank against collateral. Intraday 
credits are applied as overdrafts on RTGS accounts. According to the 
terms and conditions for RTGS accounts, a participant is obliged to 
                                          
9 See Danmarks Nationalbank (2005). 
10 Scandinavian Cash Pool (SCP) is an automated system for pledging of cross-border 
collateral between Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The purpose of SCP is that liquidity 
raised in the central bank of one country can be pledged as collateral for intraday credit 
from the central bank of another country.  
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cover overdrafts so that there are positive funds on the RTGS account 
every banking day at 15:30.
11 
  Participants in Kronos (holders of RTGS accounts in Danmarks 
Nationalbank) are Danish credit institutions and investment 
companies, including branches of foreign entities. Besides these 
institutions other entities which are important for the settlement of 
payments in Danish kroner can be allowed to open a RTGS account 
and participate in Kronos, eg CLS Bank. At the end of 2007 the 
system had 120 participants. 
  A detailed description of the data used in the simulations can be 
found in Appendix B. 
 
Table 2.1  Payment flows in Kronos in 2007
12 
 
DKK billion  Total
Average per 
banking day Per cent 
Interbank transactions  ........................................................ 30,876 124 44 
Monetary policy operations  ...............................................    13,662  55  19 
Miscellaneous ...................................................................... 535 2 1 
Liquidity transfers to other systems   
- VP Settlement  ...................................................................    9,039  36  13 
- Sumclearing ....................................................................... 9,861 40 14 
- CLS Settlement  .................................................................. 3,460 14 5 
- Scandinavian Cash Pool  ....................................................    2,827  11  4 
Total   .....................................................................................   70,259  282  100 
Source: Madsen (2008) 
 
 
2.3.3  Frequency of operational incidents in Kronos 
The relevance of simulating the impact of operational disruptions in a 
payment system depends on the perception of the risk of such 
incidents; cf. appendix A. An obvious way to form one’s perception is 
to look at the actual occurrence of incidents in the system that has 
impacted the payment settlement process. 
 
                                          
11 See Danmarks Nationalbank (2005). 
12 All values in this chapter are expressed in Danish kroner (DKK). In January 2008 the 
DKK/USD and DKK/EUR average exchange rates were 506.24 and 745.05 (100 units) 
respectively.  
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Figure 2.1  Incidents in Kronos (system level), 
     2005–2007 
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In the years 2005–2007, Kronos experienced 29 incidents, or 
approximately 10 incidents per year. It should be noted that some 
minor incidents lasting a few minutes were not included in the 
statistics. 
  The average duration of the incidents recorded was around 45 
minutes, with a notable peak in the second half of 2006. Excluding the 
incidents in the second half of 2006, the average duration of the  
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remaining incidents was less than 30 minutes. Of the 5 incidents 
lasting more than 60 minutes in 2006–2007, 4 occurred in the second 
half of 2006. The root cause of the incidents in 2006 was problems 
with the IT supplier’s connection to SWIFT; cf. appendix C. 
  The incidents occurred most often before noon. This happens to be 
the busiest time during Kronos’ opening hours. Especially between 
8:00 and 10:00, participants send many payment orders to the system 
for settlement (see Figure B.1). 
  Appendix C contains a description of two major incidents in recent 
years that in particular disrupted the settlement of payments in 
Kronos. The main impact of these two long lasting incidents was on 
the Danish money market. To normalise the market, Danmarks 
Nationalbank in both cases had to give participants extraordinary 
access to liquidity. 
 
 
2.4  Simulation of incidents in Kronos – 
System level 
Incidents at system level prevent settlement of payments completely if 
the system operator cannot provide participants with contingency 
measures and the participants are unable to settle payments by other 
means, eg in the correspondent banking network. Due to the size of 
payments settlement in central bank-owned RTGS systems like 
Kronos, the correspondent banking network has some disadvantages, 
as settlement then will take place in commercial bank money which, 
among other things, usually means higher settlement risk compared 
with settlement in central bank money.
13 For many participants, 
central bank provision of settlement has the additional advantage that 
settlement then does not take place at a competitor, ie settlement takes 
place on neutral ground. RTGS systems like Kronos are therefore 
obliged to implement effective contingency measures that can ensure 
quick resumption of settlement if the main system cannot operate. 
  The question then becomes how to decide what requirements 
effective contingency measures in payment systems should fulfil so as 
to ensure that incidents do not cause unnecessary operational and 
financial costs for participants and the central bank. 
                                          
13 See Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003).  
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  To start, we look at incidents that stop normal settlement in 
Kronos for a whole day, and then we move on to how incidents of 
shorter duration affect the settlement process. 
 
 
2.4.1  Effect of contingency measures on whole-day 
incidents 
The purpose of contingency measures is to limit risks and overall 
costs associated with operational incidents; cf. appendix A. Thus the 
scale of contingency measures the system operator relies on when the 
system is not operating normally depends not only on the number of 
payments settled on a daily basis but also on the size distribution of 
the transactions. 
 
Figure 2.2  Value of contingency payments, 




Figure 2.2 shows the capacity of potential contingency measure levels 
consisting of payments related to the CLS settlement (always very 
time-critical!) and a number of the largest payments in case of 
operational incidents.
14 On all days the settlement of CLS pay-ins/pay-
outs and the 50 largest transactions would ensure settlement of 50 per 
cent or more of the value participants planned to settle that day. If the 
                                          
14 CLS and the 200 largest transactions amounted in January 2008 to approx. 10 per cent 
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contingency measures were expanded so that the operator could 
handle the 200 largest transactions, in addition to the CLS 
transactions, the measures would cover 84–91 per cent of the value 
participants planned to settle. 
  The remaining payments not settled due to a whole-day incident 
would not have, on any single day, exceeded DKK 27 billion (13 per 
cent of the value settled that day in Kronos). Although this is a 
substantial amount, one should bear in mind that commercial banks in 
Denmark had DKK 1.046 billion of liquid assets at end-2007.
15 
Consequently, the banking system in general has ample holdings of 
liquidity to cover unanticipated stops in the incoming liquidity flows. 
In other words, payments not settled due to a whole-day incident 
would, with the most ambitious contingency measures we examined, 
amount to less than 3 per cent of the participants’ liquid assets. 
 
Figure 2.3  Payments settled compared with 
      participants’ settlement assets and liquidity 










2.1.2008 9.1.2008 16.1.2008 23.1.2008 30.1.2008
qy q y
Minimum liquidity requirement Maximum liquidity requirement
Settlement Assets Payments settled
DKK billion
 
Note: Participants’ overall daily minimum liquidity requirement equals the system’s 
‘lower bound’ (amount of liquidity that participants need to settle all payments at the end 
of the day; calculated by using a multilateral netting algorithm). Participants’ overall 
daily maximum liquidity requirement is equal to the system’s ‘upper bound’ (amount of 
liquidity that participants need to settle all payments without delay; calculated as the 
maximum negative difference between incoming and outgoing payments for each 
participant during Kronos’ opening hours aggregated over all participants). 
 
                                          
15 See Finanstilsynet (2008).  
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When setting the requirement for contingency measures, the system 
operator should look not only at how these perform in relation to the 
total value of payments settled in the system but also at how these 
mitigate the impact of incidents on participants’ holdings of settlement 
assets and liquidity requirements. On average, the participants’ 
holdings of settlement assets were nearly 2 times larger than the 
average daily values settled (DKK 286 and 152 billion, respectively). 
As a consequence, the participants have a substantial capacity to 
withstand delays in incoming payments, but only on an intraday basis, 
as the settlement assets in January 2008 consisted of 98 per cent of 
intraday credits granted against collateralised securities and only 2 per 
cent of funds in RTGS accounts (see table B.1). Participants’ daily 
minimum liquidity requirements were on average DKK 13 billion 
(varying between 59 billion and 4 billion) while their daily maximum 
liquidity requirements on average amounted to DKK 44 billion 
(varying between 73 and 21 billion). With regard to the minimum 
liquidity requirement, it should be noted that four of the five peaks in 
figure 3 occurred on Fridays on which Danmarks Nationalbank 
conducted weekly market operations. The first and highest peak (in 
the figure) occurred on 2 January when the activity in Kronos was 
affected by a large refinancing of adjustable-rate mortgages bonds, 
instalments on housing loans and tax payments. 
  The contingency measures we examined covered on average 75 
per cent of participants’ liquidity requirements (see figure 4.a). The 
capacity of contingency measures to fund participants’ liquidity 
requirements was especially good on days when the participants had 
large liquidity requirements, eg on 2 January 2008.
16 
  A closer look at the effect of contingency measures in figure 4.b, 
however, reveals that low levels of contingency measures in some 
cases increase, rather than reduce, the participants’ liquidity 
requirements. In the worst case, settling CLS pay-ins/CLS pay-outs 
and the 50 largest transactions in contingency mode more than 
doubled the participants’ liquidity requirements. Further, on one day 
settlement of CLS payments plus the 200 largest payments would only 
cover 27 per cent of the minimum liquidity requirements needed for 
settling all planned payments. However, this effect only occurred on 
 
                                          
16 The net liquidity participants receive via payment settlement in Kronos is typically 
used for payment obligations in ancillary systems or invested in the money market 
(including certificates of deposit issued by Danmarks Nationalbank). Consequently, 
participants’ funds in RTGS accounts when Kronos closes at 15:30 are quite stable over 
time despite the large intraday fluctuations.  
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Figure 2.4  Daily minimum liquidity requirement left 
      unfunded in case of whole-day incident 
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Figure 4.a: Daily minimum liquidity requirement left





Figure 4.b: Share of daily minimum liquidity requirement left
unfunded in case of whole-day incident in Kronos
 
Note: The minimum liquidity requirement left unfunded in case of whole-day incident in 
Kronos equals the minimum liquidity requirement (lower bound) for payments not settled 
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days when participants’ minimum liquidity requirements were modest 





2.4.2  Incidents of shorter duration 
We also studied the effects of three types of incidents disrupting all 
settlement in Kronos for less than one day. First, we analysed to what 
extent payments would be delayed if the system could not operate in 
the busiest two hours and four hours on each banking day in January 
2008; these ‘rush hours’ in Kronos typically occur before noon, the 
busiest 2 hours being in the time frame 8:00–11:00 and busiest 4 hours 
in 7:00–12:00. Second, we analysed the impact of an incident that 
halted settlement at noon and where resumption of normal settlement 
could not occur before Kronos’ closing time at 15:30. 
 
Figure 2.5  Settlement turnover during busiest opening 
      hours and end-of-day, per cent of total 




Incidents that halt settlement in the busiest two hours would affect on 
average 60 per cent of the day’s transactions. On the day with 
                                          
17 According to statistics compiled by Danmarks Nationalbank’s Market Operations 
Department, daily turnover in the Danish short-term money market was DKK 51 billion 
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maximum impact of a 2 hour disruption, transactions of DKK 137 
billion would be affected, ie 68 per cent of settled value. Similarly, 
incidents that halt settlement in the busiest 4 hours would affect on 
average 82 per cent of the day’s transactions. On the day with the 
maximum impact of a 4 hour disruption, transactions of DKK 179 
would be affected, ie 86 per cent of settled value. 
  The presence of highly urgent payments, eg CLS pay-ins/pay-outs, 
implies that contingency measures have to be in place to ensure quick 
settlement of a number of transactions. However, assuming that 
normal settlement resumes several hours before Kronos’ closing time, 
it seems that a 4 hour disruption of settlement will not be excessively 
harmful. This is due to the fact that the system, when functioning 
normally, has the capacity to process and settle all transactions, even 
on the busiest day, within 1 hour. This was confirmed by the incident 
on 16 November 2006 described in appendix C. It is also Danmarks 
Nationalbank’s impression from this and other incidents that the 
number of highly urgent payments is relatively modest. 
  Participants’ decision to forward payment orders to Danmarks 
Nationalbank when Kronos is not operating normally also depend on 
the costs associated with contingency measures. Based on 
participants’ behaviour when the system was not operating normally 
due to incidents, it is clear that they are reluctant to (manually) 
remove payment orders from systems that automatically send payment 
orders to Kronos for execution and send the payment orders to 
Danmarks Nationalbank by fax (also manually). The participants’ 
automated systems typically generate payment orders that include 
information to enable automatic handling of payment orders when 
received by other participants. An essential prerequisite for this 
‘Straight-through-processing’ of transactions in Kronos is that the vast 
majority of payment orders are based on standard SWIFT messages 
(MT103 and MT202).
18,19 
  As regards incidents starting at noon and lasting the rest of the day, 
8 per cent of the transactions value would have been affected on 
average. On the day with the maximum impact of an end-of-day 
incident, transactions of DKK 35 billion would have been affected, ie 
16 per cent of total value settled on the day in question. 
                                          
18 See Danmarks Nationalbank (2005). 
19 One should bear in mind that these cost considerations do not include interest costs if 
1) the participants’ settlement assets at Danmarks Nationalbank are not exhausted and 2) 
normal operations are assumed to resume before end-of-day, as there is no interest charge 
on intraday credits provided by Danmarks Nationalbank.  
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  Based on these facts, when considering the settlement activity in 
Kronos, it does not seem crucial that full-scale contingency measures 
are in place soon after an incident halts settlement. A time-frame of 4 
hours for resuming full-scale contingency measures (normal-like 
operations) seems sufficient for Kronos, as manual settlement of less 
than 250 transactions while the system is not operating normally 
would account for around 80–90 per cent of any day’s total payments 
value (see figure 2.2). 
  Participants’ emphasis on maintaining the straight-through 
processing of payment orders as described above favours a quicker 
resumption of normal settlement than 4 hours. However, it can be 
difficult to justify investments in systems that can guarantee quick 
resumption of normal settlement, say within 2 hours, to save the costs 
associated with the settlement of up to 250 payments a few times 
during the system’s lifetime. 
  In any case, it is crucial that manual-based contingency measures 
are applied as quickly as possible because of the presence of a number 
of urgent time-critical payments every day, eg payments to and from 
CLS Bank that cannot wait for start-up of full-scale contingency 
measures or resumption of normal operations. 
 
 
2.5  Simulation of incidents in Kronos – 
Participant level 
After having studied the impact of operational incidents on system 
level we now turn to incidents at participant level. In a historical 
perspective the root causes of many operational disruptions in 
payment systems lie with the participants, eg the terrorist attack on the 
World Trade Center on 11 September 2001.
20 
  For quantifying how operational incidents at participants affect the 
settlement in Kronos we selected 10 of the most active participants in 
the system in terms of turnover and number of connections to other 
participants. All of these participants are active in the Danish money 
market. Four of the participants for which we simulated incidents are 
also liquidity providers in Danish kroner in the CLS settlement of FX 
contracts, of which 3 belong to foreign banking groups. 
  In this section we restrict the simulations to operational incidents 
lasting a whole day. In the simulations we study the effect of two 
                                          
20 See McAndrews and Potter (2002).  
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types of reactions to mitigate the impact of a large participant unable 
to send payment orders for settlement in Kronos due to an operational 
incident: 1) settlement of out-going payments for the affected 
participant via manual-based contingency measures and 2) the other 
participants securing their holdings of settlement assets by stopping 
the sending of payments to the affected participant. 
  In interpreting the simulation results below one should bear in 
mind that we do not take account of more complex patterns of 
reactions that take place outside the payment system, eg other 
participants choosing not to enter into financial transactions involving 
settlement of payments in Kronos vis-à-vis the affected participant on 
that particular day. 
 
 
2.5.1 Critical  participants 
Settlement in Kronos is dominated by a few participants that are 
clearly critical for the smooth functioning of the system, as shown in 
table 2.2. However, besides the share of turnover, the impact of an 
incident is of course also highly dependent on the other participant’s 
holdings of settlement assets.
21 
  Moreover, incidents at participants with direct links to CLS 
typically have the greatest impacts of all in the simulations, not only 
because of their share of turnover, but also because CLS by nature 
only posses the funds it receives during a CLS settlement cycle and 
never pays out from its account in such a way that it would go into 
deficit. This is illustrated by Bank 4, which on one day in January 
2008 would have had an exceptionally large impact on the system 
compared with its share of the turnover. Because a large pay-in from 
Bank 4 to CLS was not settled, the simulated incident created a larger 
second order impact than Bank 2 had on any day when removal of its 
transactions was simulated. 
 
                                          
21 See Bedford et al (2004).  
38 
Table 2.2  Worst case impact on total settlement in 
      case of whole-day incidents at selected 
     participants 
 





















Bank 1  207.1  72.8  13.7  86.5  120.6  58% 
Bank 2  202.4  62.7  7.5  70.2  132.1  65% 
Bank 3  207.1  16.7  3.8  20.5  186.6  90% 
Bank 4  158.0  21.0  8.0  29.0  129.0  82% 
Bank 5  197.0  12.7  0.1  12.8  184.3  94% 
Bank 6  164.9  12.2  0.3  12.5  152.4  92% 
Bank 7  213.5  3.8  2.3  6.1  207.3  97% 
Bank 8  153.3  2.0  2.8  4.8  148.6  97% 
Bank 9  147.5  1.2  -  1.2  146.3  99% 
Bank 10  213.5  17.5  0.7  18.2  195.3  91% 
Note: Direct impact is the value of payments not sent by participant affected by an 
incident; second order impact equals payments not settled for other banks due to 
insufficient funds on their RTGS accounts. 
 
 
The impact on other participants’ available funds on RTGS accounts 
at Danmarks Nationalbank for whole-day incidents at selected 
participants are shown in figure 2.6. The figure clearly illustrates that 
many of the affected participants still had a substantial cushion for 
meeting their payment obligations despite the fact that incidents in 
worst cases halted more than 40 per cent of the payments flow in the 
system. Of course, the existence of second order impacts means that a 
number of participants saw their holdings of settlement assets 
exhausted. (In all simulations we assumed that participants opted for 
the bypass function in the transaction queue). 
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Figure 2.6  Impact on RTGS account end-of-day 
      balances of whole-day (worst case) incident 











Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6 Bank 7 Bank 8 Bank 9 Bank 10
Affected participants' RTGS accounts, end of day (when normal settlement)
Affected participants' current accounts, end of day (if incident)
Affected participants' intraday credit limit
DKK billion
 
Note: The worst case incident for a participant is defined as the day when the participant 
created the largest decrease in RTGS account balances for the other participants 
compared with normal settlement. 
 
 
As regards participants’ liquidity requirements, almost all simulations 
showed that incidents at one of the two largest participants would 
leave the remaining participants with a substantial increase in their 
minimum liquidity requirement (see figure 2.7). On two days, an 
incident at Bank 1 or Bank 2 would even have entailed a larger 
minimum liquidity requirement for the remaining banks than on 2 
January, which was the day in 2008 with by far the largest minimum 
liquidity requirement in Kronos (see figure 2.3). 
  For comparison, the average daily turnover in the Danish short-
term money market is shown in figure 2.7, too. This reveals that 
incidents at the two largest participants are highly likely to cause 
extreme stress in the Danish money market. But incidents at 5 other 
participants seem to be capable of causing some stress in the money 
market in the absence of contingency measures or stop-sending rules. 
In interpreting figure 2.7 one should keep in mind that all participants 
depicted are active in the Danish money market. Incidents at one of 
these participants would therefore not only increase other participants’ 
liquidity requirements but would also remove a player from an already 
fairly concentrated market. 
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Figure 2.7  Increase in minimum liquidity requirement 
      due to whole-day (worst case) incident 










Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6 Bank 7 Bank 8 Bank 9 Bank 10 Short-
term 
money 
market Increase in minimum liquidity requirement (due to incident)





Note: The minimum liquidity requirement in case of an incident is the system’s lower 
bound excluding transactions to and from the selected participant. The worst case incident 
for a participant is defined as the day on which the participant creates the largest increase 
in the minimum liquidity requirement for the other participants. 
 
 
Assuming no contingency measures or stop sending-rules, there would 
be perhaps 7–8 candidates for critical participants in Kronos. Two 
participants, Bank 1 and Bank 2 (each accounting for over 20 per cent 
of system turnover), are each clearly critical, as they severely disrupt 
the settlement, in terms of the impact on total settlement, balances in 
RTGS accounts and minimum liquidity requirements. Looking at the 
worst case incidents, it seems reasonable to classify also Banks 3–6 
and Bank 10 (with 3–6 per cent of turnover) as critical participants, 
both in terms of total impact on settlement and on how they can affect 
other participants’ liquidity requirements if they cannot send payments 
to Kronos. When it comes to banks 7–8 (with 1½–2 per cent of 
turnover) it is surprising that an operational incident lasting a whole 
day in worst cases would entail second order impacts that are of the 
same magnitude as the direct impacts (see table 2.2). This is explained 
by the fact that these two banks have relatively larger payment flows 
with the smaller participants in the system that on average have less 




2.5.2  Effect of contingency measures 
As already shown for incidents at system level, even rather modest 
contingency measures can notably reduce the impacts of incidents. As 
regards an incident hitting a participant, we simulated contingency 
measures including all CLS payments and the 25–75 largest payments. 
These constitute about a half of the number of payments in the 
previous section. (We assume that when Kronos technically functions 
normally, albeit with much lower activity, the system operator staff 
has to operate the settlement system as usual and, in addition, put 
resources into a contingency plan.) 
 
Figure 2.8  Effect of contingency measures on total 
      settlement (worst case incident) 
 
 
Note: Direct and second order impact is calculated as in table 2.2 by including settlement 




Contingency measures’ effect on total settlement when the largest 
participant is hit by an whole-day incident are depicted in figure 2.8. 
Settlement of CLS and the 25 largest transactions for the largest 
participant would have significantly dampened the effect of the worst 
case incident, as the impact would have been reduced with nearly 75 












No incident Incident, no 
contingency plan
CLS CLS + 25 CLS + 50 CLS + 75
Number of contingency payments settled for participant hit by incident (CLS + 
largest)





22 This is also the case when looking on how contingency 
measures mitigate the impact on a) the balances of the other 
participants’ RTGS accounts in figure 2.9 and b) the increase in their 
minimum liquidity requirements in figure 2.10. 
  On the basis of the simulations, it seems sufficient that the 
operator of Kronos can settle 50–75 payments in addition to all CLS 
pay-ins in contingency mode for a large participant unable to send 
payment orders to the system, as this will substantially reduce the 
impact of an incident. 
 
Figure 2.9  Contingency measures effect on other 
      participants’ RTGS account end-of-day 
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Note: Effect of contingency measures on other participants’ RTGS accounts are 




                                          
22 It should be noted that in some simulations settlement of CLS transactions in 
contingency mode miti-gate the impact of the incident more than is the case in figure 2.8. 
Overall, however, settlement in contingency mode of the 25 largest transactions mitigated 
the impact of incidents on Kronos much more than settlement of the participants’ CLS 
transactions.  
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Figure 2.10  Effect of contingency measures on 
     minimum  liquidity  requirement 










None CLS CLS + 25 CLS + 50 CLS +75 Short-term money 
market
Number of contingency payments settled for participant hit by incident (CLS + 
largest)
Average daily turnover
Minimum liquidity requirement (when normal settlement)




Note: Minimum liquidity requirement is calculated as the system’s lower bound 
excluding transactions to and from the participant hit by incident, except for transactions 
settled in contingency mode. 
 
 
2.5.3  Effect of stop-sending rules 
Another way to secure settlement in an RTGS system when a 
participant is hit by an incident is to activate a stop-sending rule which 
ensures that the participant in question does not drain the liquidity of 
other participants and thereby the system as a whole. Stop-sending is 
normally activated by the participant hit by the incident, either by 
sending a message to the other participants or to the system operator. 
The system operator can then decide or be obliged to temporarily 
close the account of the participant in question. 
  For the time being, the rules for participating in Kronos do not 
include a formal rule for stop-sending in the case of an operational 
disruption at one of the participants. 
  Stop-sending and contingency measures affect settlement quite 
differently. Whereas the objective of contingency measures discussed 
above is to keep settlement in the system as close to the original 
payment schedules as possible, including payments to and from the 
participant hit by an incident, stop-sending aims at excluding 
altogether this participant from the settlement. This is shown in figure 
2.11 where the number if payments settled is the smaller, the sooner  
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(more effectively) the stop-sending is activated. The same effect is 
seen in figure 2.12 where the depletion of funds on other participants’ 
RTGS accounts is the less, the faster they react and stop sending 
payments to the participant hit by the incident. 
  The advantage of stop-sending as compared to contingency 
measures is that it is easy to apply and manage for the system 
operator. 
  But if the operational disruption should last for a longer time, stop-
sending loses its advantage and the participant in question must 
somehow be involved in the settlement again. If this happens too late 
in the day, the backlog of deferred payments can be so large that it 
complicates the clearing up after the incident. 
  With this in mind, it seems that stop-sending, for the sake of 
business continuity, should only be applied for a shorter period, after 
which the participant hit by the incident and the system operator 
should switch to contingency measures of some kind, as envisaged in 
the simulations above. 
 
Figure 2.11  Effect of stop-sending reaction times on 
      total settlement (worst case incident) 
 
 
Note: Direct and second order impacts are calculated as in table 2.2 by taking account of 
the fact that other participants stop sending payments to the participant hit by an incident 













No incident No reaction 120 min 60 min 30min
Payments settled Direct impact Payments stopped 2nd order impact   
45 
Figure 2.12  Effect of stop-sending reaction times on 
      other participants’ RTGS accounts 

























































Note: Balances on other participants’ RTGS accounts are calculated as in figure 2.6 by 
taking account of the fact that they stop sending payments to the participant hit by an 




Simulations of operational disruptions in the settlement of payments 
in Danmarks Nationalbank’s RTGS system, Kronos, give us important 
insight into how to apply international best practice for business 
continuity arrangements. 
  The existence of a number of very urgent payment transactions on 
almost every banking day – eg CLS pay-ins and pay-outs – implies 
that Danmarks Nationalbank and critical participants should be able to 
switch to settlement via contingency measures very quickly. A switch 
to large-scale contingency measures that enables normal-like 
settlement, however, need only be completed within 4 hours to ensure 
that the backlog of payments does not become excessively large and 
pose a threat to the orderly ending of operations in Kronos within 
normal opening hours. 
  In case of an incident either at system level or at a large 
participant, settlement of all CLS transactions and the 50 largest 
transactions would amount to a substantial share of daily settled 
values. But this level of contingency measures would, in the case of an 
incident at system level, not be sufficient, as it sometimes increases,  
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rather than reduces, the liquidity requirements participants would not 
get funded via payment settlement in Kronos.  
  If the capacity for settlement in contingency mode is expanded by 
an additional 150 large transactions, 84–91 per cent of payments 
turnover value would be settled. In this case, the negative impact of 
operational disruptions on participants’ available funds in RTGS 
accounts and their ability to fund liquidity requirements would also be 
reduced to a level that seems manageable compared with the size of 
the Danish short-term money market. Therefore, settlement of all CLS 
transactions and the 200 largest transactions seems sufficient to 
minimise the risk of operational disruptions in Kronos which can 
jeopardise the stability of Denmark’s financial system. 
  The two largest participants in Kronos are clearly critical 
participants, as they would inevitably have a huge impact on the 
settlement if they are not able to send payment orders to the system. A 
number of other participants with 3–6 per cent shares of payments 
turnover would on some days, if disconnected from the system, also 
have a significant impact on the payment flows. Consequently, they 
too should be classified as critical for the smooth functioning of the 
system. Further, two participants each with 1½–2 per cent share of 
turnover might need to be classified as critical, not because of the total 
impact if they are disconnected from the system, but because their 
position in the payment network surrounding Kronos gives rise to a 
larger second order impact than many of the larger participants. The 
large second order impacts of incidents at these two participants must 
be explained by the fact that they are more interconnected with other 
participants that have small holdings of settlement assets relative to 
their payments turnover compared with some of the other participants 
for which we simulated incidents at participant level. 
  As regards stop-sending rules, the simulations show that they can 
be quite effective for ensuring that a participant hit by an operational 
incident does not drain the system’s liquidity. However, stop-sending 
rules cannot stand alone and should always be supplemented by 
contingency measures that are activated if the participant is not able to 
resume operations before Kronos closes down at the end of day. 
  Before one can conclude as to quantitative requirements for the 
business continuity arrangements in relation to Kronos, further 
simulations would be needed. These simulations should in particular 
look on incidents lasting more than one day, eg 3–5 banking days. In 
addition, our research would benefit from stress testing Kronos’ 
robustness by reducing the amount of settlement assets available at the 
participants and by simulating incidents affecting several large 
participants. Eg, the relatively modest second order impacts shown in  
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section 2.5.1 can be largely explained by the fact that the participants’ 
settlement assets in January 2008 amounted to almost twice the 
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Definition, measurement and management of operational risk in 
payment systems 
 
Among the most important risk factors in payment systems are the 
operational risk factors. When one assesses operational risk in 
payment systems the methods and tools applied are often qualitative. 
Quantitative methods can, however, provide figures on certain 
dimensions of the operational risks of payment systems, which can be 
valuable inputs for system owners and overseers in the overall risk 
assessment. 
  Operational risks can be defined as the risks of economic loss 
resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes and systems, 
human errors, or from external events such as natural disasters, 
terrorism, etc.
23 
  Economic losses due to operational incidents can take various 
forms depending on how the incidents affect the system and its 
participants: 
 
•  When an operational incident in a payment system results in loss 
of hardware or software, these will typically take the form of 
repair and investment costs of reconstructing or improving the part 
of the system hit by the incident. Repairs and investments may be 
required both in the system itself and at participants. 
•  Incidents can cause further costs at participants when they a) try to 
settle payments by other, less-efficient means, ie manual-based 
contingency measures; b) cancel or do not enter into profitable 
financial transactions because the payments associated with the 
transactions cannot be settled; or c) are liable for penalties as 
payments are not settled according to contractual obligations. 
•  In addition, incidents can due to delays and cancellations of 
payments result in unexpected credit and liquidity exposures at 
participants, which, depending on the circumstances in the 
financial markets, can lead to losses. This could be the case if 
participants encounter liquidity shortages and have to obtain 
liquidity from other sources on short notice, which can entail 
increased funding costs. Worst-case incidents may generate credit 
costs if one of the participants defaults while it has out-going 
payments in queue for settlement. 
                                          
23 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003).  
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•  Finally, incidents can lower the demand for a payment system’s 
services and thereby undermine the system’s business case. This 
may happen if incidents develop into a reputational risk. 
 
Inspired by methodologies applied when quantifying credit risk and 
market risk, eg Value-at-Risk, operational risk can be assessed as a 
function of the probability of incidents occurring and the impact of the 
incidents when they occur.
24 The impact of an incident could be one or 
more of the types of the economic losses mentioned above. 
  A key element in Core Principles 7 is that measures should be 
implemented and maintained with the aim of minimizing the 
operational risk in payment systems. Without taking account of these 
measures the result of the assessment would be the gross operational 
risk; where including the measures the assessment leads to the net 
operational risk, often termed the residual risk.
25 
  Due to the complexity of the design of payment systems and the 
large number of threats to the security and operational reliability of 
the systems, a wide variety of measures have to be implemented. The 
purpose of these measures should be to reduce the probability of 
incidents as well as the impact of realised incidents. Reduction of 
operational risk can take the form of either measures that make the 
system less prone to disruptions or contingency measures that can be 
switched to if an incident in any way disrupts settlement in the main 
system. 
  The impact of an incident will depend on where the incident 
happens. An incident hitting the core system and thereby disrupting all 
settlement will of course have a greater impact than if the incident 
only hits one participant. Ie, the size of the initial incident also matters 
in assessing the operational risk caused by the incident. However, as 
already noted, settlements in most payment systems are dominated by 
a few critical participants. This explains why oversight of payment 
systems in recent years has expanded and now also encompasses the 
critical participants of the systems. 
  Timing and duration of incidents also matters in assessing the 
operational risk in payment systems, as payment settlement typically 
fluctuates during the systems’ opening hours. 
 
                                          
24 See Jorion (2000). 
25 See Danmarks Nationalbank (2004).  
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Appendix B 
Data used in simulations 
 
Simulations were based on payment transactions in Kronos settled 
during 22 banking days in January 2008 (see table 2.1). The data sets 
used in the simulations consist of: 
 
•  Time-critical payments (RTGS transactions) between participants 
during Kronos’ opening hours (7:00–15:30). 
•  CLS pay-ins and pay-outs. 
•  Funds on participants’ RTGS accounts at start-of-day. 
•  Intraday credit limits granted to participants based on value of 
assets in securities accounts in VP Securities Services, the Danish 
central securities depository, and pledged to Danmarks 
Nationalbank. 
 
Table B.1  Overview of Payment transactions 
      in Kronos, January 2008 
 
 Volume DKK  billion 
Total turnover  63.467  3.348 
– of which CLS pay-ins and pay-outs  2.144  391 
Daily turnover     
– Average  2.885  152 
– Minimum  2.605  64 
– Maximum  3.905  213 
Settlement assets (average start-of-day)    286 
– of which balances on RTGS accounts    6 
– of which intraday credit limits    280 
Participants (active in January 2008)  117   
 
 
In table B.1 it should be noted that participants’ average holdings of 
settlement assets exceeded the payment turnover on every day in 
January 2008. This has of course a stabilising effect on the simulation 
results. 
  As in many other RTGS payment systems operated by central 
banks in small European countries, the network topology of Kronos 
shows a pronounced concentration on participants active in FX 
settlement and the money market (see table B.2). 86 per cent of 
payments in Kronos involve one of the CLS liquidity providers while  
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Table B.2  Network topology of Kronos, 
      January 2008 (simplified) 
 
Share of turnover in per cent Receiving  participants   
Sending participants  CLS  CLS-LP  MM-P  Other  All 
CLS   6      6 
5 CLS liquidity providers (CLS-LP)  6  48  10  3  67 
8 money market participants (MM-P)    10  2  5  17 
103 other participants    3  5  2  10 
All participants    68  17  10  100 
 
 
We excluded payments related to Danish ancillary systems, as 
virtually all of these are settled at night and hence seldom significantly 
alter participants’ liquidity positions (funds available for payment 
transactions) during Kronos’ normal opening hours. Participants’ 
RTGS transactions in Kronos are of course closely related to the net 
payments settled in the ancillary systems during the night as part of 
participants’ over-all liquidity management. 
  Similarly, monetary-policy operations were excluded, since these 
fully collateralised operations do not alter participants’ holdings of 
available settlement assets. Assets eligible for loans in Danmarks 
Nationalbank and certificates of deposit issued by Danmarks 
Nationalbank are also eligible for obtaining intraday-credit. 
Consequently, monetary-policy operations merely move funds 
between participants’ RTGS accounts and their holdings of monetary-
policy instruments but leave their aggregate position at Danmarks 
Nationalbank unchanged. 
  Finally, the value of assets in the collateral accounts that 
participants use for obtaining intraday-credit were fixed at the start of 
each day. They are revaluated daily with effect from the time when 
Kronos opens at 7:00 a.m. Changes in collateral value due to transfers 
to and from the accounts were very limited in January 2008 during 
Kronos’ opening hours. 
  The timing of payment settlements in the system is fairly stable, as 
illustrated in figure B.1. With a few exceptions, more than 90 per cent 
of all payments were settled before noon in 2007. In the last hour of 
Kronos’ opening hours, system activity was very limited. 
                                          
26 More information on the network topology of Kronos can be found in Rørdam and 
Bech (2008).  
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Figure B.1  Time profile of interbank payments in 




Note: Figure shows accumulated share of daily settlement at specified times during 
Kronos’ opening hours. 
 
 
The data set satisfied the needs of our simulations. It shall be noted, 
however, that the exclusion of payments related to Danish ancillary 
systems prevented us from simulating incidents lasting more than one 
day (because net payments in the night settlement of the ancillary 
systems often cause a significant redistribution of liquidity between 
participants). This restriction should be removed in future research, as 
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Appendix C 
System incident in Kronos 16 November 2006 
 
The settlement of payments in Kronos was particularly disrupted by 
several system incidents in the second half of 2006 due to problems 
with the IT supplier's connection to SWIFT.
27 Most failures were of 
short duration and did not require special measures, but in order to 
prevent problems with CLS settlement, Danmarks Nationalbank in 
three cases had to initiate contingency procedures with respect to 
manual transmission of funds between participants. In connection with 
the most serious incident, on 16 November, which lasted 6½ hours, 
DKK 12 billion was transmitted between participants in order to 
ensure timely settlement of foreign-exchange contracts with a total 
principal of DKK 148 billion. 
 
Figure C.1  Time profile of interbank payments settled 
      in Kronos on 16 November 2006 
 
Note: Figure shows accumulated share of daily settlement at specified times during 
Kronos’ opening hours. 
 
 
The disruption of payment settlement caused by the incident on 16 
November 2006 was so severe that it had an impact on the Danish 
money market. Consequently, Danmarks Nationalbank extended its 
opening hours and gave access to extraordinary buy-back of 
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certificates of deposit. Soon thereafter, conditions in the money 
market normalised. 
  In the end, the impact of the incident was more or less limited to a 
delay in the settlement of payments, as shown in figure C.1. The 
figure also shows that when Kronos was operating again, from around 
13:40 in the afternoon, the backlog of payments then released from the 
participants was quickly settled with almost 70 per cent of that day’s 
transactions settled within 20 minutes. 
  As a consequence of the incidents in the second half of 2006, a 
project was launched to improve the IT provider's SWIFT 
environment. 
 
Incident at a large participant, March 2003 
 
One of the largest participants in Kronos was hit by an incident in its 
IT systems in the afternoon on Monday 10 March 2003. The 
participant was subsequently unable to participate normally in 
payment systems in Denmark and abroad for several days. 
  In relation to Kronos, the incident severely impacted the 
participant’s capacity to send payments to other participants on 
Tuesday and Wednesday 12–13 March (see figure C.2). However, the 
contingency measures put in place ensured that the participant was 
able to send a number of large payments, so that the bank’s payments 
activity in terms of value was comparable with other banking days in 
March 2003. 
  On the days after normal operations were resumed, the participant 
hit by the incident had to send an extraordinarily large number of 
payments to other participants. Cleaning up after the incident entailed 
payments sent from the participant on Friday 14 March that, in terms 
of value, amounted to 60 per cent more than the participant’s average 
payments activity in Kronos in March 2003. Cleaning up was not 
completed before the following week and an extraordinary large 
number of payment orders were sent on 17 and 19 March 2003. 
  The incident had some impact on other participants, which 
experienced a slight decrease in their liquidity positions. This did not, 
however, significantly affect their behaviour in relation to payments in 
Kronos. Danmarks Nationalbank only had to provide a limited amount 
of extra liquidity to other participants because of the incident. 
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Figure C.2  Settlement of payment orders from large 
      participant affected by incident in second 
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3  Liquidity effects of a participant-
level operational disruption in the 
Swiss Interbank Clearing System 
Abstract 
This paper shows that in an adverse scenario an operational disruption 
of a major participant in the Swiss large-value payment system, Swiss 
Interbank Clearing (SIC), can lead to significant systemic liquidity 
effects. Our analysis is based on simulation methods employing the 
BoF-PSS2 simulator developed by the Bank of Finland. We simulate 
an operational disturbance which prevents a major participant from 
inputting payments into the system. Due to a suspension of the 
participant’s outgoing payments, liquidity can accumulate on its 
account and cause liquidity shortages for other participants and disrupt 
settlement of their payments. Our simulations show that under certain 
assumptions, the daily average systemic effect in SIC corresponds to 
36 billion Swiss francs – or 22% of total payment value. However, the 
effect in terms of number of payments is much smaller. Subsequently, 
we examine the determining factors of the systemic liquidity effect 
such as participants’ input behaviour and system liquidity levels. Our 
work highlights the importance of measures aimed at preventing 





Safe and efficient payment and securities settlement systems are a key 
prerequisite for the smooth functioning of an economy and an integral 
component of a stable financial system. One of the features of real-
time gross settlement (RTGS) systems is that participants’ liquidity 
management relies on the constant recycling of liquidity from 
incoming payments. This enables participants to effect payments with 
liquidity levels equivalent to only a small fraction of the total values 
settled. However, operational disruption of a participant during the 
day can interrupt this recycling mechanism as liquidity accumulates  
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on the account of that participant and a ‘liquidity sink’ develops. This 
can lead to systemic effects,
1 as other participants lack the liquidity to 
settle their payments. Given the network of interdependencies, these 
systemic effects can spread to other connected systems. 
  Research on payment and securities settlement systems is typically 
hampered by the complexity of these systems, the dynamic behaviour 
of the participants and the vast amount of data, which make traditional 
econometric models difficult to apply. As a result, simulation methods 
have become a widely used tool. We use simulations – employing the 
BoF-PSS2 simulator developed by the Bank of Finland – to analyse 
the systemic impact of a participant-level operational disruption in the 
Swiss large-value payment system, Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC). 
We further identify the main factors driving the size of the systemic 
effect and the measures taken to mitigate it. 
  SIC is one of the largest RTGS systems in terms of number of 
transactions, with 1.4 million transactions settled on an average day in 
2008. Being linked to almost all the other payment and securities 
settlement systems in the country, it is the core of the Swiss financial 
market infrastructure. SIC also settles pay-ins and pay-outs in Swiss 
francs related to Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS), a multi-
currency payment system for settling foreign exchange transactions. 
Therefore, systemic effects in SIC can lead to contagion effects in 
interdependent payment and securities settlement systems. Moreover, 
these other systems can be a source of liquidity shocks in SIC. 
  This paper is organised as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the results 
of similar studies in other countries. Section 3.3 highlights the key 
characteristics of the SIC system. Section 3.4 provides a conceptual 
overview of the liquidity effects of an operational disruption in 
payment systems. This is followed by a description of the simulation 
methodology in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6, the results of the 
simulations for the systemic effects of operational disruptions are 
presented and compared to other studies. Section 3.7 discusses the 
                                          
1 For the purpose of our study, we define systemic risk as the possibility that a single 
participant’s inability to meet its SIC obligations due to operational problems will render 
other participants unable to meet their SIC obligations when due. Systemic effects are 
measured by the value and number of payments from a participant which are not settled 
in SIC due to liquidity shortages stemming from an operational problem at another 
participant. The daily average systemic effect is then calculated as the average of the 
systemic effects for every day over the 18 business days in May 2004 used in the 
simulation. Note that according to this definition, systemic effects would not necessarily 
lead to a systemic crisis or threaten financial stability. The decisive feature of systemic 
effects in our study is that due to liquidity shortages stemming from an operational 
problem at one participant, other participants cannot settle their own payments in SIC.  
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different factors that drive the systemic effect for SIC. Special 
attention is devoted to participants’ input behaviour. Section 3.8 
presents the measures that can be taken in case of operational 




3.2 Literature  review 
Bedford, Millard and Yang (2004) were among the first to apply 
simulation techniques to study systemic effects of participant-level 
operational disruptions. They concluded that for the CHAPS Sterling 
payment system in the UK systemic effects are unlikely to occur given 
the very high liquidity levels in the system (150% of upper bound 
liquidity)
2 and the other banks’ fast reaction time (10 minutes) on 
which their simulation is based. A significant systemic effect was only 
identified in a theoretical scenario where three CHAPS Sterling 
settlement banks were hit by an operational disruption when effective 
liquidity was below the upper bound. 
  Subsequently, various studies have investigated systemic effects of 
an operational disruption in interbank payment systems. Some of these 
found only very minor systemic effects, for example Bech and 
Soramäki (2005) for the US Fedwire, and McVanel (2005) and Ball 
and Engert (2007) for Canada’s large-value transfer system. Others 
found moderate systemic effects. For example, Ledrut (2007), Mazars 
and Woelfl (2005) and Hellqvist/Snellman (2007), making certain 
assumptions, found moderate indirect liquidity effects in the Dutch 




3.3  Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC) 
SIC plays a pivotal role in the Swiss financial market, as it settles all 
large-value payments and a large number of retail payments in Swiss 
francs. Linked to almost all other payment and securities settlement 
systems in the country, it is the core of the Swiss financial market 
infrastructure. SIC settles money market transactions, the cash-leg of 
                                          
2 For a description of the concept of upper bound liquidity see for example Koponen and 
Soramäki (1998).  
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securities transactions, and CLS related pay-ins and pay-outs in Swiss 
francs. Its safe and efficient functioning is critical for implementation 
of the Swiss National Bank’s monetary policy. 
  The system is operated by SIX Interbank Clearing AG on behalf of 
the Swiss National Bank (SNB), and transactions are settled on 
accounts at the SNB. It is an RTGS system with central queues, and 
processes payments according to priorities and the first-in first-out 
rule. Through a link with the SECOM securities settlement system, 
SIC guarantees settlement of securities transactions according to the 
principle of delivery-versus-payment (DvP). SIC operates around the 
clock on bank working days. Payments can be entered at any time, and 
up to five days in advance. Settlement takes place for 23 hours of 
every day, starting at around 5 pm on the calendar day before the 
value date and continuing until around 4.15 pm on the value date. To 
ensure smooth functioning of SIC, the SNB provides intraday liquidity 
through its repo facility. Of the approximately 330 participants, the 
two major participants account for roughly a half of the transaction 




3.4  Overview of liquidity effects of a 
participant-level operational disruption in 
interbank payment systems 
The risks arising in interbank payment systems can be broadly 
grouped into credit risk and liquidity risk. Credit risk is the risk that a 
party will be unable to fully meet its financial obligations within the 
system on the due date or at any time in the future. Liquidity risk is 
the risk that a party will have insufficient funds to meet its financial 
obligations when due, although it may be able to do so at a later date. 
Operational problems and legal uncertainties can cause credit and 
liquidity risk. Central banks are especially concerned with systemic 
                                          




4 as these can endanger financial stability, which, usually, is an 
explicit or implicit objective of the central bank. Credit and liquidity 
risks, operational disruptions, and legal uncertainties can be sources of 
systemic risk, if the failure or delay of a participant to meet its 
obligations, or a disruption in the system itself, will cause other 
system participants or financial institutions to be unable to meet their 
obligations as they fall due. Such a failure may cause widespread 
liquidity or credit problems and thus threaten the stability of the 
financial system or even the economy as a whole. SIC – being an 
RTGS system – eliminates credit risk in the settlement process, as 
settlement is final within the day. Liquidity risk is mitigated by 
providing easy access to intraday liquidity from the central bank and 
through a gridlock-resolution mechanism.
5 
  In recent years, due to events such as the ‘Year 2000’ date change, 
the terrorist attacks on financial centres like New York and London, 
and the threat of global pandemics like SARS or avian flu, increasing 
attention has been paid to potential systemic effects of operational 
disruptions. As a result, operators of payment systems have updated 
their business continuity plans and tightened operational requirements 
for critical system participants. For example, in Switzerland, an 
industry group has published recommendations for improving 
business continuity planning which were subsequently adopted in the 
self-regulatory best practices published by the Swiss Bankers 
Association.
6 
  In the event that a participant of an interbank payment system 
suffers an operational disruption, two effects can be distinguished. 
First, other participants will not receive payments from the disrupted 
participant and may cancel payments to the participant in question 
after a certain period of time (direct effect); and second, other 
participants may not be able to settle their own payments due to 
liquidity shortages caused by the liquidity sink stemming from the 
failing participant. The latter effect is typically referred to as the 
indirect or systemic effect of an operational disruption. Systemic 
                                          
4 The ECB and Eurosystem (2008) defines systemic risk as ‘the risk that the inability of 
one participant to meet its obligations in a system will cause other participants to be 
unable to meet their obligations when due, with possible spillover effects such as 
significant liquidity or credit problems that may threaten the stability of or confidence in 
the financial system.’ Note that our definition in the context of this study (see footnote 1) 
focuses on the inability of participants to meet their own obligations due to an operational 
problem of another participant. It ignores whether this has the potential to threaten the 
stability of the financial system. 
5 For a detailed discussion of risks in large-value payment systems see CPSS (2005). 
6 See Industry group (2006) and Swiss Bankers Association (2007).  
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effect refers here to the second-round effects within the payment 
system and need not imply that financial stability would be 
compromised by this indirect effect. While the direct effect can have a 
significant impact on other participants, it can be calculated in a 
straightforward manner. In contrast, the systemic effect of a 
participant's disruption is less obvious, as it depends on the dynamics 
of the settlement process and participants’ behaviour. We therefore 
estimate the systemic effect by simulating 18 business days in May 
2004. We show that in an adverse scenario the daily average systemic 
effect in SIC corresponds to 36 billion Swiss francs – or 22% of total 
payment values. However, in terms of the number of payments, the 
effect is much smaller. 
 
 
3.5 Simulation  methodology 
Data sample 
 
Our simulations are based on SIC transaction data for May 2004. The 
data sample covers 18 business days and 12,950,000 payments 
totalling 2,983 billion Swiss francs. The very large transaction 
volumes can be explained by the fact that SIC settles both large-value 
and small-value payments. In May 2004, transaction volumes and 
values were equal to the averages for the year 2004, and they exhibit a 
typical monthly pattern with a peak towards the end of the month. 
This provides an indication – though not certainty – that May 2004 
was a representative month for SIC in that year. 
 
 
Differences in the settlement algorithm 
 
Using the simulator version BoF-PSS2 1.2.0, it is possible to mimic 
the functionality of an RTGS with central queues. However, there are 
some specific settlement characteristics of SIC which were not 
replicated in our simulations. These are outlined in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1  Differences between SIC settlement 
      algorithm and its simulation 
 






Payments are queued and processed 
according to payment priority (first 
criterion) and input date and time of 
payment (second criterion). 
Due to huge numbers of SIC payments 
and processing capacity limits, one or 
several accounts can include queued 
payments even with sufficient available 
funds. In such case, SIC selects the 
queue to be settled first according to 
input date and time of first payment, 
regardless of priorities. Once a queue is 
selected for settlement, the algorithm 
continues to settle payments from that 
queue as long as funds are available, 
the priority is the same, the maximum 
packet size of 100 payments is not 
reached, and the next payment is not 
more than 50 seconds younger than the 
first payment (based on input time). 
Payments are queued and processed 
according to payment priority (first 
criterion) and input date and time of 
payment (second criterion). 
All queued payments are settled as 
long as sufficient funds are available. 
Since capacity limits are not simulated, 
there will never be accounts with 




If no payment is settled within 15 
seconds, the system initiates a bilateral 
off-setting mechanism.
7 
No bilateral off-setting mechanism. 
CLS 
accounts 
A CLS settlement member for Swiss 
francs can have a special CLS account 
in SIC to initiate such payments, which 
prevents queues in its regular account 
from blocking time-critical pay-ins to 
CLS. 
Regular accounts and special CLS 
accounts are combined in a single 




For value dates after weekends and 
bank holidays, a SIC settlement day 
lasts for more than 24 hours. 
Since the simulator version used could 
only handle settlement days of up to 
23:59 hours, the SIC opening was 
delayed for value dates after weekends 
and bank holidays. Thus payments 
were queued in our simulation, 
although they would have been settled 




                                          
7 The bilateral off-setting mechanism for solving gridlocks is seldom used (in July 2007 – 
July 2008, it was used 142 times, with a total value of 8,727 million Swiss Francs). For a 
description of the bilateral off-setting mechanism, see Sturm (2000). 
8 This explains why in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 (which show an aggregated view of the CLS 
account and the regular account) the participants may exhibit queued payments although 
sufficient funds are available for settlement. In these cases, the funds are on one account 
(eg the CLS account) while the queued payments are on the other account (eg the regular 
account).  
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We cannot determine conclusively the extent to which these 
differences distort our findings on the SIC liquidity and the systemic 
effects of operational problems. However, test simulations indicate 







For our simulations we broadly follow the methodology developed by 
Bedford, Millard and Yang (2004) in their assessment of systemic risk 
in CHAPS Sterling. We simulate operational disruptions that prevent 
one of the two major participants from inputting payments into SIC 
from a certain time onward until the end of the settlement day. 
Queued payments that are inputted by the affected participant prior to 
the disruption are settled. We assume that the other participants will 
cancel payments to the disrupted participant two hours after the 
disruption has occurred. During these two hours, the onset of a 
liquidity sink is possible, as the disrupted participant is receiving 
payments but is unable to initiate new payments. We also assume that 
the disruption occurs at the moment when the theoretical liquidity sink 
is largest, given the scenario described above. Algebraically, we find 
the largest theoretical liquidity sink LSi,t (and hence the moment when 




t t , i t , i t , i Q IP B LS − + = ∑
+  
 
for participant i, where Bi,t denotes his account balance at time t, 
∑
+120 t
t t , i IP  is the value of incoming payments of participant i over the 
next 120 minutes, and Qi,t is the value of payments in the queue of i at 
time t. 
  The timing of the largest theoretical liquidity sink depends on 
participants’ input and settlement behaviour. We refer to theoretical 
liquidity sink because it does not account for liquidity restrictions on 
the other participants. According to our calculation and ignoring 
liquidity restrictions on the other participants, the potential liquidity 
trapped on the account of the failing participant lies between 7 and 25 
billion Swiss francs. 
                                          
9 However, the delay indicators could be significantly impacted by these differences. We 
did therefore not rely in our analysis on the delay indicators generated in the simulations.  
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  While our methodology is similar to that of Bedford, Millard and 
Yang (2004), a few important assumptions are different. In contrast to 
CHAPS Sterling, SIC uses centralized queues. This means that 
payment orders in the queue of the disrupted participant will still be 
settled after the disruption occurred. Furthermore, we also differ in our 
assumptions on reaction time for other system participants to cancel 
payments to the disrupted participant. While the UK simulation 
assumes that the other participants stop their payments to the disrupted 
participant 10 minutes after the incident, we assume that participants 
stop sending and executing payments to the disrupted participant only 
two hours after the failure occurs. Our assumption regarding the non-
disrupted participants’ behaviour is motivated by their input behaviour 
in past incidents in SIC. Based on these incidents, we assumed for our 
simulations that in the event of an operational disruption, the disrupted 
participant continues to receive payments until the operational failure 
is communicated and the extent of the operational problem becomes 
evident. 
  This might however not be the case for other payment systems. 
Amanuel and Conover (2005) identify historical disruptions by 
looking at unusual delays between payments. They then evaluate the 
number and value of payments received by these potentially disrupted 
participants and find some evidence that temporarily disrupted banks 
receive less payment values. This suggests that non-disrupted 
participants react to temporary operational disruptions of a participant 
by quickly and significantly altering their payment behaviour. This 
finding is in line with McAndrews and Potter (2002), who estimate a 
reaction function where participants’ payment sending behaviour is 
related to payment receipts. Inspired by these studies, Ledrut (2007) 
simulates systemic effects of participant-level disruptions considering 
different scenarios for behavioural changes. 
  We consider it important to distinguish two different types of 
behaviour changes for non-disrupted participants. First, behaviour 
changes of non-disrupted participants can reflect a deliberate decision 
to delay payments because of uncertainty about a disrupted participant 
and its ability to pay its obligations. Second, delays in payments might 
not be based on an explicit decision but may instead reflect liquidity 
effects because of a lack of incoming funds from other participants. 
While the first type of behaviour change would probably be reflected 
in input behaviour, the second type would be reflected in available 
liquidity and thus in the number and value of payments actually 
settled. We reviewed the SIC data from historical incidents to evaluate 
these behaviour changes. This was facilitated by the fact that the SIC 
data includes both input and settlement times of payments. Looking at  
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past incidents, we could not identify behaviour changes for both 
effects. However, it must be stressed that we had to rely on a very 
small sample of historical participant-level disruptions. Also, these 
historical incidents tended to be of a much smaller scale than the 
disruptions assumed in our simulations. 
 
 
3.6 Simulation  results 
Our simulations show significant direct effects from a disruption of a 
major participant in SIC: on average, 24% of payment values and 4% 
of the number of payments (see Table 3.2). This comes to a daily 
average of approximately 32,000 payments totalling 40 billion Swiss 
francs. These payments are either not inputted into or are deleted from 
the payment system queue following a participant’s operational 
disruption. As noted in Section 3.5, we assume that the disrupted 
participant immediately stops sending payment orders, whereas the 
other participants take two hours to react and stop sending payment 
orders to the disrupted participant or deleting such orders from the 
queue. 
 
Table 3.2  Direct and systemic effects of an 
      operational disruption of a major SIC 
      participant (daily average for 18 business 
      days in May 2004) 
 
  Number of transactions  Value of transactions in million 
CHF 
May 2004  Daily average  % (minimum 
to maximum) 
Daily averages  % (minimum 
to maximum) 
Settled transactions  661 000  92 (85 to 98)  89 100  54 (33 to 93) 
Unsettled 
transactions – 
direct effect  32 000  4 (1 to 7)  40 400  24 (4 to 44) 
Unsettled 
transactions – 
systemic effect   26 000  4 (0 to 9)  36 200  22 (1 to 37) 
Total  719 000  100  165 700  100 
 
 
Also the systemic (indirect) effect of such a disruption can be large in 
an adverse scenario. In terms of payment values, an average of 22% – 
or 36 billion Swiss francs – would not be settled due to systemic  
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effects.
10 However, in terms of the number of payments, the systemic 
effect is much smaller, affecting only 4% of transactions. This 
substantial difference is due to the fact that many retail payments of 
small value are settled before the disruption is assumed to occur. On 
average, around one third of all participants would be affected. 
  It should however be stressed that these results for the systemic 
effect are based on rather extreme assumptions and ignore the 
possibility of participants’ access to additional liquidity from the 
central bank or other sources in the market. Our assumptions therefore 
most likely resemble a crisis scenario. Depending on the actual 
operational disruption and taking into account the measures taken to 
mitigate liquidity and operational risks (see Section 3.8), actual 
systemic effects would typically be much smaller. 
  Irrespective of the underlying assumptions, significant systemic 
effects are limited to disruptions of the two major SIC participants; 
simulating the disruption of other, smaller participants results in minor 
systemic effects only. The results are therefore only valid for the two 
major participants in SIC. Also, the size of the systemic effect varies 
considerably among major participants and even among different days 
for the same participant. The systemic effect, in terms of payment 
values, ranges from 1% to 37%, depending on the day and disrupted 
participant. 
  Comparing our results with other simulations, we find larger 
systemic effects from a participant-level operational disruption in SIC 
compared to similar studies conducted so far. For example, Bedford, 
Millard and Yang (2004) find only minor systemic effects from 
operational disruption of a participant in CHAPS Sterling. However, 
their simulations are based on different assumptions (see Section 3.5). 
In another study, Ledrut (2007) concludes that systemic effects of an 
operational disruption of a major participant in the Dutch large-value 
payment system TOP are limited, due to relatively high liquidity 
levels in the system. While Mazars and Woelfl (2005) and Hellqvist 
and Snelmann (2007) find some systemic effects, they are clearly 
smaller than in SIC. The same is true for the studies conducted for the 
Canadian large-value transfer system by Ball and Engert (2007) and 
McVanel (2005), and for the US Fedwire system by Bech and 
Soramäki (2005). While the differences in systemic effects can to an 
extent be attributed to simulation assumptions, there is still a residual 
of difference that must be explained by system-inherent factors. 
                                          
10 For the calculation method for the systemic effect, see footnote 1.  
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Therefore, in the next Section, we will evaluate the main drivers of the 
large systemic effects in SIC. 
 
 
3.7  Factors driving systemic effects 
There are various factors that influence the systemic effects of a 
participant-level operational disruption in a payment system. In the 
following paragraphs, we discuss these factors in light of our 





One of the main characteristics of SIC is its relatively high liquidity 
turnover. On an average day in May 2004, 165.7 billion Swiss francs 
were settled with only 11.6 billion Swiss francs of liquidity, which 
equals 7% of settled values. This means that liquidity in SIC was 
turned over more than 14 times in a single business day.
11 While this 
means that participants can settle their payments with low liquidity 
levels and can therefore invest more funds in assets that may provide 
higher returns, it also has drawbacks. In particular, with a low level of 
liquidity in the system, it is likely that the emergence of a liquidity 






Another factor influencing the potential size of the systemic effect is 
the payment system’s participant structure, which is highly 
concentrated in the case of SIC. As mentioned above, the two largest 
participants account for roughly 50% of all payments, in terms of 
value. If one of these major participants faces an operational problem, 
                                          
11 Liquidity levels in the large-value payment systems in Norway and Sweden amount to 
around 70% and 20% respectively of total settled values (see Enge and Overli, 2006 and 
Sveriges Riksbank, 2003). However, one should not draw conclusions from these 
turnover figures on the liquidity efficiency of the systems. Differences between systems 
may reflect differing reserve requirements or liquidity supply costs for participants. For 
example, February 2009 figures for liquidity turnover in SIC show that it has dropped to 
only 4 times, as the Swiss National Bank has cut interest rates and substantially increased 
liquidity available to SIC participants.  
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the consequences are more severe than in a less concentrated system. 
Indeed, our simulations indicate that only the two largest participants 
have the potential to cause significant systemic effects. The disruption 
of any other participant will have only minor systemic effects. This 
finding is supported by Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer and Alentorn (2008), 
who conduct simulation experiments to examine contagion effects in a 
theoretical banking system with interbank exposures. They conclude 
that, ceteris paribus, the higher the concentration in the banking 
system, the more vulnerable it is to systemic risk. This result holds 





Furthermore, the size of the potential systemic effect is influenced by 
the system design. As described above, SIC is an RTGS system with 
only limited liquidity saving mechanisms. Systems with continuous 
offsetting mechanisms may be able to settle more payments in 
circumstances when liquidity is scarce than those without such 
features. However, as these mechanisms are also used in normal 
situations, participants might anticipate their use and lower their 




Participants’ input behaviour 
 
Our results also suggest that the input behaviour of a participant has a 
major impact on the size of the systemic effect. Looking at our May 
2004 data sample, we find evidence of different input behaviour for 
the two largest participants, but also within the same participant on 
different weekdays. 
  For example, figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the stylised input behaviour 
of the two major participants, labelled A and B. A enters most of its 
payment orders (in term of values) early in the morning (at around 
7.30am). This leads to a large queue in the morning, which is reduced 
over time because SIC settles the queued payment orders 
automatically as liquidity becomes available on A’s account (see 
figure 3.1). B, however, seems to manage its payment input to avoid 
the build-up of queues in SIC. It only enters payment orders if 
settlement liquidity is available. Therefore, its queued payment values 
are typically low (see figure 3.2). This difference in input behaviour 
has implications if a participant faces an operational disruption and is  
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unable to send new payment orders to SIC. In the case of A, the 
queued payments act as a buffer, as liquidity is automatically recycled. 
The potential liquidity sink on the disrupted participant A’s account 
will be smaller and the systemic effect will be reduced. By contrast, if 
participant B is unable to send payment orders to SIC, this will be 
immediately felt from a liquidity perspective as a liquidity sink 
accumulates and drains other participants’ liquidity levels. 
 
Figure 3.1  Participant A – Early morning input of 
      payment orders (stylised) 
 
Components of theoretical liquidity sink: account balance, centrally queued outgoing payments, 
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Figure 3.2  Participant B – Continuous input of 
      payment orders in the course of the day 
     (stylised) 
 
Components of theoretical liquidity sink: account balance, centrally queued outgoing payments, 
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Also, we find that the input behaviour of the major participant A 
varies depending on the weekday. Participant A receives high-value 
payments in the morning, typically between 8am and 11am. Hence, 
this is a time when a large liquidity sink could arise. For this 
participant, a small difference in input behaviour has a significant 
impact on the size of the potential systemic effect arising from an 
operational disruption. This is because we assume the disruption  
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occurs when the potential liquidity sink is largest. On Mondays and on 
days after bank holidays, this participant inputs the majority of its 
payments (in terms of values) before 7.30am (see Figure 3.1). On 
these days, the systemic effect of an operational failure of this 
participant is relatively small. This can be explained by the fact that 
the value of outgoing payments already stored in the central queue is 
larger than the value of incoming payments. Therefore, on Mondays 
and after bank holidays, the biggest theoretical liquidity sink for 
participant A arises rather late during the settlement day, when a large 
share of payments has already been settled. On the contrary, the effect 
of an operational problem of participant A on other weekdays is very 
large in terms of value. On these days, it inputs its payment orders 
only after 8am and consequently, very large liquidity sinks can arise if 
a disruption occurs just before 8am. This small difference in input 
behaviour leads to large variations in the size of the systemic effect, 
given our assumptions. 
  These examples also suggest that under certain circumstances 
queues can be beneficial for a payment system. Queues in payment 
systems might be seen as a consequence of a shortage of liquidity 
which then leads to settlement delays. The conclusion would then be 
that queues should be avoided. Our results show, however, that central 
queues which reflect the early input of payment orders act as a 
potential shock-absorber for the liquidity effects of a participant-level 
disruption. For this reason, central queues arising early in the 
settlement day can have positive effects. Of course, central queues 
arising late in the day can be a source of liquidity risk, as settlement 
failures or even minor operational disruptions can have significant 
consequences on the liquidity planning of other participants and can 
lead to short-term liquidity needs. 
  In general, we conclude that early input of payment orders into the 
system (even if queued centrally and not immediately settled) reduces 
the theoretical liquidity sink, compared to late input of payments.
12 In 
the event that a participant with early input experiences an operational 
disruption and is unable to send new payment orders to the system, the 
queued payment orders would help recycle liquidity. This would 
prevent the emergence of a systemic effect or at least limit its size. If, 
however, a participant inputs payments only late in the day, an 
operational disruption occurring before that will be felt immediately in 
the settlement process, as no payments are queued. In such cases, the 
                                          
12 Of course, it must be noted that participants’ leeway in scheduling payment orders is 
limited. Payment orders might be arriving late from customers or internal sources, 
preventing early input of such payments.  
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time span before a liquidity sink builds up will be shorter and the 
liquidity trapped in the liquidity sink will be larger. Variation in the 
daily input behaviour of major participants largely explains the wide 
range of potential systemic effects experienced in our simulations 






Several assumptions were made for our simulations which 
significantly affect the results. For example, we assumed that the 
disruption of a major participant takes place at the time when the 
theoretical liquidity sink is highest. Further, we supposed that non-
disrupted participants only cancel payments to the affected participant 
two hours after the disruption has occurred. This last assumption is 
based on anecdotal evidence from real temporary disruptions of 
participants in SIC and the subsequent behaviour of other participants. 
If the reaction time of the non-disrupted participants were shortened, 
this would reduce the potential systemic effect. 
  Our assumption for the timing of the disruption is the moment 
when the theoretical liquidity sink is highest. However, this need not 
correspond to the largest potential systemic effect. To identify the 
moment when a disruption triggers the largest systemic effect, one 
needs to take into account not only the liquidity sink, but also the 
payment distribution over the day and between participants. 
Therefore, the largest systemic effect cannot be derived directly but 
would require a multitude of simulations for every participant for 
every settlement day on a trial-and-error basis. 
 
 
3.8  Measures to mitigate systemic effects 
As shown, assuming an adverse scenario the operational disruption of 
a major participant can cause significant systemic effects in SIC. This 
highlights the pivotal role of sound business continuity measures – not 
only at system-level but also at participant-level – and the importance 
of adequate incentives and instruments for all involved parties to 
mitigate systemic effects. 
  First, preventive measures have been taken to minimise the 
likelihood of a prolonged operational disruption of a participant in 
SIC. An industry group has established recommendations for the  
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maximum down-time of critical participants in SIC.
13 In its report, this 
industry group suggested that critical participants should be able to 
resume operations within four hours after the loss of a key building, 
including the staff working in the building.
14 These recommendations 
have been integrated in self-regulatory best practices published by the 
Swiss Bankers Association.
15 Specific measures taken to adhere to 
these best practices include the establishment of redundant data 
centres and backup communication networks to access the payment 
system. 
  Second, there is a variety of incentives and instruments to reduce 
systemic effects should a prolonged disruption occur. As illustrated 
above, early input of payments can reduce the size of the potential 
systemic effect. In SIC, early input is encouraged by a progressive fee 
structure. Furthermore, the end-of-day cut-off time can be postponed, 
should a temporary operational disruption occur. Participants also 
have access to intraday liquidity from SNB, based on a wide range of 
collateral. Also, payments on behalf of the affected participant can be 
entered by SNB, which helps to redistribute the liquidity among 
participants. Further, SNB has the technical possibility to initiate an 
individual clearing stop for a disrupted participant, which immediately 
stops all outgoing and incoming payments to and from this participant. 
In addition, there are facilities for physical input of data via tapes 
should the telecommunication infrastructure be unavailable. Finally, 
an interbank alarm and crisis organisation exists to coordinate industry 
reactions. 
  Our analysis of the driving factors of systemic effects also 
highlights additional measures which might prove to be even more 
effective in dealing with disruptions. These include: 
 
•  establishing bilateral or multilateral sender limits to reduce the size 
of a liquidity sink arising from an operational disruption; 
•  influencing the input behaviour of critical participants, eg by 
establishing through-put requirements. These would require major 
participants to settle a certain percentage of payment obligations 
before a given time on the settlement day;  
•  adapting the settlement mechanism in SIC to include additional 
liquidity optimisation algorithms; and 
                                          
13 For defining critical participants, a threshold of a 5% (or slightly below) value share in 
SIC was used. 
14 See Industry Group (2006). 
15 See Swiss Bankers Association (2007).  
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•  enhancing the existing interbank alarm and crisis organisation to 
reduce reaction times of other participants should a disruption 
occur. One concrete option would be to include communication 
network operators in the alarm and crisis organisation. 
 
 
3.9 Conclusions  and  outlook 
Our simulations suggest that in an adverse scenario the systemic 
liquidity effect of an operational disruption of a major participant in 
SIC can be very large. On an average day in May 2004, 22% of 
payment values – ie a total of 36 billion Swiss francs – would not be 
settled and about one third of the other participants could be affected. 
As SIC is also closely connected to other Swiss payment and 
securities settlement systems as well as to international systems, these 
systemic effects could lead to further contagion effects if liquidity 
shocks are transferred to other systems. 
  We find that some of the factors accounting for the large systemic 
effect are participants’ input behaviour, the relatively low liquidity 
levels in SIC and the high concentration ratio of its participants. Since 
pending payment orders can act as a shock absorber for liquidity 
effects, our results suggest that under certain circumstances queues 
can be beneficial for a payment system. To the extent that queues are 
managed centrally in the payment system and reflect participants’ 
early inputs of payment orders, the build-up of such queues – at least 
early in the day – can act as a liquidity shock absorber in case of 
operational disruptions. In SIC, the fee structure encourages early 
input of payment orders into the payment system, even if they are not 
immediately settled but initially queued in SIC’s central queue. 
  There are two important caveats to our analysis. First, the 
potentially large systemic effects in SIC underline the importance of 
taking measures to mitigate liquidity and operational risk in SIC. As 
these measures were not incorporated in our simulations, our analysis 
identifies the potential size of systemic effects in SIC in a rather 
extreme scenario. For example, we ignore the possibility of 
participants having access to additional liquidity from the central bank 
and assume that compensating liquidity cannot be found from other 
sources in the market. Our assumptions therefore resemble a crisis 
scenario. Depending on the actual operational disruption and taking 
into account the measures taken to mitigate liquidity and operational 
risks, actual systemic effects would typically be much smaller.   
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  Second, our simulations only allow for one behaviour change, 
which is that participants cancel payments to the affected participant 
two hours after a disruption has occurred. Other behaviour changes – 
for example faster reaction by other participants to the disruption or 
re-prioritisation of certain payments – are not considered. 
  Looking forward, an intriguing extension of our analysis would be 
to vary the assumed reaction behaviour of non-disrupted participants. 
For example, the measures already taken to mitigate systemic effects 
in SIC (which are highlighted in Section 3.8) could be incorporated in 
our simulations. Also, similarly to Ledrut (2007), the assumptions on 
participants’ behaviour changes in response to a participant-level 
disruption could be varied to analyse the systemic effects. Finally, the 
usefulness of potential new measures could be evaluated. Specifically, 
the work of Mazars and Woelfl (2005) suggests that bilateral limits 
can be a powerful instrument for containing systemic effects of a 
participant-level disruption in interbank payment systems.  
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4  Operational disruption and the 
Hungarian real time gross 
settlement system (VIBER) 
Abstract 
Central bankers wish to ensure worldwide that large-value transfer 
systems exhibit sufficiently robust levels of operational resilience. We 
focus on the operational resilience of the Hungarian real time gross 
settlement system, known as VIBER. The goal of the research is the 
quantitative assessment of the ability of the system to withstand the 
technical default of one or two systemically important participants. 
Altogether six plausible scenarios were formed, three entire-day 
incidents and three incidents involving less time (part-time incidents). 
When entire-day incidents, assuming no back-up options, and 
behavioural reactions were simulated, the disturbance of the payment 
system was severe. By international standards, the proportion of 
unsettled transactions was very high, which can be explained by the 
high concentration of debit turnover, the liquidity scarcity of the most 
active VIBER participants, and the structure and size of the money 
markets. We also shed light on the importance and potential efficacy 
of back-up options: the shock-absorbing capacity of the system 
improved significantly when back-up procedures were included. The 
impact of behavioural reactions of technically non-defaulted 
participants was also considered. Blocking payments to the stricken 
bank raised the value of unsettled payments, which is the price of 





The Hungarian real time gross settlement system (Valós Idejű Bruttó 
Elszámolási Rendszer or VIBER) is used mainly for settling large-
value payments. The system can be considered critical infrastructure 
for those transactions that are to be settled in Hungarian forint. These 
transactions include mainly large-value financial market deals and 
other time-critical payments. The average daily turnover of VIBER  
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amounts to approximately 10% of the annual GDP of Hungary. Given 
this scale of activity, if the system is inappropriately designed or 
poorly operated, it could expose participants to risk potentially large 
enough to threaten their day-to-day business activity. In extreme 
cases, the financial soundness of the participants and the stability of 
the system as a whole might also be threatened. A smoothly 
functioning large-value payment system is crucial to the efficiency of 
the financial markets. Besides the assurance of financial stability, 
central bankers have an additional interest in a resilient payment 
system, as it plays a pivotal role in the implementation of monetary 
policy. 
  A disruption to normal payment processing activity could result in 
the realisation of liquidity risk. If an operational problem involving a 
settlement bank prevents the bank from submitting payments to the 
system, then liquidity can accumulate on the defaulter’s account 
(liquidity sink effect). As the bank is unable to redistribute liquidity in 
the system by submitting payments, the liquidity positions of the 
counterparties are also affected or even threatened. The counterparties 
may delay their payments or even worse: a lack of funds may render 
them unable to settle their payments. 
  Analysing the resilience of VIBER is part of the MNB’s
1 payment 
systems oversight duties. Act LVIII of 2001 on the MNB defines as 
one of the basic tasks of the MNB the development of payment and 
settlement systems and monitoring of their activities in order to 
achieve sound and efficient operations and smooth money circulation 
(MNB, 2001). In line with this, the MNB has to assess all risks that 
might have an impact on the system overseen. If the central bank finds 
that there is high risk, it should take steps to eliminate or lessen the 
risk via proper risk management. 
  Accordingly, the goal of the current research is the quantitative 
assessment of the ability of the system to withstand certain types of 
operational shocks. We wish to shed light on the capacity of the 
system to function smoothly in the event of operational problems and 
highlight the mechanisms for mitigating the impact of such problems. 
  The paper is organised as follows. In section 4.1 we review the 
operational incidents in VIBER and outline the scope of the research. 
Section 4.2 offers a brief review of previous empirical literature using 
the same simulation methodology as we do. Section 4.3 presents the 
data and discusses the simulation methodology, including the 
functioning of RTGS systems in general and the specific features of 
                                          
1 MNB stands for Magyar Nemzeti Bank, the central bank of Hungary, hereinafter MNB.  
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VIBER. The indicators used to describe the operation of an RTGS 
system are explained, along with the assumptions underlying the 
hypothetical scenarios. The assumptions cover the behavioural 
reactions of technically non-defaulted participants, the timing and 
length of operational failures, the number and list of technically 
defaulted participants and the application of existing back-up 
procedures. Section 4.4 summarises the simulation results. We 
simulated altogether six scenarios, three entire-day incidents and three 
part-time incidents. Section 4.5 presents conclusions and suggestions 
for further research. 
 
 
4.1.2 Operational  incidents 
The smooth functioning of payment and settlement systems assumes 
the availability of the requisite resources (premises, staff, IT 
equipment, power, etc.). These resources are exposed to operational 
risk. They can be endangered by both internal and external factors that 
could lead to operational disruption. The spectrum of internal and 
external factors is diverse; it includes power outages, disruptions to 
telecommunication networks, IT failures (software or hardware 
problems), natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Resources can be 
protected by different means (eg back-up sites and procedures or, in 
the case of outsourcing, by service level agreements). Nevertheless, a 
considerable amount of money has to be allocated for their protection. 
Due to the great variety of operational incidents, the unforeseen nature 
of such events and the low probability of large-scale events, on the 
level of the entire society, the costs often offset the expected benefits 
of the protection. 
  The Hungarian real time gross settlement system fortunately has 
not yet suffered from any large-scale natural disaster or terrorist 
attack. The incidents occurring in the recent past had a small impact 
on the operation of the payment system. The events either affected the 
components of the central settlement infrastructure or the participant’s 
facilities. 
  The components of the central settlement system are operated by 
the central bank and its service providers. Reliable statistics are 
available on operational incidents affecting these central components. 
The database of incidents affecting the central components can be 
considered as complete. Nevertheless, processing of payments also 
requires the constant ability of VIBER participants to send and receive 
payment messages. However, the technical problems of VIBER  
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participants are not always reported to the MNB. Exceptions include 
when the participant asks for prolongation of operating hours. 
  Despite the incomplete database for external incidents, the MNB is 
aware that in the recent past several serious operational incidents have 
occurred. Between April 2003 and May 2007, the MNB recorded 72 
external incidents (including problems with monitoring facilities and 
incidents involving ancillary systems like retail ACH or CSD/SSS), 
which evidently greatly understates the number of real occurrences. In 
20 cases the MNB has information on how long the problems lasted. 
The average length of time for operational problems was 2 hours and 
21 minutes, the maximum 5 hours and 50 minutes, and the minimum 
14 minutes. Twenty-six of the 72 cases occurred due to the 
unavailability of the messaging network, known as SWIFT. For the 
remainder of the cases, there is no detailed information on the source 
of the technical problem. Although it is hard to draw conclusions from 
the incomplete database of the external incidents, it is clear that 
failures arose at both small and large credit institutions. The incident 
database shows that failures happen from time to time. Regardless of 
the low probability of a serious incident, once one occurs, it can have 
a huge impact on the functioning of VIBER and its participants. 
 
 
4.1.3  Scope of the research 
An operational incident, historical or hypothetical, can be 
characterised by two dimensions: probability of occurrence and 
impact (Figure 4.1). The probability of the incident can be estimated 
from either a long-period incident database or an appropriate 
theoretical distribution, eg using the extreme value theorem. By 
measuring the impact of an operational incident, there is a need to 
distinguish between first and second round effects. First round effects 
can be directly observed in the payment system. Appropriate 
indicators of the severity of first round effects include the indicator of 
payment delay or the volume of unsettled transactions. 
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Figure 4.1  Operational incidents and payment system 





PROBABILITY IMPACT (the possible effects of operational distruptions)
a) Estimated from an incident database a) First round effects (directly observed in the payment system)
b) Estimated from a theoretical distirbution aa) Ex post analysis: historical payment system data
ab) Forward looking analysis: simulations
b) Second round effects (can not be directy observed in the payment system)
c) Cost estimations of first and second round effects
EXPECTED COSTS OF OPERATIONAL INCIDENTS IN PAYMENTS SYSTEMS FOR THE ENTIRE ECONOMY
EVALUATION OF BACK-UP FACILITIES:
Efficiency and sufficiency of currently used back-up facilities, further possible investment decisions on back-up facilities
EXPECTED COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ADDITIONAL INVESTMENTS IN BACK-UP FACILITIES
COST AND BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF INVESTMENTS IN THE PAYMENT SYSTEM  
 
 
The analysis is ex post if the first round effects are measured by 
means of historical payment system data, while forward looking if the 
disruption of the system is forecasted via simulations. Second round 
effects cannot be directly observed in the payment system. Second 
round effects materialise in delays of time-critical payments or other 
contractual obligations. Besides the severity of the incidents, the costs 
related to those incidents should also be estimated. 
  After estimating the expected costs of operational incidents in the 
payment system for the entire economy, one should evaluate the role 
of the current back-up facilities. Note that there could be other risk 
mitigating investments, eg limitations or alert systems that might 
constitute appropriate back-up facilities. The efficiency and 
sufficiency of the current back-up facilities should be analysed. If the 
current back-up options prove to be insufficient, investment decisions 
related to additional back-up options should be considered. The 
investment decision should rely on a detailed cost-benefit analysis. At 
the same time, the appropriateness of the payment system design 
should also be evaluated, and a cost-benefit analysis of the possible 
risk mitigating investments should be carried out. 
  In fact, the research carried out can be considered a first step 
towards evaluating the ability of the payment system to withstand 
certain types of operational shocks. We set up hypothetical scenarios 
for operational incidents and examine the severity of the payment  
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system disruption. We do not estimate either the probability of an 
operational incident or the severity and costs of second round effects. 
The paper only assesses the severity of first round effects of an 
operational incident via ex post analysis. 
 
 
4.2 Literature  review 
There are several studies prepared by central banks that assess the 
affects of various operational failures in RTGS or hybrid systems. 
Bedford et al (2004) assess the impact of different types of operational 
incidents that could affect the United Kingdom’s CHAPS Sterling. 
The study of Mazars and Woelfel (2005) assesses the impact of a 
technical default in the French PNS large-value transfer system. 
Schmitz et al (2006) quantify the contagion effect of an operational 
incident at one of the participants in ARTIS on the other participants 
of the system. Bech and Soramäki (2005) evaluate the performance of 
gridlock resolution algorithms under both normal operating conditions 
and failure scenarios in the Danish KRONOS system. The study of 
Enge and Øverli (2006) measures the resilience of the NBO (the 
Norges Bank’s real time large-value settlement system) by varying the 
liquidity levels. 
  For analytical purposes simulations based on historical data are 
carried out. These experiments operate with the payment system 
simulator developed by the Bank of Finland (BoF-PSS) or Banque de 
France. With their built-in functionalities these simulators can 
replicate the functioning of various types of large-value payment 
systems. The goal of performing the simulations is to shock the 
payment system and to see what would have happened if the payment 
system had experienced an unanticipated operational incident. The 
possibility of insolvency is ruled out. The market participants do not 
doubt the financial soundness of the institution in trouble; the default 
is exclusively operational in nature. 
  All the studies considered address the question whether the 
inability of a single participant or multiple participants to submit 
payments leads to serious disturbances in the system. For analysing 
these effects three features of the incident are given: (1) the set of 
technically defaulted or affected participants, also named stricken 
banks; (2) when the incident starts (the timing of the incidents) and (3) 
how long it takes (the length of the incidents). These parameters are 
usually set in accord with the worst-case scenarios, given certain 
constraints (eg the length of the incident should be two hours).  
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Besides these features, the severity of the failure depends also on the 
assumptions concerning the liquidity available in the system, the 
payment system design (eg the existence of back-up procedures) and 
whether the non-defaulting (or unaffected) participants react to the 
incident by applying stop sending rules or adjusting bilateral limits. 
  In general, all studies aim at analysing how operational risk might 
lead to the realisation of liquidity risk. However, the studies differ in 
the parameters of stylised incidents, the assumptions made as to 
system design and behavioural reactions of non-defaulting 




4.3  Data and methodology 
In this paper the operation of VIBER is analysed with the help of the 
simulator developed by the Bank of Finland (BoF-PSS). The 
simulations are conducted under normal (benchmark case or reference 
scenario) and distressed periods using actual data on payments and 
liquidity from the period December 2006 – January 2007 (41 business 
days). The reference scenario replicates the actual functioning of 
VIBER. The institutional features of VIBER are reflected in the 
parameterization of the BoF-PSS2. 
 
 
4.3.1  About RTGS systems with special focus on VIBER 
Like CHAPS Sterling, ARTIS, KRONOS or NBO, the Hungarian 
VIBER is an RTGS system, in which the moments of clearing and 
settlement are not separated in time; booking is managed item by item 
continuously and in real time. In VIBER, the processing of payment 
orders and their final settlement takes place continuously, and the 
participants concerned are notified in real time. Each settlement takes 
place by examining whether the participant has provided sufficient 
liquidity. If so, the payment orders are settled immediately. If the 
participant does not have sufficient liquidity, the payment will be 
placed in the central queue. There is one queue per account that 
contains validated payments waiting for settlement. When entries are 
placed in the payment queue, they are inserted in FIFO (first in first 
out) order by priority, the latter being set by the submitter. Payments 
with high priority are always closer to the front of the queue than 
those with lower priority. If the payment at the head of the queue  
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cannot be settled due to insufficient cover, the queue is blocked. 
VIBER has a built-in feature (gridlock resolution algorithm) which 
solves gridlock situations on a multilateral basis. In VIBER, gridlock 
resolution can be initiated manually by the central bank, at the request 
of the submitter. It can also be initiated automatically at a pre-defined 
frequency. In the current setup gridlock resolution algorithm is 
initiated every 30 minutes. Basically the algorithm corresponds to 
multilateral partial offsetting at a given interval of 30 minutes. During 
the business day, the unsettled payments can be re-prioritised or 
deleted. 
  At the end of 2006 VIBER had 38 direct participants. The 
available (or actual) liquidity of direct participants consists of the 
current account balance plus the intraday credit line, which can be 
obtained from the central bank by providing collateral. The list of 
eligible collateral and the evaluation principles of those assets are 
determined by the central bank. Assets eligible as collateral for 
intraday credit are the same as those accepted in monetary policy 
operations. Pledging additional collateral is possible at any time 
during VIBER business hours. 
  In order to replicate the functioning of VIBER the following data 
were collected: 
 
a)  the payments with 
  –  submission and value dates, time stamps and sequencing 
parameters that were essential to obtain the submission 
ranking, 
 –  the  amounts, 
  –  the original priorities and the changes in priorities, 
  –  the debited and credited banks, and 
  –  the message types (customer payments, bank-to-bank items, 
securities transactions or manual account transfer by the 
central bank ) defined by the submitter, 
 
b)  the initial current account balances and intraday credit lines at the 
opening of the system and changes of the intraday credit lines 
during the day, 
 
c)  the system’s opening and closing times, and 
 




4.3.2  Specific indicators used for describing the operation 
of an RTGS system 
Besides the usual statistics (turnover and liquidity, concentration 
indicators, timing indicators) more specific indicators were calculated 
to describe the operation of VIBER by employing the BoF-PSS. 
 
 
a) Non-submitted, rejected and unsettled payments 
 
An obvious indicator of the severity of an operational incident is the 
number and value of payments not submitted to the system. This 
direct effect is related to the fact that the operational failure of the 
settlement bank prevents the bank concerned sending payment orders. 
  The risk resulting from the technical default of a participant can be 
best captured by the rejected payments indicator. The indicator shows 
how significant the contagion effect is in terms of number and value 
of rejected transactions. We refer to unsettled transactions as the sum 
of the payments not submitted to the system and payments submitted 
but rejected due to insufficient funds. 
 
 
b) Hypothetical liquidity levels 
 
Besides the actual level of liquidity, there are various hypothetical 
liquidity levels which could provide useful insight into the extent to 
which participants are able to withstand the liquidity risk of an 
operational incident of a counterparty. 
  The lower bound of liquidity equals the minimum amount of 
liquidity required to settle all payments submitted during a day. The 
lower bound of liquidity corresponds to a very extreme case, in which 
the banks have just enough liquidity to settle their payments before the 
end of the day by applying multilateral offsetting as a gridlock 
resolution algorithm. A more detailed explanation and the formal 
definition of lower bound can be found in BoF (2005), p. 38. 
  The upper bound of liquidity corresponds to a liquidity level that a 
settlement bank would need in order to settle its outgoing payments 
immediately upon submission. Thus, the upper bound of liquidity is 
defined as the amount of liquidity needed to settle transactions without 
any queues. 
  Potential liquidity is equivalent to the sum of the current account 
balance and the maximum of the intraday credit line. The maximum of  
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the intraday credit line is based on information concerning eligible 
assets recorded on the participant’s balance sheet. Unfortunately these 
figures produce only rough estimates, as credit institutions can pledge 
their securities for other purposes such as to meet collateralization 
obligations related to stock exchange transactions. Since in Hungary 
collateral is pledged without transferring the title of the securities, we 
do not have information on how much of the eligible assets are not 
available in case additional collateral is needed for payment purposes. 
 
 
c) Liquidity usage indicator 
 
During the business day the outgoing payments are financed by 
incoming payments and by the available liquidity, consisting of the 
current account balance plus the intraday credit line. The liquidity 
usage indicator (LUI) measures the maximum share of the liquidity 




d) Queue and delay statistics 
 
To obtain better insight into the performance of the payment system it 
is worth analysing the evolution of the queue statistics (BoF, 2005). 
The percentage of payments settled in real time – in volume and value 
terms – shows the fluidity of the system. The number and total value 
of queued transactions show the opposite. Note that in all cases we 
refer to centrally queued payments. In our analysis we focus on the 
total value of queued transactions. It should be noted that the indicator 
is very rough; it does not take into account how large the queue was at 
certain points in time and for how long the payments were blocked 
due to insufficient funds. 
  The maximum queue and the average queue lengths are two 
indicators that can complement the total value of queued transactions. 
The maximum queue is the peak queue value during the business day. 
The average queue length is an indicator that captures the amount of 
                                          
2 The exact calculation of the liquidity usage indicator (LUI) is as follows. If both the 
start of day balance (SoDB) and the minimum balance of the day (MB) are negative, than 
the indicator can be expressed as: LUI = [abs(MB)–abs(SoDB)]/[IDCL+SoDB]. If both 
the start of day balance (SoDB) and the minimum balance of the day (MB) are positive, 
than the indicator can be expressed as: LUI = [abs(MB)–abs(SoDB)]/  [IDCL+SoDB], 
where IDCL stands for intraday credit line. Finally, if the start of day balance (SoDB) is 
positive and the minimum balance of the day (MB) is negative, than the indicator can be 
calculated by the formula of LUI = [SoDB+abs(MB)]/(SoDB+IDCL).  
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time the payments spent in the queue. The average queue length 
shows the average queue duration of queued payments, namely the 
total queuing time of payments divided by the total number of queued 
payments. 
  The fourth and fairly complex indicator of the queue statistic that 
was quantified and analysed is the delay indicator. As this indicator 
has been quantified in many previous studies, it also serves as a good 
base for international comparison. The delay indicator quantifies the 
extent to which settlement of individual transactions is actually 
delayed compared to the theoretic maximum delay to the end of the 
day. The delay indicator is a relative indicator ranging from 0 to 1. If 
no transactions are queued, its value is 0. When all transactions are 
queued to the end of the day, its value is 1. The indicator is calculated 
as the queuing-time-weighted value of all queued transactions 
(transaction value multiplied by time in queue) divided by the time-
weighted value assuming all payments were delayed to the end of the 




4.3.3  Description of normal functioning of VIBER: 
the benchmark case 
Analysis of the benchmark case, that is the normal functioning of 
VIBER in December 2006 and January 2007, is valuable for several 
reasons. First of all, the results of the stress scenarios can be compared 
with the benchmark case. Secondly, we can identify critical period(s) 
of the business day(s) when an incident with a pre-defined length 
might have the largest impact on the functioning of VIBER. Thirdly, 
we can discover the critical participants based on proxies for liquidity 
risk and concentration indicators. The critical participants can be 
either systemically important participants or endangered participants. 
The technical default of the systemically important participants might 
have serious negative consequences for the functioning of VIBER. 
(For a proper definition of systemically important VIBER participants, 
see Subsection 4.3.3.4.) Endangered participants are institutions which 
might be heavily influenced by the operational incidents of 




4.3.3.1 Descriptive  statistics 
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics of VIBER for the months 
December 2006 and January 2007. All submitted payments were 
settled by the end of the day; there were no unsettled payments. As 
demonstrated by Table 4.1, in December 2006 and January 2007 on 
average 3,429 transactions were settled daily. The number of 
payments settled ranged from 2,098 to 4,963. The mean value of 
payments settled totalled 3,496 billion HUF. 
 
Table 4.1  Descriptive statistics of VIBER 
      (December 2006 – January 2007) 
 
 Minimum  Average  Maximum  St.  dev. 
Number settled  2,098  3,429  4,963  585 
Number  unsettled  – – – – 
Value settled (million HUF)  1,422,990  3,496,231  5,387,416  751,756 
Value  unsettled  – – – – 
 
 
VIBER opens at 8:00 a.m. CET and closes at 5:00 p.m. CET. During 
the period studied prolongation of operating hours occurred three 
times (once for 15 minutes and twice for 30 minutes). The credit 
institutions justified their request for prolongation with reference to 
technical problems. If we examine the distribution of value of 
submitted payments according to the system’s receipt time, we might 
conclude that at the beginning of the business day the banks submit 
relatively more payments. This can be explained by the warehoused 
payments (payments submitted before the days of the value date) 
which are channelled into the central accounting system right after the 
system is opened. By analysing the distribution of the value of 
submitted payments we can also conclude that the most active 




4.3.3.2 Liquidity  levels 
At the aggregate level, the system had more than enough liquidity to 
settle all payments immediately, and the system as a whole had many 
securities not posted as collateral. This is reflected in Figure 4.2 by the 
fact that potential level of liquidity is much higher than the upper 
bound. In Figure 4.2 it can also be seen that on the system level the 
actual level of liquidity in VIBER is significantly higher than the  
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lower bound. This means that on the system level the payments can 
always settle at least by the end of the day. However, there are 
significant variations across banks. In distressed periods there might 
be institutions at which the liquidity buffer available might not be 
sufficient to mitigate the impact of a liquidity shock. 
 
Figure 4.2  Lower and upper bounds of liquidity, 
      actual liquidity and potential liquidity 

















































































































































Note: The data for the Hungarian State Treasury (Single Treasury Account) were 
included in the liquidity levels.  
 
 
4.3.3.3  Queue and delay statistics 
In December 2006 and January 2007 the total value of queued 
transactions expressed as a percentage of value settled equalled 
16.41% on average (Table 4.2); the maximum was 33.02%. The 
maximum queue value, expressed as a percentage of value settled, 
equalled 4.29% on average. However, there was a day when the 
maximum queue value was 11.08% of all the transactions settled. The 
mean of the average queue duration of queued payments was 41 
minutes. On 19 January 2007, with more than two hours of average 
queuing time, the indicator reached its maximum. 
  In relation to the queue statistics there are significant variations 
across banks. Five participants are responsible for 97% of the queues  
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(both in number and value). Three of the five participants dispose of 
the highest share in debit turnover. The two participants with the 
highest proportions of queued payments queued up 76.22% (number) 
and 70.28% (value) of their payment orders. 
  The settlement delay was 0.07 on average (Table 4.2), the 
maximum for the delay indicator equalled 0.16. The settlement delay 
also varies across banks. There is one small bank whose average 
settlement delay is remarkably high compared to other system 
participants. The average settlement delay of this small bank equals 
0.1895, which is almost 4 times higher than the average settlement 
delay of the bank with the second highest settlement delay (0.0478). 
This can be explained by the specific timing behaviour of the small 
bank: it sends the majority of its payment orders at the beginning of 
the day and waits for incoming payments. Meanwhile the payment 
orders are queued up; the average queue length of the bank is almost 2 
hours. 
 
Table 4.2  Queue and delay statistics 
      (December 2006 – January 2007) 
 
 Minimum  Average  Maximum 
Value of payments initially not submitted  –  –  – 
Value of unsettled payments  –  –  – 
Total value of queued transactions (in % of 
value settled)  2.62%  16.41%  33.02% 
Maximum queue value (in % of value settled)  1.35%  4.29%  11.08% 
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss)  0:08:34  0:41:24  2:08:44 
Settlement delay  0.01  0.07  0.16 
 
 
4.3.3.4  Systemically important and endangered participants 
In our analysis those participants are considered as systemically 
important institutions which dispose of more than 5% of the debit 
turnover in the reference period. In this way we identified six 
participants whose technical default might have a serious impact on 
the functioning of VIBER.
3 
                                          
3 Similarly to our findings, the study of Lublóy (2006) identified the same systemically 
important institutions according to certain network criteria. In the study a graph 
theoretical framework was applied. The author argued that the institutions most capable 
of generating contagion can be best captured by means of valued outdegree centrality and 
out-proximity centrality. Based on the centrality measures, six institutions were 
identified; illiquidity of these institutions could cause the most serious disruptions in the 
payment system.  
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  Participants endangered by the technical default of systemically 
important members can be identified by assessing the liquidity risk 
they face under normal conditions and in distressed periods. By 
examining various proxies for liquidity risk under normal functioning 
we form clusters with common characteristics. Based on the 
clustering, we identify those whose members could be easily 
endangered in the case of a liquidity shock. As a next step, the circle 
of these endangered participants is enlarged by means of a simple 
sensitivity analysis based on a stress indicator. As a result, we arrive at 
an indicative list of participants who might be endangered if a 
systemically important member technically defaults. 
  Based on the queue, delay and liquidity indicators, we formed five 
clusters. Our results are summarised in Table 4.3. The first column of 
the table states the share of days during the analysing period (41 days) 
when the actual level of liquidity was less than the upper bound of 
liquidity. When the liquidity level is at or above the upper bound, the 
settlement of transactions can happen without any queues. The higher 
the number of days on which the actual level of liquidity was less than 
the upper bound of liquidity, the higher was the probability of having 
longer queues and delays in the bank’s payment process and hence the 
lower was the level of the bank’s liquidity buffer. This also means that 
if the bank looses some of its credited payments, it could lead to more 
unsettled payments. The second column of Table 4.3 provides 
additional criteria for dividing the VIBER participants into smaller 
subgroups. The grouping criteria in the second column are not 
homogeneous in the case of the three main groups obtained according 
to the criteria of the first column. The criteria rather reflect points in a 
decision tree for forming subgroups of homogeneous banks within the 
main group. 
  Participants in Group ‘A’ have a higher actual level of liquidity 
than the upper bound of liquidity on most days. Participants in Group 
‘A’ have recorded queues extremely rarely. The participants are not 
prone to liquidity risk, the actual liquidity level already ensures the 
existence of a buffer against liquidity risk. Additionally, the 
participants have high liquidity buffers in their balance sheets, in case 
the actual liquidity proves to be insufficient. 
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Table 4.3  Grouping of VIBER participants 
 
Share of days when actual 
liquidity was below the 
upper bound of liquidity 











(in % of 41 days 
0% <...<  10% 
Liquidity usage indicator greater than 50% on at 






Liquidity  usage 
indicator less than 50% 
on at least half of the 
days 
Ratio of intraday credit 









Ratio of intraday credit 
line to available liquidity 





Ratio of intraday credit 






10% <...< 50% 
Balance sheet seems to contain enough liquidity 





Rarely are there days when balance sheet does 






50% <...<  100% 
Balance sheet seems to 
contain liquidity buffer, but 
there may be days when it is 
not sufficient 
Delay indicatoris 




exposed to FX 
settlement risk 
D  Delay indicatoris 
mid-sized  3 
Delay indicatoris 
relatively high  0 
It can easily happen that 
balance sheet does not have 
enough liquidity 
Delay indicatoris 
relatively low  0 
E  Delay indicatoris 
mid-sized  1 
Delay indicatoris 
relatively high  1 
 
Please note that two participants (central bank and Hungarian Post) are not clustered. 
 
 
Participants in Group ‘B’ queue up transactions more often, but their 
balance sheet contains abundant liquidity buffer. In the reference 
period these institutions did not post any collateral. Based on debit 
turnover, these members are the least active participants. 
  Group ‘C’ contains those participants which queue up payments 
more often than participants in Group ‘A’. In the case of liquidity 
shocks there might be occasions when potential liquidity is not enough 
for immediate settlement of payments. We consider these credit 
institutions as endangered participants, as they might face problems if 
there are liquidity shocks. 
  Participants in Group ‘D’ build up queues often and transactions 
spend quite some time in the queue. The delay indicator is medium-
sized for them. Their balance sheet contains some liquidity buffer. 
Taking the uncertainty regarding the proper level of potential liquidity  
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into account, these institutions might easily experience problems if 
there is a liquidity shock. We consider these credit institutions as 
endangered participants. 
  The two participants in Group ‘E’ have no liquidity buffer in their 
balance sheets. Participants in this group dispose of the highest delay 
indicator. One of the institutions has a significantly greater indicator. 
However, its share in debit turnover is low. The other credit institution 
is the most active one in VIBER (in monthly average its share of 
credited and debited items is the highest in value terms). This 
institution is certainly pushed toward more active payment and 
liquidity management. This participant manages its intraday credit line 
actively. 
  Using a simple sensitivity analysis, we examined what happens to 
VIBER participants if they loose a pre-defined proportion of their 
incoming payments. We measured whether the participants’ eligible 
asset portfolio would be sufficient for financing incoming funds. We 
found that eleven institutions would face serious problems on at least 
25% of the business days if they did not get at least 50% of their 
incoming payments. These participants rely heavily on financing via 
incoming payments. Interestingly, during the clustering we classified 
8 of these 11 as endangered participants. In line with this simple 
sensitivity analysis, we enlarged the group of endangered participants 
by the three previously unidentified institutions. 
  If we look at the lists of systemically important and endangered 
institutions, we notice an overlap between them. Only one of the 
systemically important participants is not identified as an endangered 
institution. 
  In sum, the six most active players measured by debit and credit 
turnover in VIBER could easily trigger a serious liquidity shock. On 
the other hand, these institutions could easily suffer from a liquidity 
shock if that is caused by a systemically important member. The six 
most active institutions, and in many cases their important customers 
(eg large foreign financial institutions for whom domestic banks are 
HUF correspondents), are active money market participants in the FX 
swap segment. A recent FX settlement survey by the central bank 
(Tanai, 2007) showed that these participants recorded the largest FX 
settlement risk in the domestic banking sector. These credit 
institutions initiate large amount of transactions in VIBER with a 
relatively small balance sheet. Should a liquidity shock arise in the 
system (eg due to improper functioning of financial markets or 
operational incidents), their balance sheets could easily be a 
bottleneck. On the one hand, the relatively high velocity of liquidity 
makes the institutions vulnerable to unexpected liquidity shocks but  
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4.3.4  Assumptions of the different stress scenarios 
In the paper operational failure is defined as the existence of technical 
problems for one or more system participants other than the MNB. 
The technically defaulted participants are unable to send and receive 
payment messages, ie they are unable to access the SWIFT network. 
Inability of technically defaulted participants to send and receive 
payment messages would not hinder other non-defaulted participants 
from sending payments to the problematic credit institutions. 
  The liquidity risk caused by operational disruptions is examined 
via several scenarios. The scenarios are hypothetical and based on 
stylised operational failures, though they might not be far from reality. 
The scenarios are based on different assumptions concerning: 
 
•  the behavioural reactions of technically non-defaulted participants, 
•  the timing and length of the operational failures, 
•  the number of technically defaulted, systemically important 
participants, and 
•  application of existing back-up procedures. 
 
 
4.3.4.1  Behavioural reactions of technically non-defaulted 
participants 
In the simulations several behavioural assumptions are made. On the 
one hand, it is assumed that the behaviour and payment patterns of the 
non-defaulted VIBER participants are not affected by the initial shock. 
This behavioural assumption of no reaction has several dimensions. 
Firstly, it is assumed that the settlement banks wish to settle the same 
volume and value of transactions (even to the technically defaulted 
participant) with the same priority as under normal business 
conditions. Secondly, in the model, the settlement banks do not raise 
additional liquidity by borrowing funds from the parent bank or the 
interbank market in order to ensure settlement of all their payment 
orders. Based on inquiry-responses from some Hungarian credit 
institutions, this behavioural assumption is not far from reality for 
(already) agreed obligations. There might be several reasons why 
banks do not stop sending payments to the stricken bank. Firstly, the 
technical infrastructure of the payment systems located in the back  
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offices is very complex. Most of the payment orders are generated 
automatically from several internal back office systems as the last step 
of the straight through processing (STP). As a consequence, it is not 
easy to modify the list of payment orders waiting for transmission to 
the central settlement engine. Secondly, the banks cannot take risks 
with their reputations. If a bank wishes to maintain its high prestige, it 
should prove that it is able to fulfil its contractual commitments, even 
in the face of problems. Thirdly, a contractual commitment is an 
obligation which, if not met, could have legal and financial 
consequences. 
  On the other hand, in separate scenarios we assume that the 
settlement banks are not passive economic agents. Instead they take 
actions to prevent the bank under distress from becoming a liquidity 
sink and they stop sending payments to the bank experiencing the 
technical default (stop sending rule). In real life it usually takes time 
to get information about participants’ technical problems. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that there is a time-lag between a VIBER 
participant experiencing an operational failure and the timing of phone 
calls in which the technically defaulted bank announces its problems 
to the MNB. It can also happen that, even before the announcement, 
the intact settlement banks notice that they are not receiving expected 
incoming payments and want to know whether the MNB has any 
information about the source of the problem at the settlement bank 
under distress. They usually call the central bank in order to obtain 
more information. Empirical evidence suggests that, even if the intact 
members become fully informed, they usually do not know whether 
they should stop sending payments. The central bank usually 
encourages them to submit their payments. There is high degree of 
uncertainty about how much time the elimination of information 
asymmetry requires. In our simulations we assume two hours reaction 
time, thus the stop sending rule applied in two hours is simulated. To 




4.3.4.2  The timing and the length of operational failures 
The timing and length of operational incidents have a large impact on 
system performance. In one set of simulations the worst-case 
scenarios are considered. It is assumed that the operational incident 
occurs no later than the opening of VIBER and lasts until the end of 
the business day (entire day incident). Thus, the technical problem  
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arose no later than 8:00 a.m. CET and could not be sorted out until 
5:00 p.m. CET. 
  We also ran simulations where the starting point of the operational 
failure is not fixed in advance but the length of the incident is set at a 
pre-defined level, 4 or six hours respectively (part-time incidents). In 
this case the timing of the operational incident is the outcome of a 
worst-case scenario maximization routine. We look for an appropriate 
algorithm to find the worst-case scenario; the operational failure 
should arise when it has the largest negative impact on the system. 
  However, there are some constraints. The disruption of payment 
processing can be sufficiently severe only if the banks wish to settle 
many payments during the rest of the business day. As a consequence, 
it is of no interest to analyse the impact of an incident that happens 
close to the end of the business day, as the value of remaining 
transactions to be settled would be low. The daily cumulative 
distribution of payment flows showed that in VIBER most payments 
(80–90% of turnover) are settled by 2 p.m. CET. Thus, it is not useful 
to let the operational incident occur later than that. 
 
 
4.3.4.3  The number and list of technically defaulted participants 
Initially it was assumed that a single settlement bank is unable to 
submit payments to VIBER owing to a failure of its internal back-
office system. The technical problem is isolated; a single bank is hit 
by the shock. As we are interested in the disturbance of the payment 
system in the worst case, there is no point in choosing a minor 
participant whose failure would not have a significant impact on the 
functioning of VIBER. Thus, we assume that systemically important 
institutions are affected by the technical problem.
4 In this paper, as we 
focus on the worst case, we quantify the impact of the first six 
systemically most important institutions. 
  Via additional scenarios we also quantify the risk implications of 
an operational disruption affecting the ability of multiple settlement 
banks to submit payments to VIBER. If we selected two banks 
randomly from the 38 participants, we would end up with 703 possible 
combinations. If we selected three banks randomly we would arrive at 
                                          
4 Note that occasionally it might happen that operational problems at a bank with a 
relatively lower debit turnover results in a severe disruption of the payment system. The 
connectedness of the bank and the unequal distribution of liquidity might also play a 
crucial role. Nevertheless, the probability of a small bank generating a large shock is 
relatively low.  
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8,436 various combinations. The modification of the input data and, in 
the case of a part-time incident, the worst-case scenario maximisation 
procedure would take too long for all of these combinations. As a 
result, we opted for analysing the worst cases and we assumed that the 
technical problems hit two of the six systemically most important 
institutions. This resulted in 15 possible pairs of banks suffering from 
a technical problem simultaneously. It is important to stress that the 
probability of such an incident is low. 
 
 
4.3.4.4 Possible  contingency  procedures 
The functioning of the system in a distressed situation can be 
enhanced if back-up procedures are in place. In some countries these 
contingency procedures usually require time-consuming manual 
intervention. There exist quicker (mostly electronic) back-up facilities, 
but this is not the case in Hungary. We assume that one or more 
participants cannot submit their payments via SWIFT, but 
communicating via fax, which is the back-up for SWIFT, is feasible. 
The identification of not-yet-sent payments, the production of the 
paper-based credit transfer with all the required data and the 
submission of the fax to the central bank requires some time, like the 
processing of these fax-based transactions at the central bank.
5 It is 
important to note that, due to the fear of duplicating payments, 
participants hesitate to use back-up options. 
 
 
4.4 Simulation  results 
4.4.1  General considerations on simulation techniques 
The technical default of one or more VIBER participants has both 
direct and indirect effects on system performance. The direct effect is 
obvious: operational failure of the settlement bank prevents the 
concerned bank from submitting payments to the system. If the 
problem is severe enough and cannot be fixed before the end of the 
business day, in the absence of contingency arrangements, the 
                                          
5 The work at the central bank takes approximately five minutes per transaction. During 
the simulations we assumed four persons as an average number of staff members in the 
VIBER team of the central bank. This means that in one hour the VIBER team is able to 
process approximately 50 fax-based transactions.  
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settlement bank under distress will end up with many unsettled 
transactions. In addition to this direct effect, there might be significant 
indirect, so-called network effects. Namely, as the liquidity position of 
each VIBER participant is influenced by payment flows, if one 
settlement bank is unable to send payments, the liquidity position of 
the remaining participants is threatened. This, in turn, could force the 
initially unaffected settlement banks to queue and thus delay 
payments. It might also happen that a large amount of liquidity is 
drained out of the system, as it is accumulated on the account of the 
bank experiencing the technical problem. As a consequence, there 
might be banks short of liquidity, and they might end up with rejected 
payments at the end of the day. Both direct and indirect impacts are 
captured by the performance indicators. 
  For simulation purposes, on the day of the incident, the 
transactions initiated by the technically defaulted participants should 
be removed or modified. The transactions should be removed if it is 
assumed that the operational problem cannot be solved before the end 
of the day. The transactions should be modified if it is assumed that 
the bank managed to solve the operational problem within the 
business day. In this latter case the time stamps (receipt times) of the 
transactions should be altered. The modified time stamps should 
reflect the point in time when the bank managed to sort out the 
technical problem. 
  Payment instructions initiated by technically functioning 
participants (including infrastructure like the CSD/SSS) to be debited 
or credited on the account of the defaulted participants are processed 
normally. Transactions processed normally include mandated 
payments.
6 In addition, warehoused outgoing payments of technically 
defaulted participant are processed normally as well. 
  If it is assumed that the initially unaffected participants do not 
react to the shock, no modification in the initial dataset is needed. 
However, the participants may react to the liquidity shock. If the 
banks apply the stop sending rule, the time stamp of the transactions 
which are sent two hours after the beginning of the incident should be 
                                          
6 At default, the transactions are initiated by the debited bank. However, there are cases 
when payments are initiated by someone else. These payments are called mandated 
payments and are initiated, for instance, by the central bank (eg settlement of clearing 
positions of the ancillary systems) or by the CSD/SSS (eg DVP transactions). Mandated 
payments include the START transfers, the DVP transactions initiated by KELER, the 
multinet settlement of stock exchange deals, the settlement of card transactions and cash 
withdrawals with the central bank, etc.  
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modified. The new time stamp of the transactions should reflect the 
time of the restoration of the SWIFT connection. 
  In the simulations it is implicitly assumed that the banks are able 
to solve the problem right after the official closing of VIBER and 
somehow the payments are settled. We do not simulate two- or three-
day operational incidents. 
 
 
4.4.2 Simulated  scenarios 
The simulations of operational failure scenarios are based on a 
combination of assumptions (see Subection 4.3.4). The assumptions 
applied in the simulations are summarised in Table 4.4. In the first 
simulation setup (Scenario 1 to 3) entire-day incidents were imitated. 
It was assumed that the operational failure starts at the beginning of 
the day and the bank under distress cannot sort out the problem until 
the end of the business day. In each scenario one of the six 
systemically most important banks became unable to send payment 
orders. In Scenario 1, shown in the first column of Table 4.4, no back-
up facilities and behavioural reactions were assumed. In Scenario 2 
we examine the shock-mitigating impact of back-up facilities. In 
Scenario 3 the disturbance of the payments system was assessed if 
technically non-defaulted participants took actions to prevent the bank 
under distress from becoming a liquidity sink, and stopped sending 
payments to the bank experiencing the technical default after two 
hours (stop sending rule). 
 
Table 4.4  Scenarios examined in simulation exercises 
 
  Entire day incident  Part-time incidents 
Scenario  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of technically defaulted 
participants  1 1 1 1 1 2 
Duration of the incident (hours)  9  9  9  4  6  4 
Contingency procedures: Back-up 
facilities  – + – – – – 
Behavioral reaction of technically non-
defaulted  participants  – – + – – – 
 
 
In the second simulation setup more realistic part-time incidents were 
simulated. We looked for worst-case scenarios in which operational 
failures of given length occurred when the value weighted submission 
delay for payment orders sent by one of the six systemically most  
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important banks was the highest. In the worst-case scenario 
maximisation procedure, the values of postponed payments were 
weighted by the time lag between submission and the end of the 
operational incident. The weighing of payments by the time left until 
the end of the incident takes into account both the value of the 
payment and the delay in submission (consequently the delay in 
settlement). 
  In the worst-case scenario maximisation procedure, only the length 
of the incident and the number of technically-defaulted banks were 
provided as input parameters. It was assumed that the technical 
problem can be sorted out in either four or in six hours, but no later 
than the end of the business day.
7 In Scenarios 4 and 5 one bank 
defaulted technically and the incident lasted for four or six hours 
respectively. Scenario 6 corresponds to a situation where an 
operational problem affected two banks simultaneously for four hours. 
It was assumed that the incidents began at the same moment. For the 
sake of simplicity, it was also assumed that the technical problems 
were sorted out within the same time period. 
  The output of the worst-case scenario maximisation gave us the 
starting point for the operational failure and the list of technically 
defaulted participants. The timing and the technically defaulted 
bank(s) were not necessarily the same across the days. They were 
highly dependent on the daily payments patterns. 
 
 
4.4.3 Disturbance  in  the  payment system: entire-day 
incidents (Scenarios 1–3) 
4.4.3.1  Scenario 1: Entire-day incidents – no back-up facilities 
and no behavioural reactions 
The simulation results for the first scenario are summarised in Tables 
4.5 and 4.6. As a first step it was assumed that the bank with the 
highest turnover suffers from an operational incident and is unable to 
submit payments during the entire business day. The counterparties 
did not change their behaviour and back-up facilities were not in 
place. Detailed results of the simulations accessing the impact of the 
                                          
7 Quantifying the effects of incidents lasting for three or five hours, for example, could 
also have been reasonable and realistic. However, in order to reduce the number of 
simulated scenarios, we disregarded these possibilities. Further research could be done in 
this direction as well.  
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other five technically defaulted participants on the payment system are 
presented in Appendix 1 of Lublóy and Tanai (2008). 
  As shown in Table 4.5, due to the technical default of Bank 1 an 
average 16.3% of the payments could not be submitted to the system. 
On 6 of the 41 days more than 20% of the payments sent in the 
benchmark scenario were not submitted at all. Meanwhile, there were 
no rejected payments in the benchmark scenario. In this scenario on 
average 16.2% of the submitted payments remained unsettled. As 
shown in the last column of Table 4.5, in the very extreme worst-case 
scenario, 21.7% of the payments were not submitted and 34.7% of the 
payments submitted were rejected. In comparison with the benchmark 
scenario, on average altogether 31.0% of the payments remained 
unsettled, while in the worst case 50.9% of the payments remained 
unsettled (either not submitted or rejected). The indicator of 
multiplication equals the ratio of the value of rejected payments over 
the value of non-submitted payments. The indicator reflects the 
following: one unit of non-submitted payment resulted in x units of 
rejected payment. In the worst-case the multiplication effect equalled 
1.25, meaning that a single unit of non-submitted payment resulted in 
1.25 units of rejected payment. 
  In an international comparison,
8 the proportion of unsettled 
transactions is remarkably high. This can be explained by the high 
concentration of debit and credit turnover and by high rank 
correlations. The banks – being relatively poorly endowed with 
liquidity – rely consciously on financing via incoming payments. 
Thus, if there is a deficit in the incoming payments, outgoing 
payments cannot be settled due to lack of funds. Not surprisingly, the 
five banks disposing of the highest value of unsettled transactions 
include the banks with the highest debit and credit turnover in VIBER. 
They account for around 88% of unsettled payments. Due to the 
liquidity drain effect, these banks are left with 26% of rejected 
payments on average at the end of each day. Four other small banks, 
having close relations with the banks active in the payment system, 
suffer heavily from the liquidity drain effect as well. They cannot send 
16% to 34% of their payment orders respectively. All of the nine 
banks can be found in the list of possibly endangered participants. 
  Another important explanation of the high proportion of unsettled 
transactions might be linked to the structure and size of the money 
markets. In the euro zone several large market participants (eg JP 
                                          
8 See eg the studies of Bedford et al (2004), Mazars and Woefel (2005), Schmitz et al 
(2006), Ledrut (2007) or the Financial Stability Review of the National Bank of Belgium 
(2007).  
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Morgan, Morgan Stanley) might be considered ‘small’, at least 
compared to the size of the entire euro market. In contrast, in Hungary 
the above-mentioned large market participants – involved in some 
HUF deals through their correspondent banks – might be considered 
large, especially relative to the size of the market. 
 
Table 4.5  Disturbance in payment system: 
      operational incident at Bank 1 
 
Bank 1 – Entire day incident  Minimum  Average  Maximum 
Value of non-submitted payments 
 (in % of the benchmark scenario) 
4.6% 16.3%  21.7% 
Value of rejected payments 
(in % of submitted payments) 
0% 16.2%  34.7% 
Value of unsettled payments 
(in % of the benchmark scenario) 
2.0% 31.0%  50.9% 
Multiplication  effect  0.00 0.83 1.25 
Total value of queued transactions 







Maximum queue value 





















Compared to the benchmark case, the total value of queued 
transactions, measured as the percentage of submitted payments, was 
approximately 2.34 times higher. Note that in the last four rows the 
figures in the brackets show how many times the indicator became 
larger in the case of the disturbance compared to the normal operation 
of VIBER. In the worst case, more than half (54.0%) of the submitted 
payments were in the queue once, for either a shorter or longer period. 
Both the average and the maximum of the maximum queue value 
indicators increased significantly, to 4.52 and 3.79 times higher 
respectively. The average queue length increased drastically as well, 
to 2.65 times higher than average. If Bank 1 suffered from an 
operational incident, the average of the settlement delay indicator 
equalled 0.29. This is more than 4 times higher than in the benchmark 
case. Note that the minimum of the delay indicator is 13 times higher 
than in the benchmark case. 
  Table 4.6 compares the outcomes of the simulations where one of 
the six systemically important participants suffers from an operational 
incident. The values shown in Table 4.6 are averaged over 41 days. 
The minimum and the maximum of the corresponding indicators are  
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shown in Appendix 1 of Lublóy and Tanai (2008). Evidently, the 
lower the turnover of the participants in VIBER, the lower the value 
of payments not submitted to the system (measured as a percentage of 
value of payments of the benchmark scenario). The value of unsettled 
payments also decreases slightly. In the case of the bank with the 
highest turnover, on average 16.2% of the submitted payments were 
rejected, while in the remainder of the cases the corresponding figure 
ranges from 0.5% to 13.8%. The multiplication effect is strongest in 
the case of the technical default of Bank 2, on average 1 unit if non-
submitted payments generated more than one unit of rejected 
payment. 
 
Table 4.6  Disturbance of payment system 
     in  Scenario  1 
 
  Bank 1  Bank 2  Bank 3  Bank 4  Bank 5  Bank 6 
Value of non-submitted payments 
(in % of the benchmark scenario) 
16.3%  13.7%  10.3%  6.6% 5.8% 4.5% 
Value of rejected payments 
(in % of submitted payments) 
16.2%  13.8%  7.0% 3.1% 2.7% 0.5% 
Value of unsettled payments 
(in % of the benchmark scenario) 
31.0%  26.7%  17.2%  9.9% 8.6% 5.1% 
Multiplication effect  0.83 1.01 0.68 0.47 0.46 0.11 
Total value of queued transactions 













Maximu queue value 







































The total value of queued transactions is almost the same for the first 
three banks. If an operational incident hits one of the three banks with 
the largest turnover in VIBER, one third of the transactions are queued 
up for some time during the business day. The corresponding figure is 
one fifth for the bank with the sixth largest turnover in VIBER. The 
maximum queue value, the average queue length and the settlement 
also decrease significantly in relation to turnover. In general, queue 
and delay indicators show a more favourable picture with a lesser role 
for the shocked VIBER participants. 
  The message from the simulation exercise is straightforward. 
Regarding liquidity levels and unchanged timing behaviour, an 
operational incident at the most active players can lead to serious 
disturbances in VIBER. The disturbance highly depends on the daily 
payment patterns; the severity caused by the incident changes from  
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day to day. Operational incidents at the three systemically most 
important banks require special attention, especially if their problem 
cannot be sorted out until the end of the day. There are several lines of 
defence which can mitigate the severity of such operational incidents. 
The first includes (electronic) back-up facilities. If they work 
properly, the incident might not even be noticed by other VIBER 
participants. In the next subsection we examine the impact of the time-
consuming, paper-based back-up solution. The second factor which 
can provide some protection for the intact members lies in adapting to 
the situation. It is important to note that the technically non-defaulted 
banks would probably trade with operationally viable counterparties 
more than with the bank in a distressed situation. If this is the case, the 
payment pattern is changed as part of the intraday trade is adjusted. 
Since the intraday financial market trades were not identified in the 
paper, we overestimated the consequences of operational incidents. 
 
 
4.4.3.2  Scenario 2: Entire-day incidents – Back-up facilities 
without behavioural reactions 
In this section we examine the shock-mitigating impact of back-up 
facilities. We assume that effective business continuity arrangements 
are in place and back-up options are employed one hour before system 
closing. The processing of payments was assumed to be carried out 
manually. Thus, we do not take account of the possibility that the 
back-up options enable settlement of a very large number of payments 
before system closing. In the simulations it was assumed that the 
banks under distress can submit altogether 50 payments. The 
payments were ranked initially by priorities set by the banks, secondly 
by the amount of the transactions and thirdly by the receipt time of the 
central accounting system. The first 50 transactions in this ranking 
were submitted to VIBER one hour before closing of the system. Note 
that implicitly it was assumed that the internal systems of the stricken 
banks work properly and thus the stricken banks have up-to-date 
information about their payment obligations. 
  Table 4.7 summarises the disturbance in the payment system under 
Scenario 2. The values shown in Table 4.7 are averaged over 41 days. 
The minimum and the maximum values of the corresponding 
indicators are shown in Appendix 2 of Lublóy and Tanai (2008). If 
Bank 1 submits 50 of its daily 482 payments at the end of the business 
day, then only 3.0% of the payments were not submitted to the system 
instead of the 16.3% of the payments in Scenario 1. (For comparison 
see Table 4.6.) The value of rejected payments also decreased  
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significantly, from 16.2% to 0.1%. There is no such significant decline 
in the value of the indicators relating to the queue statistics. The 
significant queues and delays in the system can be explained by the 
fact that the payments of the technically defaulted bank are channelled 
to the system in the last hour of the business day. 
 
Table 4.7  Disturbance of payment system 
     in  Scenario  2 
 
  Bank 1  Bank 2  Bank 3  Bank 4  Bank 5  Bank 6 
Value of non-submitted payments 
(in % of the benchmark scenario) 
3.0% 8.2% 5.0% 3.1% 0.2% 0.1% 
Value of rejected payments 
(in % of submitted payments) 
0.1% 5.8% 2.3% 1.0%  0%  0% 
Value of unsettled payments 
(in % of the benchmark scenario) 
3.3% 14.5% 7.5%  4.4%  0.3%  0.1% 
Multiplication effect  0.03 0.71 0.45 0.31 0.00 0.04 
Total value of queued transactions 













Maximu queue value 







































If Bank 2 or Bank 3 suffers from the operational incident but employs 
back-up facilities, then the decline in the proportion of unsubmitted 
and rejected payments is significantly lower than in the case of 
Bank 1. This can be explained by the fact that the 50 transactions that 
were booked manually do not have the highest values. On several days 
Bank 2 and Bank 3 had many customer payments with high priority. 
As the values of these payments are much lower than the values of 
bank-to-bank payments, it could be that the payments with the far 
highest values were not submitted to the system. On these days, the 
liquidity drain effect showed a very similar pattern to that of 
Scenario 1. 
  As shown in Table 4.7, if Bank 4 is under distress but uses the 
back-up facility, then the disturbance to the payments system is 
somehow similar to the disturbance caused by Bank 1. If Bank 5 and 
Bank 6 are technically defaulted, but 50 of their transactions are 
booked manually at the end of the business day, there will be almost 
no rejected payments. In contrast, compared to the benchmark 
scenario, the queues became larger and lasted longer. This is reflected 
in the figures in brackets, which tell how many times the indicator  
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became larger in a distressed situation compared to the normal 
operation of VIBER. 
  If we compare the results of the entire-day incident with and 
without back-up facilities, we might conclude that even if the number 
of payments processed manually is limited, the effect of submission to 
the system of the payments stuck in the internal queues of the 
technically defaulted banks is positive. This is obvious if we compare 
Table 4.6 with Table 4.7. Nevertheless, the improvement depends 
heavily on the selection procedure of manually processed payments. 
We have chosen a prioritization scheme that leads to significant 
improvement if the incident happens at Bank 1, Bank 5 or Bank 6. 
The disruption of the payment system remained almost unchanged 
when operational failure occurred at Bank 2, Bank 3 or Bank 4. In 
sum, the improvement achieved by back-up facilities is highly 
dependent on how the technically defaulted institution chooses the 
payments to be processed manually in a distressed situation. 
 
 
4.4.3.3  Scenario 3: Entire-day incidents – Behavioural reactions 
without back-up facilities 
Table 4.8 shows the disturbance of the payments system if one of the 
banks is hit by an operational incident and the rest of the system reacts 
by blocking their payments to the stricken bank within two hours. 
Comparing Table 4.8 with Table 4.6, we conclude that by applying the 
stop sending rule the non-submitted payments increased significantly 
and the value of rejected payments decreased drastically. This fact is 
also nicely captured by the indicator of multiplication that remained 
below 0.1 in all cases. The composition of unsettled payments is very 
different. In Scenario 1 a high proportion of payments is rejected due 
to insufficient liquidity. The liquidity drain effect is significant; many 
banks suffer from the impact of the technical default. In contrast, in 
Scenario 3 banks try to escape from the liquidity drain effect by not 
submitting their payments to the bank under distress. Many payments 
are withheld; the high disruption of the payment system can be 
explained by this behaviour. It is important to stress that, despite the 
higher proportion of unsettled payments in Scenario 3, the shock 
remains isolated. The disruption of the payment system is strongly 
connected to payments not submitted by the bank under distress and to 
payments not submitted to the bank under distress. 
  The value of payments that remained unsettled (unsubmitted or 
rejected) is higher in Scenario 3 than in Scenario 1. This is the price of 
isolating the shock and privileging payments sent to other participants.  
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The higher value of unsettled payments means that some kept-back 
payments could have been settled. Comparing the evolution of queues 
and delays in Scenario 1 and Scenario 3, we concluded that in 
Scenario 3 the transactions are settled more smoothly and the queues 
and the delays are shorter. For more detailed insight into the 
disturbance of the payment system under Scenario 3, see Appendix 3 
of Lublóy and Tanai (2008). 
 
Table 4.8  Disturbance of payment system 
     in  Scenario  3 
 
  Bank 1  Bank 2  Bank 3  Bank 4  Bank 5  Bank 6 
Value of non-submitted payments 
(in % of the benchmark scenario) 
29.6% 25.5% 18.4% 12.1% 10.9%  8.0% 
Value of rejected payments 
(in % of submitted payments) 
2.6% 2.0% 1.6% 0.7% 0.5% 0.2% 
Value of unsettled payments 
(in % of the benchmark scenario) 
32.5%  28.2%  20.4% 3.3% 11.8% 8.5% 
Multiplication effect  0.09 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.03 
Total value of queued transactions 
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As Scenario 3 relies on behavioural expectations, the results should be 
analysed with caution. We applied stop sending rules in the 
simulations without filtering out the intraday financial transactions 
(transactions agreed and settled on the day of the incident), which 
could be misleading. In order to see the influence of the stop sending 
rule, intraday financial transactions should be mapped. In addition, we 
think that stop sending is very doubtful behaviour. It is more realistic 
to assume that operationally viable participants fulfil their agreed 
obligations in the course of the day and payments sent to the 
technically defaulted bank are placed to the end of the internal or 
external queues. It could also happen that transactions in question are 
only submitted at the end of the business day. If in the absence 
incoming payments the participants face liquidity deficits and cannot 
finance all of their outgoing transactions, they would try to finance 
payments to the participant under distress from payments to be 
received from the participant suffering from the shock. Consequently, 
management of the loss reallocation would be easier afterwards. 
Usually the loss reallocation works very smoothly between  
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participants. Further research is required to map changes in intraday 




4.4.4  Disturbance in the payment system:  
part-time incidents (Scenarios 4–6) 
In Scenarios 4 and 5 it was assumed that one bank suffers from an 
operational incident and is unable to send payment orders to its 
counterparties for four and six hours respectively. The beginning and 
the end of the four- and six-hour intervals were calculated via the 
worst-case scenario maximisation procedure detailed in Subsection 
4.4.2. Of the 41 days analysed, in Scenarios 4 and 5, on 35 days and 
32 days respectively the bank most active in the payment system 
would have to suffer from on operational incident in order to cause the 
most severe disturbance in the payment system. On the other the days, 
the second, third and fourth participants most active in the payment 
system would have to suffer from the operational incident in order to 
have the most serious impact on the payment system. In Scenario 6, in 
most of the cases, the joint technical default of Banks 1 and 2 (20 
cases) vs. Banks 1 and 3 (17 cases) generated the highest values of 
payments not submitted on time. 
  Table 4.9 shows the value of transactions not submitted on time in 
Scenarios 4 to 6. The maximum, the average and the minimum of the 
value of payments with delayed submission are displayed. Obviously, 
if the incident lasts longer or two banks default technically, the value 
of transactions not submitted on time increases. In Scenarios 4, 5 and 
6, the average value of transactions not submitted on time equals 466 
billion, 541 billion and 806 billion HUF respectively. 
 
Table 4.9  Value of transactions not submitted on time 
     (million  HUF) 
 
 Minimum  Average  Maximum 
Scenario 4  75 040  466 334  650 003 
Scenario 5  98 459  540 828  773 256 




Table 4.10 provides some information on the timing of incidents. The 
beginnings of the operational incidents occurring the earliest and latest 
on average are highlighted. If the incident lasts six hours, it should 
start earlier compared to an incident lasting for four hours. 
 
Table 4.10  Timing of incidents 
 
 Minimum  Average  Maximum 
Scenario 4  8:52:16  9:54:56  12:36:05 
Scenario 5  8:01:22  9:25:48  10:16:16 
Scenario 6  8:23:46  9:47:25  11:12:05 
 
 
Table 4.11 illustrates the simulation results for part-time incidents. 
Note that, as the values of non-submitted payments to the system and 
the value of unsettled payments are all zero, they are excluded from 
the table. By comparing the simulation result to the benchmark 
scenario (see Table 4.3) we conclude that, in line with our 
expectations, more queues and longer delays show up in the system. 
The average of the total value of queued transactions increased by 
almost 50% in Scenarios 4 and 6, and by 75% in Scenario 5. The two 
extremes (minimum and maximum) almost remained unchanged. The 
average of the maximum queue value also increased notably. 
Compared to the benchmark case, it became 2.66, 3.55 and 3.85 times 
higher in Scenarios 5, 6 and 7 respectively. The maximum queue 
value is more than two times higher in each part-time incident 
scenario than in the benchmark. The average queue length increased 
by 12 minutes in Scenario 4, by 27 minutes in Scenario 5, and by 21 
minutes in Scenario 6. In the benchmark case the average of the 
settlement delay equalled 0.07. The average of the delay indicator 
increased by around 75% in Scenarios 4 and 6, and tripled in 
Scenario 5. 
 
Table 4.11  Simulation results for part-time incidents 
 
 Scenario  4  Scenario 5  Scenario 6 
 Minimum  Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum Average  Maximum 
Total value of queued 
transactions (in % of 
submitted payments) 
2.4%  24.5% 37.9%  0.8%  28.7% 40.8%  3.0%  23.5% 37.7% 
Maximum queue value 
(in % of submitted 
payments) 
2.0%  11.4% 24.8%  0.4%  14.4% 31.1%  2.0%  12.2% 24.7% 
Average queue length 
(hh:mm:ss)  0:23:48  0:52:58 1:21:04 0:46:16  1:07:56 1:59:37 0:16:52  1:01:57 1:27:19 




If we compare the part-time incident scenarios with each other it is 
interesting that Scenarios 4 and 6 show very similar properties. In both 
cases the incidents lasted for four hours; nevertheless in Scenario 4 
one, while in Scenario 6 two, banks suffered from the operational 
incidents. The similar queue and delay properties can be explained by 
two adverse effects. First, the value of payments submitted later is 
higher in Scenario 6. This should obviously result in larger queues and 
longer delays. Second, the banks suffering from the operational 
incidents also transact intensively with each other. If both of them 
send their payments as soon as the incidents are sorted out, their 
payments will not remain long in the queue. This is why it could 
happen that we do not experience more significant queues and delays 
in Scenario 6 than in Scenario 4. In Scenario 5 the operational incident 
lasted for six hours. The simulation results are in line with our 





The simulations carried out can be considered a first step in evaluating 
the ability of the Hungarian payment system to withstand certain types 
of operational shocks. When entire-day incidents without back-up 
options and behavioural reactions were simulated, the disturbances to 
the payment system was severe. In international comparisons, the 
proportion of unsettled transactions is remarkably high. Queues and 
delays were also higher than in the simulation exercises of other 
countries. This can be explained by the high concentration of debit 
turnover in VIBER and by the fact that the most active participants are 
generally not those with abundant liquidity. Another important 
explanation might be linked to the structure and size of the money 
markets. 
  If back-up options were employed, then the disturbance to the 
payment system was significantly less. This stresses the importance 
and potential efficacy of back-up procedures. However, the shock-
absorbing capacity of the system depends heavily on the selection 
procedure for manually processed payments. In the case of operational 
incidents, the MNB should stipulate that the banks select not only the 
transactions with the highest priority but also those with the highest 
value. 
  Behavioural reactions were also taken into account; the initially 
unaffected participants reacted to the operational incident by blocking  
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payments to the stricken bank within two hours. As a result, the value 
of non-submitted payments increased significantly and the value of 
rejected payments decreased drastically. By withholding many 
payments the value of payments remaining unsettled (either not 
submitted or rejected) was raised. This is the price of isolating the 
shock and privileging payments sent to other participants. The higher 
value of unsettled payments means that some of the held-up payments 
could have been settled. 
  By analysing the impact of scenarios involving part-time incidents, 
we concluded that more queues and longer delays showed up in the 
system. By comparing the part-time incident scenarios with each 
other, we experienced similar settlement patterns regardless of the 
number of defaulting banks. The similar queue and delay properties 
can be explained in this case by the mutual interdependence of the two 
shocked banks – they trade very actively with each other. 
  The simulation exercise has several drawbacks, which lead to the 
overestimation of liquidity risk. First, we assumed that the participants 
do not raise additional funds. Secondly, we assumed unchanged 
trading patterns during the entire business day, ie that the banks 
planned to settle the same volumes and values of transactions with the 
same counterparties and with the same priorities as under normal 
business conditions. Probably such behaviour would not take place, as 
banks are not passive economic agents and would adjust their trading 
patterns to the shock situation. Banks short of liquidity might 
postpone some of their transactions and attempt to settle fewer 
transactions on the day of the shock. Moreover, the banks would 
surely favour participants with operating infrastructure and with 
abundant liquidity. Thus, not only would the value and volume of 
intraday transactions be lower, but also the counterparties to trade 
with would be reset. 
  Moreover, not only the trading patterns, but (except for the 
scenario with the stop sending rule) the settlement behaviour was also 
assumed to be constant. Banks initially unaffected by the operational 
incident did not place payments to the technically defaulted bank at 
the end of the internal or external queues, or did not alter the timing of 
the payments (for example, by submitting the transaction to the 
defaulter at the end of the business day). In this way the severity of 
disruption might be overestimated again. Probably those participants 
that face liquidity shortage would try to finance payments to the 
participant under distress from the payments to be received from it by 
re-prioritizing or altering the time stamps of the transactions. 
  As we had no information on how the trading patterns and 
settlement behaviours of banks would change in distressed periods, we  
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tried to keep the simulations as simple as possible and avoided making 
further, more speculative assumptions. As a next step, by means of 
qualitative and quantitative research methods, more investigation is 
needed to model precisely the behaviour of the banks in shock 
situations. 
  As for policy implications, the role of the MNB in a crisis situation 
is of crucial importance. The MNB is the player that communicates 
with the participants and might be able to influence the settlement 
behaviour by providing up-to-date information on the nature of the 
operational incident. In addition, there seems to be a small number of 
VIBER participants whose operational failure can markedly affect the 
functioning of the system. In the future, as regards central bank 
oversight, more attention should be paid to the back-up facilities and 
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5  Simulations in the Dutch 
interbank payment system: 
A sensitivity analysis 
Abstract 
This paper presents an analysis of the sensitivity of the Dutch 
interbank payment system with respect to value transferred and the 
amount of available collateral. The Dutch system can be characterised 
as having a few large and many fairly small participants. Historical 
data has been used and modified to create a stress scenario. The 
changes in respect to the historical data are an increase or a decrease 
in payment values for one of the large participants. These changes in 
payment value are calculated for the three large banks in the Dutch 
system. The collateral level was modified between the different stress 
scenarios. In total, three levels of collateral are investigated, of which 
one is based on historical data and two on theoretical values that 
would optimise collateral usage. The results of this paper are 
presented in terms of both the number of banks affected and the 
amount of unsettled values at the end of the day. A disruption of one 
of the large banks does not have a huge impact on the other large 
banks in the system. The small banks however do face more liquidity 




Total disruptions of payment systems are relatively rare. Therefore 
there is not much historical evidence on how payment systems react to 
a disruption. Even in the current financial crisis the payment systems 
worldwide have functioned without serious disruptions. One of the 
most well known operational disruptions in the interbank payment 
system is the attacks on the world trade centre in New York on 11 
September 2001. The massive damage to property and communication 
systems made it more difficult or even impossible for some banks to 
execute payments to other banks. Such a disruption can have effects 
beyond the immediate counterparties of banks disrupted by the shock. 
In extreme cases they might even disrupt the whole financial system.  
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  Simulations are used to gain a better understanding of the potential 
impact of a disruption in the interbank payment system. The Bank of 
Finland has developed a payment system simulator (BoF PSS2) that 
has been proven to be a very useful tool for gaining insight into the 
effects of operational disruptions. Many simulations have been run 
using the BoF PSS2. Ledrut (2007) describes the impact of an 
operational failure, varying the time at which the disruption takes 
place and McVanel (2007) investigated the impact of unanticipated 
defaults in Canada’s Large Value Transfer System. A new direction of 
development of the BoF PSS2 is the integration of network topology; 
Soramäki et al (2007). 
  The simulator provides possibilities to simulate a delayed net 
settlement system (DNS) or a real time gross settlement system 
(RTGS). A DNS, which settles the payments after a predefined time 
span by transferring the net positions, uses the smallest amount of 
liquidity. The settlement risk of a DNS is the highest, because in case 
of a defaulting participant all payments after the last settled 
transactions may have to be unwound. A RTGS, which settles 
payments immediately and individually, requires the largest amount of 
liquidity, but the settlement risk is very low. There are many system 
designs between RTGS and DNS, often called hybrids, which require 
less liquidity than a pure RTGS. 
  The goal of this paper is to describe the potential impact on the 
payment system when one large participant in the Dutch interbank 
system faces a given (small or large) disruption. In the Netherlands, 
the impact of small-participant disruptions are modest for the total 
payment system, due to the small payment values involved. Therefore, 
a disruption of a small participant in the payment system is not 
discussed in this paper. 
  The types of disruptions simulated in this paper are an increase and 
a decrease in the outgoing transaction value of a certain percentage. 
The potential impact is measured by the number of banks with 
unsettled payments at the end of the day and by the corresponding 
value of unsettled payments. An increase in the total transaction value 
resulting from a temporary increase in the obligations of one large 
participant means that that participant ‘provides’ the other participants 
with extra liquidity (due to increased obligations) up until the large 
participant runs out of liquidity. The important issue here is how the 
extra liquidity is distributed over the participants: homogeneously or 
heterogeneously. A decrease in outgoing transaction value for the 
large participant leads to a decrease in liquidity available to the other 
participants. In this case it is interesting to see to what extent the other 
participants are able to deal with the lower level of liquidity without a  
126 
disruption of the whole payment system. One important parameter for 
the amount of available liquidity is the amount of central-bank-
approved collateral that is available to the participants. Simulations 
provide good insight into the potential effects, ie into the payment 
system’s sensitivity to disruptions. 
  The paper proceeds in a straightforward manner. Section 5.2 
describes the stress scenarios that are simulated and lists the general 
characteristics of the three large banks that are used to create the stress 
situations. Section 5.3 analyses the number of banks affected given 
those stress situations, and section 5.4 shows the value of unsettled 
payments of banks that use all of their collateral for intraday credit, 
the amount of collateral used by the banks with unsettled payments, 
and the total negative end of day balance of participants that have 
settled all their payments in a given stress scenario. Section 5.5 
concludes and offers some policy recommendations. 
 
 
5.2 Data  description 
5.2.1  The Dutch large value payment system 
The Dutch large value payment system, referred to as TOP until 18 
February 2008, was a Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) payment 
system. From 1999 to February 2008, it was part of the European 
TARGET1 system for euro-denominated payments.
1 
  For a payment system to function properly it is essential that 
participants have sufficient funds for making payments without delay. 
The means of achieving this vary across systems. In the Dutch system 
DNB,
2 like other Euro-system central banks, provides intraday credit 
(secured by collateral); see Ledrut (2006) for a discussion of the 
optimal provision of intraday liquidity. In effect, participants can use 
as payment liquidity their own credit balances or the credit facility. 
Participants can thus execute their outgoing transactions before 
receiving their incoming transactions for that day. Free intraday credit 
therefore facilitates smooth functioning of the payment system and 
prevents gridlocks. If the day’s closing balance is negative, the 
participating institution have to pay overnight interest. 
 
                                          
1 TARGET: Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer 
system. 
2 DNB: De Nederlandsche Bank (Dutch Central Bank).  
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5.2.2 Top  data 
The data set consists of transaction data for the months December 
2005 and April 2006 from the Dutch large value payment system 
(TOP). It includes all transactions carried out during these two 
months, both domestic and cross-border. The data set includes both 
payments made during regular opening hours of TOP and during the 
evening settlement. The incoming cross border transactions are also 
included in the dataset. Table 5.1 shows some key characteristics of 
TOP and compares them to other RTGS systems. 
 
Table 5.1  Key characteristics of daily payments in 
      TOP, TARGET, CHAPS Sterling and 
     Fedwire 
 
 TOP





Participants 155  10,197  Not 
available 
6,819 
Of which direct participants  100  1,126  15  Not 
available 
Transactions (x thousand)  18.4  312  116  519 
Value (x billion EUR)  120  1,987  297  1,634 
Average transaction value 
(x million EUR)  6.5  6.4  2.6  3.1 
Source: TOP (datawarehouse DNB), TARGET (ECB Bluebook), CHAPS and Fedwire 
(BIS, 2007 #3053). 
1 The values listed for TOP include only the figures are reported to the ECB for Blue 
Book statistics. They do not include incoming cross border payments, which do fall 
within the scope of this paper. 
2 The Pound sterling values are converted via US dollars to Euros. 
3 The US dollar values are converted to Euros via the exchange rate EUR/USD 0.8051, 
which is the average exchange rate for 2005 as listed in Red Book (BIS) 2006. 
 
 
Some participants have more than one account in TOP. These 
accounts are used by the participant for administrative purposes. In the 
simulations these accounts are treated separately. The results are 
however for the participant level. In case several accounts of a single 
participant have unsettled values at the end of the day, as a result of 




5.2.3 Stress  scenarios 
A stress scenario in this paper is defined as a modified dataset, based 
on historical data, given certain conditions. There are two parameters 
in the historical payment datasets, which have been modified in 
defining the stress scenarios: 
 
–  the outgoing payment value of one participant, expressed as a 
percentage (8 alternative values: 50%, 75%, 90%, 95%, 110%, 
125%, 150% and 200%), 
–  available collateral values for all participants; 3 alternative values: 
historic available collateral for intraday credit (HC), minimum 
liquidity to settle all payments at the end of the day when there is 
no disruption (lower bound or LB), and the liquidity necessary for 
immediate settlement of all payments when there is not disruption 
(upper bound or UB). 
 
The modified payment values are applied to: 
 
–  three large banks one at a time, 
–  two different months. 
 
The disruption period is set to: 
 
–  two different lengths of time (one day or the whole month). 
 
To define a scenario one option from each of the five items is chosen. 
  The three chosen banks are the three largest banks in TOP with 
respect to value transferred per day. For each of these three banks, the 
outgoing payment value either increased or decreased by a certain 
percentage. A decrease in payment value could result from a technical 
problem or an intentional delay by the participant. An increase in 
payment value could result from paying off of loans or a temporary 
increase in obligations. It might also be that customers move funds to 
other banks because they no longer trust their bank, due to market 
rumours about the bank, as observed in the current crisis. This may 
also be seen as a decrease in the payment value of all other banks. 
Even though this increase in outgoing value provides extra liquidity to 
the other participants as a whole, it need not mean that each 
participant will get its own share. The interesting question concerning 
such an increase in liquidity is whether this liquidity is distributed 
evenly over all participants.  
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  The data of December 2005 and April 2006 were used to define 
stress situations. The reason for choosing two different months is to 
investigate differences in outcome of stress simulations. It would be 
desirable from a statistical point of view to investigate all the months 
of the year, but this is a rather time consuming operation. The length 
of the disruption is either one day or the whole month. A disruption of 
one day means that unsettled payments at the end of the day will be 
deleted before going to the next. When the disruption or behaviour of 
a single bank lasts the whole month unsettled payments at the end of 
the day are the first payments to be settled the next day. Even though a 
disruption of a month is not very likely it provides a measure of how 
long a disruption needs to last before crucial banks in the payment 
system are also affected. In other words, is two days sufficient for a 
total disruption of the payment system or does this perhaps require 20 
days or more. The more time it takes for a total disruption, the more 
time central banks have to take counter-measures. 
 
 
5.2.4 Payments  statistics  of the three large banks 
Figure 5.1 shows the total payment flows in per cent of total outgoing 
payments in December 2005 for the three large banks. The total value 
of outgoing payments excludes incoming cross border payments. An 
interesting aspect is the net payment flow between participants. Given 
the fact that in the long run there cannot be net payers or receivers in 
the system, this extra flow between two participants must come back 
from other participants (domestic or cross border); see eg Pröpper et al 
(2007) on network characteristics. The figure also shows that the three 
large banks have a lot of cross border payments. This is important 
because this paper looks at the potential impact of a disruption on the 
domestic market. The more a bank pays cross border, the smaller the 
potential impact on the domestic market. 
  Figure 5.2 shows that there is wide variation in the daily net value 
transferred for the three large banks in December 2005. The daily 
balances of bank-A vary between EUR -9 and EUR +7 billion. The 
balances of bank-B and bank-C are slightly lower than that of bank-A. 
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Figure 5.1  Payments flows between the three large 
      banks and between the large banks and 
      other domestic participants and cross 
      border payments in December 2005.
3 
 
Payment values are in % of total outgoing payments of TOP 
participants (this excludes incoming cross border payment values), 





                                          
3 The payment transactions from and to the same participant are not shown.  
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Figure 5.2  Daily net transferred values for the three 
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5.2.5 Collateral  values 
Simulations were run with three different values of collateral; see 
Section 5.3.1. The HC collateral level shows the maximum level of 
intraday credit a participant can obtain. The UB and LB are 
theoretically calculated levels of collateral. It would be difficult to 
determine these levels prior to the start of a new business day because 
it is not (exactly) known at what time and how many payments will be 
paid and received that day. If a bank faces an operational disruption 
and cannot pay the planned amount, it is likely that some of the other 
banks will run out of liquidity (including intraday credit) and cannot 
execute all payments immediately in the case of the UB or by the end 
of the day in the case of the LB. If the disruption is large enough, 
there will even be unsettled payments at the end of the day, when the 
UB collateral level is used. 
  Figure 5.3 shows the three different collateral values of bank-A, 
bank-B, bank-C and all participants together for December 2005. The 
HC (thick solid line) shows more fluctuation in the values, which 
means that these banks participated in open market operations during 
the month. The upper bound (dotted line) fluctuations vary for the 
three large banks. Bank-A shows values between EUR 6 billion and 
EUR 14 billion. Bank-C shows values between EUR 0 and EUR 6 
billion. A value of EUR 0 for the upper bound means that the banks 
did not need any collateral on these days to settle all their payments 
immediately. The values for bank-C fluctuate the most: between EUR  
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2 billion and EUR 14 billion. On a few days of this month the value of 
the upper bound is higher than or close to the maximum collateral 
value. This suggests that bank-C actively uses its collateral. The lower 
bound is zero for the three banks and almost zero for all participants. 
This is due to the fact that all banks have an obligation to hold a 
certain level of credit on their account for their minimum reserve 
requirement. These funds can be used to settle payments intraday 
while at the end of the day their balances are levelled to meet the 
requirements. 
 
Figure 5.3  Collateral values for all banks together 
      (top left), bank A (top right), bank B 





































































































































The total value of the HC varies between EUR 44 billion and EUR 59 
billion. For HCex, the variation is larger than for the HC. The 
variation of the UB, between EUR 20 billion and EUR 36 billion, is 
comparable in absolute value to the HCex but in relative terms it 
varies more. The LB, on the other hand, shows values close to zero 
most of the time. This means that most banks will be able to settle 
their obligations by the end of the day without having any collateral. 
  From Figure 5.3 it can be seen that there is more collateral 
available in the payment system as a whole than is needed. This  
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means, in theory, that there is enough collateral available to execute 
all payments without any delay. However the distribution of the 
collateral is not optimised over the participants. For the three large 
banks there are several days in which the UB is higher than the HC. 
 
 
5.2.6  Simulations and assumptions 
The scenarios described in section 5.3.2 are based on several 
assumptions, which do not necessarily reflect what happens in reality. 
They are necessary for studying the potential impact of a disruption 
given a certain stress scenario. The assumptions are: 
 
–  no extra liquidity from other accounts 
–  no extra collateral can be pledged 
–  participants cannot borrow from other banks 
–  participants do not react in any way to the stress situation. 
 
 
5.3  Results: number of banks affected 
5.3.1 Introduction 
This section gives the results of the simulations with respect to the 
number of banks affected by the disruption. The figures presented in 
this section refer to December 2005. The results for April 2006 are 
very similar. In this paper, to be affected means that a bank has 
unsettled transactions at the end of the day. Also banks which do not 
have unsettled payments are impacted by the disruption but are able to 
‘absorb’ the shock and to fulfil their own obligations. The number of 
banks affected gives insight into how the disruption spreads across the 
payment system but says nothing about the value of unsettled 
payments, which will be described in section 4. The description of the 




Figure 5.4 shows the average number of banks affected and the 
standard deviation, for the 50% to 200% cases using the HC. The 
number of banks affected, running from 75% to 95%, does not show a 
decrease of the average number. This is the result of small banks not  
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having any collateral. In case they do not receive some payments, this 
will automatically lead to unsettled payments at the end of the day. If 
there is a bank affected in the 110% to 200% cases, it is at least bank-
A. This is because bank-A will run out of its liquidity (including its 
intraday credit) first. In the 200% case, there are other banks affected 
besides bank-A. This is the result of the inhomogeneous distribution 
of liquidity. A large part of the liquidity will leak across the border. 
  Figure 5.5 shows the average number of banks affected for the 
50% to 95% and 110% to 200% cases using the UB; see Figure 5.3. 
The difference between UB and HC varies between EUR -3 and EUR 
8.5 billion. The average number of banks affected for the 50% and 
75% cases is higher for UB than for HC. This is the result of the lower 
collateral levels for most banks in the UB than in the HC. Due to the 
lower collateral value of bank-A, it will run out of liquidity more 
quickly for the 110% to 200% cases. This means that bank-A is not 
able to absorb the same shock in the same way as in the HC. 
  Figure 5.6 shows the average number of banks affected for the 
50% to 95% cases and 110% to 200% cases using the LB. The 
average number of banks affected in both figures is clearly higher than 
in the previous two collateral cases. For the 50% case, the average 
number of banks affected rose from 7 to 16 banks for the 200% case. 
For the HC scenario, the average number of banks rose to 9 for the 
50% case and 3 for the 200% case. From this figure one can conclude 
that under ‘normal’ circumstances the Dutch payment system does not 
need collateral to execute all payments by the end of the day, but a 
small disruption by bank-A results in many banks being affected by 
the end of the day. In other words, the shock absorbing ability of the 
payment system declines to a low level. For the multiple day scenario, 
the number of banks affected rises to 52 banks for the 50% case and to 
33 for the 200% case. 
  The multiple day scenarios show an increasing trend of banks 
affected on almost all days for all cases (95% to 200%). The 
maximum number of banks affected for the 50% case rises to 34 and 
for the 95% case to 12 for the HC, ie 46 and 22 banks for the UB and 
54 and 30 for the LB scenario, respectively. There will be up to 7 
banks for the 110% case and 11 for the 200% case, ie 11 and 26 banks 
for the UB scenario and 24 and 34 for the LB. 
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Figure 5.4  Average number of bank affected when 
      bank-A pays 50%–95% and 110%–200% 
      of its payments, with each day is treated 
      individually and historical collateral 
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Figure 5.5  Average number of bank affected when 
      bank-A pays 50%–95% and 110%–200% 
      of its payments, with each day treated 
      individually and the upper bound collateral 
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Figure 5.6  Average number of bank affected when 
      bank-A pays 50%–95% and 110%–200% 
      of its payments, with each day treated 
      individually and the lower bound collateral 
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5.3.3  Bank-B and bank-C 
Figure 5.7 shows the average number of banks affected for the 50% to 
95% and 110% to 200% cases for the HC of bank-B. For the 50% 
case, there are on average 6 banks affected by the shock. The average 
number of banks affected is just below that for the same disruption of 
bank-A. This is due to the smaller daily payment values by bank-B. 
When bank-B increases its outgoing values (110% to 200% cases), 
there are more banks affected on average compared to bank-A. Even 
though bank-A has a larger daily payment value than bank-B, the HC 
is relatively lower for bank-B than bank-A. As a result, bank-B will 
run out of its liquidity sooner and therefore will impact other 
participants as well. 
  The LB collateral of bank-B is zero for all days and the upper 
bound collateral is zero for most of the business days, which makes 
these two scenarios very similar. However, two of the days have 
collateral values of EUR 4.5 and EUR 6 billion. The average number 
of banks affected for the single day scenario is just over 12 banks for 
the 50% case, see Figure 5.8, which is approximately twice the 
number for the HC collateral scenario. The multiple day scenario rises 
to 43 banks for the 50% case and 24 banks for the 95% case. For the 
200% case, the number of banks affected rises to 35. The reason for 
this is that liquidity leaves the domestic market and flows to cross 
border TARGET participants. It is assumed in this simulation that 
cross border participants cannot run out of liquidity. 
  Figure 5.9 shows the average number of banks affected for the 
50% to 95% and 110% to 200% cases for the LB of bank-C. This is 
lower than for bank-A and bank-B. Even though bank-C has a larger 
total outgoing payment value (20% of total) than bank-B (13%), it has 
fewer banks affected for the HC. This is mainly due to the fact most of 
the extra payment value of bank-C goes to cross border participants. 
The average number of banks for the UB is only slightly higher 
because the average amount of collateral in the UB is slightly lower 
than for the HC. The average number of banks affected for the LB is 3 
to 4 times as large as for the HC, but lower than for bank-A and 
slightly lower than for bank-B. 
  The multiple day scenarios show the same trend as for bank-A. 
The maximum number of banks affected is however lower for both 
bank-B and bank-C. The maximum number of banks affected for the 
50% case is 25 for bank-B and 20 for bank-C. For the 200% case this 
is 11 and 9 banks respectively. 
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Figure 5.7  Average number of bank affected when 
      bank-B pays 50%–95% and 110%–200% of 
      its payments, with each day treated 
      individually and historical collateral 















































Figure 5.8  Average number of bank affected when 
      bank-B pays 50%–95% and 110%–200% of 
      its payments, with each day treated 
      individually and the lower bound collateral 















































Figure 5.9  Average number of bank affected when 
      bank-C pays 50%–95% and 110%–200% 
      of its payments, with each day treated 
      individually and historical collateral 





















































5.4 Results:  unsettled  values 
5.4.1 Introduction 
The previous section showed the number of banks affected for the 
different scenarios. The number of banks affected indicates how a 
disruption spreads across the whole payment system. When only a few 
(small) banks are affected by the disruption, the impact on the 
payment system is very limited. However, when many banks are 
affected, especially large banks, the impact of the disruption on the 
whole payment system is greater. 
  The number of banks affected does not say anything about the 
unsettled value and negative end of day balances which correspond 
with this number. In a hypothetical case, a bank is EUR 0.01 or EUR 
100 billion short for making a payment and this bank will be 
‘affected’ according to the definition in section 5.3. The first case 
however will be much easier to resolve than the latter one. This 
shortage of liquidity can be resolved by eg an incoming payment or 
bringing in fresh collateral. The effect of bringing in extra collateral is 
not investigated in this paper; see the assumptions in section 5.2.6. 
  This section describes three different values as a result of the 
disruption: 
 
–  the mean value of unsettled payments at the end of the day 
–  the mean collateral of banks with unsettled payments at the end of 
the day 
–  the mean negative end of day balances of banks without unsettled 
payments. 
 
The mean value of unsettled payments indicates the direct impact of 
the disruption on the payment system. The mean collateral of banks 
with unsettled payments provides information on the type of bank. 
The banks with large values of collateral are relatively large ones 
while banks with little collateral are usually relatively small. There are 
also participants which do not have any collateral at all. The mean 
negative end of day balance of banks without unsettled payments 





Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11 show the values of the 50% to 95% and 
110% to 200% cases of the HC. From the figures, it can be seen that 
the amount of collateral of banks with unsettled payments at the end 
of the day (red bars) is almost zero. These banks are usually very 
small and in most cases subsidiary banks of larger banks which do 
have significant amounts of collateral. These subsidiary banks are in 
most cases funded by the parent bank in the morning, and at the end of 
the day the liquidity is transferred back to the parent. It can also be 
seen from the figures that when the disruption of bank-A is small, say 
95%, the other banks are able to absorb the shock without any 
problem. This does not mean that banks which are able to absorb the 
shock are also willing to absorb it. When a bank suspects that the 
disrupted bank, in this case bank-A, has serious financial problems, it 
may stop sending payments even though it has sufficient liquidity to 
make a payment. The results for the UB are similar. This is the result 
of the low (almost zero) collateral values of the affected banks. 
 
Figure 5.10  The average values of bank-A using 
     historical  collateral amounts for 50%, 75%, 
      90% and 95%, with each day treated 
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Figure 5.11  The average values of bank-A using 
     historical  collateral amounts for 50%, 75%, 
      90% and 95%, with each day treated 
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The values of the LB are twice as large as the HC for the 50% to 95% 
cases and roughly the same for the 110% to 200% cases. The values of 
the LB consist only of unsettled payments at the end of the day (blue 
bar). This is because there is hardly any collateral available and 
therefore banks cannot obtain any intraday credit. In the Euro system, 
banks must secure intraday credit against eligible collateral. 
  Figure 5.12 shows the values of the 50% to 95% cases for the 
multiple day HC scenario. From the 50% case, it can be seen that the 
sum of the values shows an increasing trend if the shock continues for 
the whole month. From the 14th day, the sum of the three values 
jumps. This is mainly due to the used collateral, which increases by a 
factor 10 to EUR 16.2 billion. A large part of this collateral is from 
bank-C, which for the first time this month has unsettled values at its 
main account. The increasing trend is also visible for the 75% and 
90% cases but not as strong as the 50% case. For the 95% case, this 
trend cannot be observed. 
  The 110% to 200% cases show increasing trends for all four cases. 
For the first few days of the 110% and 125% cases, all values are 
settled by the end of the day. This can also be seen in Figure 5.4, 
which shows the number of banks affected by the disruption. The 
trend for the number of banks affected is not the same as for the 
values. There is both an increase and a decrease in the number of 
banks affected at the end of the month. This means that even though 
the maximum potential impact increases in value, the number of banks 
affected does not\. Most of the unsettled values are to bank-A. 
However, an increasing amount is linked to other participants. This 
can be seen by the increasing use of collateral, from EUR 15.9 to EUR 
30.9 billion for the 200% case.  
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Figure 5.12  The values of bank-A using historical 
      collateral amounts for 50%, 75%, 90% and 
      95%, when the disruption continues for the 
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5.4.3  Bank-B and bank-C 
The average values of the 50% to 95% cases for the HC of bank-B are 
similar to those for bank-A. However, the differences in values 
between the different days are much smaller than for bank-A. The 
average values for the 125% to 200% are lower than for bank-A. The 
average daily outgoing payment value of bank-B is half the value of 
bank-A. The impact of the disruption of bank-B is however similar. 
This is the result of small banks being affected. For these banks, even 
a small decrease in the amount of incoming payments causes payment 
problems. As for the disruption of bank-A, most banks which are 
affected are relatively small and do not have much or any collateral 
and are often subsidiaries of larger banks. The LB and UB of bank-B 
show values which are approximately 50% of the value of bank-A. 
  When the shock continues for more than one day, the total impact 
(the sum of the three values) increases over the days. The 50% to 95% 
cases of the HC MD scenario show an increasing trend. This trend is 
not as clear as for bank-A situation. The total value for the 50% case 
is significantly lower than in the bank-A case. This observation is not 
surprising in light of the total amount of outgoing payments in 
December 2005, listed in Figure 5.1. Secondly, the amount of cross 
border payments is relatively higher for bank-A (17.1%) than for  
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bank-B (6.5%) and bank-C (12.5%). For 110% to 200%, the trends are 
very similar to those of bank-A. 
  The total payment value of bank-C is smaller than bank-A, but 
larger than bank-B; see Figure 5.1. The average value of the payment 
of bank-C is however much higher than the other two, EUR 21 billion 
compared to EUR 9 billion for bank-A and bank-B. This is an 
important characteristic in case of a disruption. In situations in which 
there is not much liquidity available on the accounts a large value 
becomes more difficult to settle than smaller ones. This is especially 
important in the 200% case because the payments are doubled and 
therefore even larger. 
  The payment values of bank-C and bank-B for the domestic part of 
the payment system are almost equal while the value for bank-A is 
significantly larger. This explains why the impact of bank-B and 
bank-C show similar results for the 50% to 95% cases. For the 
decreased value cases, only the domestic payments are relevant 
because the cross border TARGET participant (by assumption) will 
never face payment problems. 
 
 
5.5  Conclusions and policy recommendations 
This paper has demonstrated the sensitivity of the payment system to a 
disruption of a large bank. 
 
1. The Dutch large value payment system shows a high level of 
resistance. 
 
2.  Intraday credit is an important aspect of a large value payment 
system. The more collateral banks have, the more intraday credit 
they can obtain. When banks do not have any collateral, they are 
still able to fulfil all their obligations at the end day under normal 
circumstances, but the intraday queues will be longer. In times of 
(small or large) disruptions, there will be banks which cannot fulfil 
their obligations at the end of the day. This argues for substantial 
amounts of collateral such that temporary technical disruptions 
will not automatically lead to long queues and unsettled payments 
at the end of the day. The ability to bring in extra collateral to 
obtain more intraday credit can help to reduce the impact of 
disruptions. A smooth functioning collateral management system 
is therefore required. 
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3.  Between January 2006 and 2009, the total amount of collateral 
increased by nearly almost 200%! A part of this extra collateral 
was used for open monetary loans, but a large share collateral was 
still available for extra intraday credit. The banks have not used 
significantly more intraday credit even though they were able to do 
so. This means that all banks have become better able to absorb 
shocks. 
 
4.  It is important to realise that this paper discusses the ability to 
withstand a disruption. This does not mean that banks are willing 
to continue making payments in cases of disruption. This depends 
on the cause of the disruption. When banks fear that a certain bank 
is unable to meet its obligations as a result of financial problems, 
as in the current crisis, they may delay or even stop making 
payments for some time to the disrupted bank or, in an extreme 
case, to all other banks. 
 
5.  The affected banks are mainly small banks which do not have any 
or only a small amount of collateral. This means that if they do not 
receive some payments, this will automatically lead to unsettled 
payments at the end of the day. These small banks are quite often 
subsidiaries of larger banks. In case they do not have sufficient 
liquidity to make their payments, the parent bank can supply them 
with extra liquidity. This will reduce the impact of the disruption.  
 
6.  For the domestic payment system, the disrupted bank’s level of 
cross border payments is important. When a bank cannot execute a 
part of its payments, the impact will be less if the bank has more 
cross border payments and vice versa. The increase of cross border 
payments within the European Union over the last decade has 
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6  Structure and stability in payment 
networks – A panel data analysis 
of ARTIS simulations 
Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact and importance 
of network structure, at the network and node levels across days and 
scenarios (stricken ARTIS participants) for the stability of payment 
systems hit by operational shocks. The analysis is based on a large 
number of simulations of the Austrian large-value payment system 
ARTIS that quantify the contagion impact of operational shocks at 
participants’ sites. We find that only a few payment system 
participants are systemically important and that contagion displays 
substantial variation across time and across scenarios. A subsequent 
panel data investigation is aimed at explaining the variation across 
time and network participants by structural differences in the payment 
network across time and the position of the stricken account within the 
network. It shows that (i) standard variables such as liquidity and 
liquidity loss can explain a substantial fraction of the variation across 
both time and scenarios, (ii) the structure of the network itself adds 
very little and (iii) the position of the stricken account within the 
network indeed contributes moderately to explaining the variations in 
contagion. Relative explanatory power is higher when the analysis 
focuses on contagion measured by the number of banks with unsettled 
payments or the value of unsettled payments than when the measure is 
based on the number of unsettled payments. Because the structural 
indicators add very little explanatory power to the more traditional 
measures of the role of an individual participant in the payment 
system (value and volume of payments), we conclude that at this stage 






Recent work on the stability of banking systems suggests a systematic 
relationship between network structure, system stability and 
contagion.
1 Similarly, a recent study conjectures that network 
structure might be relevant for the stability of payment systems.
2 In 
previous research we found wide variation in contagion impacts of an 
individual bank’s failure to process payments across banks, across 
days, and across scenarios.
3 Here we investigate whether the position 
of the stricken bank within the network helps to explain contagion 
across scenarios and whether daily variations in network structure 
contribute to understanding the contagion variation across days. 
  Studies concerning network stability in the real world
4 have 
focused on the often observed fact that a few nodes have a large 
number of links, while most nodes have only a few. The reason that so 
much attention has been placed on these ‘scale-free networks’
5 is their 
robustness to random node removal (the common way of assessing 
instability). However, a targeted attack in which the most highly 
connected nodes are removed leads to rapid disintegration. In financial 
stability analysis, this framework and focus might be relevant for 
interbank credit (where establishing a credit relation – a link – is 
costly). The physical network structure of ARTIS, however, is not 
scale-free but complete.
6 Thus connectivity is not the relevant stability 
concept. 
  The stability problem in ARTIS is not that bank A cannot make a 
payment to bank B because the banks are no longer linked. The 
problem is that bank A might not have enough liquidity to make the 
payment because it has not yet received payments from other banks in 
the system. As connectivity relates to the flow of liquidity in the 
system and the liquidity flows through central nodes exceed those 
through the peripheral nodes, it plays an indirect role for the analysis 
of stability. Therefore, our measures of the contagion impact of shocks 
                                          
1 Inter alia Boss et al (2004). 
2 Soramäki et al (2007). 
3 Schmitz and Puhr (2007). 
4 Eg the Internet, but also large value payment systems such as FedWire and BOJ-NET, 
or the Austrian interbank market. 
5 Scale-free networks are a special case of the aforementioned networks with few 
important and many minor nodes (in terms of links), where their degree distribution 
follows a power law P(k)∼k
-γ. 
6 Participants need not submit payments to each other via hubs; they can do so directly. 
The only exception would be a failure of the entire payment system infrastructure, but 
this question is beyond the scope of this paper.  
148 
focus on the impact of the shock on the flow of liquidity (ie unsettled 
payments) rather than on the disintegration of the network. 
  To quantify the contagion effect following the failure of an 
individual bank, we run about 30  000 simulations based on actual 
ARTIS transaction data for the period 16 November 2005 to 16 
November 2007, following the methodology presented in our previous 
work on ARTIS.
7 In addition to this quantification of (contagiously) 
unsettled payments in case of an operational incident, we calculate a 
large number of network indicators on the network (44) and node (71) 
levels for each scenario (stricken ARTIS participants) and for each 
day in the sample. 
  In the main body of this paper we investigate whether the variation 
in network indicators can explain the variation in contagion. We start 
with a univariate analysis at the network-level on variation across days 
and at the node level on variation across days and scenarios (stricken 
ARTIS participants). In a second multivariate step, we conduct an 
exploratory panel data analysis which includes network indicators at 
both levels and we show how well they explain the variation in our 
three measures of contagion across scenarios and days (number of 
banks with unsettled payments, volume of unsettled payments, and 
value of unsettled payments). 
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 6.2 
we present data on the network structure of ARTIS. Section 6.3 
introduces the simulations. Based on the results, we discuss the scale 
of contagion in ARTIS and try to provide a means to determine 
systemically important banks. Section 6.4 covers the univariate 
analysis and provides a first glance at the relation of network and 
node-level indicators to the contagion effects in the simulations. In 
section 6.5 we cover the multivariate analysis and present the results 
of our panel data analysis. Section 6.6 wraps up our findings. 
 
 
6.2  Measures of network structure
8 
The definition of the network under investigation is not trivial in 
empirical network analysis. We focus on the Giant Strongly 
                                          
7 Schmitz and Puhr (2007) and Schmitz et al (2008). 
8 For detailed definitions, formulas, and graphical illustrations of the network indicators, 
see Appendix 2.  
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Connected Component (GSCC) of ARTIS.
9 The GSCC is the largest 
component of the network, in which all nodes connect to each other 
via directed paths.
10 We have chosen this definition of the network for 
two reasons: first, ARTIS contains a comparatively large number of 
accounts which are not related to financial stability (ie offset accounts 
of OeNB’s cash distribution subsidiary) and which are not active on 
most of the days in the sample. Second, we want to ensure the 
comparability of our data with that reported for FedWire in Soramäki 
et al (2006) which refers to the GSCC.
11 
  A related question is about the selection of the appropriate 
indicator of network structure, as the number of available indicators is 
large. At the network-level we calculate 44 network indicators.
12 
Similarly, the number of available indicators at the node-level comes 
to 71. We composed our set of indicators to include those used in 
comparable studies as well as those suggested by the underlying 
theory for selecting appropriate indicators for specific typologies of 
payment flows. 
  Boss et al (2004) relate contagion in the interbank market to 
betweenness centrality at the node-level, because this measure has a 
higher explanatory value than the alternative network indicators in 
their data set. They find a dented linear relationship. Banks with 
betweenness centrality 0≤CB(h)≤2 do not cause any contagious 
defaults. For CB(h)>2 they find a linear relationship with a slope of 
about 0.8. 
  Borgatti (2005) studies the selection of the appropriate centrality 
measure for various typologies of flow processes. He classifies flows 
along two dimensions: the characteristics of the route through the 
network and the characteristics of the transfer mode. The first 
dimension considers the constraint on the sequences in which links 
and nodes are (repeatedly) passed. Liquidity can be transferred to any 
other node in the network (including the submitter of the first 
                                          
9 For comparable data on the network of all active accounts see Schmitz and Puhr (2007). 
For a description of the Austrian banking system see OeNB and FMA (2004) The 
Austrian Financial Markets, Vienna, pp. 50–55. 
10 A directed path is a path that connects nodes without passing any node or link more 
than once. 
11 For a comparison as well as a more detailed account of ARTIS network indicators, see 
Schmitz et al (2008). 
12 This includes the directed and/or value/volume weighted and/or average/maximum 
values of select indicators. Kyriakopulos et al (forthcoming) find a strong dependence of 
network characteristics on aggregation time. The large number of network indicators and 
critical role of aggregation time raise the problem of data-mining in network topology 
studies.  
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payment). Hence, it is unconstrained (referred to as a walk). The 
second dimension refers to the way in which the flowing good is 
passed along the route from one node to another. In the case of 
liquidity, the initial holder has to part with it (referred to as a transfer). 
  What does this imply for the flow of liquidity in ARTIS? In a 
physically complete network banks need not make payments to other 
banks via third parties. They transfer directly to the ultimate receiver. 
However, the flow of liquidity does not stop there. Where it ultimately 
ends up, is beyond the control (and interest) of the initial submitter of 
a payment. Given that betweenness centrality is based on the share of 
all shortest paths through a node, it is not a good measure of centrality 
in a study of liquidity flows. Degree centrality is more suitable for this 
purpose. 
  Besides considering the most meaningful indicators we want to 
ensure a high degree of comparability with other papers and therefore 
employ a wider range of network indicators. Moreover, we want to 
investigate whether network indicators in general add value to the 
more traditional measure used in comparable simulation studies (ie 
size of the individual node in terms of value and volume of 
transactions). Therefore we focus on the measures value and volume 
as well as on the network indicators average path length, degree, 
connectivity, clustering, betweenness centrality and dissimilarity 




Table 6.1  ARTIS network indicators (Network-level) 
 
 Mean  Median Min.  Max.  Std.Dev. 
Payments         
Volume 15380  15436  9786  25000  2019 
Value (EUR bn)  48.5  46.9  22.6  84.9  10.6 
Average (EUR mn)  3.20  3.00  1.90  5.90  0.70 
Size         
Nodes 133.2  132  112  159  9.3 
Links 1376  1376  1222  1602  69 
Distance measure         
Avg. Path Length  2.4  2.4  2.2  2.6  0.08 
Connectivity         
Average degree  15.6  15.5  14.2  17.8  0.6 
Connectivity (%)  7.9  7.9  5.9  9.9  0.8 
Clustering (%)  58.3  58.3  51  63.7  2.3 
Others         
Betweenness cent. (%)  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.9  0.1 
Dissimilarity index  0.47  0.47  0.39  0.60  0.03 
Source: Own calculations based on daily averages of the ARTIS GSCC from 16 
November 2005 to 16 November 2007 (excluding Austrian holidays). 
 
 
For our observation period, 16 November 2005 to 16 November 2007, 
the average volume of transactions per day is 15380 in the GSCC of 
ARTIS. The average value of transactions per day is EUR 48.5 billion 
and the average transaction size is EUR 3.2 million. The size of a 
network is defined by the number of nodes. On average, there are 
133.2 nodes in the GSCC during the sample period, of which 63 are in 
the GSCC on all days. The active nodes are linked by an average of 
1376.1 directed links.
13 
  An indicator of distance between nodes is the shortest path length. 
We calculate the average shortest path length for each originating 
node by averaging over terminating nodes and then averaging over 
originating nodes, to get the average path length of the entire network. 
Across days, it is 2.4. 
  How well nodes are connected in the network is captured by the 
average degree of the network. It is calculated by summing over all 
(undirected) links originating from the nodes and then averaging over 
nodes.
14 Averaged also across days, it amounts to 15.6 in the ARTIS 
                                          
13 The average number of nodes in ARTIS active each day was 209.8 and the number of 
directed links was 1637.5. 
14 The out-degree refers to the number of links originating at the node while the in-degree 
is based on to the number of links terminating at the node. Over the network, the average 
out- and in-degree are equal to m/n.  
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system. However, the most active nodes have many more links 
originating and terminating at them.
15 The connectivity of a network is 
captured by the number of actual links relative to the number of 
possible links. Connectivity averages 7.9 per cent. The clustering 
coefficient provides a measure of the average connectivity of the 
neighbours of all nodes in the GSCC. On average, about 58 per cent of 
neighbours of the nodes are also linked. 
 Betweenness  centrality  measures  how many shortest paths pass 
through the average node. The 8 per cent figure is quite low and stems 
from the centrality of a few nodes with high betweenness centrality 
and a large number with low values. Finally, the dissimilarity index 
captures the relative viewpoints of the network from two neighbouring 
nodes. If the network looks very similar from both nodes, the 
dissimilarity index number is low. In the GSCC it is 0.47, which 
implies that on average the perspectives of the GSCC differ 
substantially from any two neighbouring nodes. A lot of nodes are 
linked that otherwise do not share many network characteristics. In 
sum, we interpret the data on network indicators as corroborating 
previous evidence that a few large nodes dominate the payment 
system and that many of the smaller nodes are connected to the largest 
nodes at the centre of the network. 
 
 
6.3  Measures of network stability 
As argued in the introduction, connectivity is not an adequate criterion 
to capture the systemic impact of an operational problem at one of the 
nodes in a large value payment system. Alternatively, we suggest 
defining a threshold based on the average contagion effect following 
the failure of an individual payment system participant. As operational 
failures, let alone such with systemic impact, are few and far between, 
we resort to simulations. These provide us with what we call 
contagious defaults, which can be measured in three ways. 
  First, the number of participants (banks or transfer accounts) with 
unsettled payments at the end of day measures how many participants 
(banks or transfer accounts) faced liquidity problems due to an 
                                          
15 For the analysis of the degree distribution, see Schmitz et al (2008), where the 
hypothesis of a Power Law distribution is rejected for the monthly network and 
Kyriapopulos et al (forthcoming) who find that degree distributions seem to have a Power 
Law distribution in daily networks (in ARTIS), but that this property vanishes in longer 
aggregation times.  
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operational incident at another participant. Second, the number of 
unsettled payments at the end of day is the total volume of all 
payments that could not be settled by participants that were not 
subject to an operational incident. Third, the value of unsettled 
payments at the end of day is the total value of all payments that could 
not be settled by participants that did not experience an operational 
problem. 
  We conduct 31311 simulations based on 63 different scenarios for 
497 transaction days from 16 November 2005 to 16 November 2007 
(excluding Austrian holidays) which yield some 620 million simulated 
transactions.
16 These simulations are calculated with a self-
implemented Matlab-based software tool (inspired by the Bank of 
Finland Payment System Simulator), tailored for ARTIS. 
  For this paper we run simulations for all 50 banks in the GSCC on 
all Austrian working days throughout the sample period and all 13 
Transfer accounts
17 that form part of the system on all days in the 
sample period. We assume an operational incident that hits one 
participant (banks or transfer accounts) in each simulation. The 
operational incident is mapped into the simulation as the 
incapacitation of the participant to process outgoing payments, ie the 
inability to submit transactions for the whole day.
18 This assumption is 
extreme but plausible. As shown in Schmitz and Puhr (2007), shorter 
outages of participants may lead to payment delays but not to 
unsettled payments. 
  In Figure 6.1, the upper panel shows that about 27.5 per cent of all 
simulations (8604) do not lead to contagion. Another 26.3 per cent 
(8230) yield one contagious default and 33.1 per cent (10375) two to 
five, while 13.1 per cent (4102) lead to more than five contagious 
defaults with a maximum across the 31311 simulations of 33. 
 
                                          
16 For more details on simulations, their motivation, and their design, see Schmitz and 
Puhr (2007). The operation of ARTIS was discontinued after 16 November 2007, due to 
the introduction of TARGET2. 
17 Transfer accounts are ARTIS accounts held by other ESCB central banks at OeNB. All 
national TARGET components are directly linked by transfer accounts. All transactions 
to and from the respective country and Austria are routed via these transfer accounts. 
18 It is assumed that the resulting illiquidity of the participant is not interpreted as 
potential insolvency by other participants of the payment system and the financial system 
at large. In addition, ARTIS provides business continuity arrangements for participants. 
We tested their impact in Schmitz and Puhr (2007), but disregard them in this paper, as 
they are of little relevance for the interaction between network topology and contagion.  
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Source: Own calculations based on daily simulations of the 50 banks and 13 
Transfer accounts that formed part of the ARTIS GSCC from 16 November 2005 
to 16 November 2007 (excluding Austrian holidays).  
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The other two panels in Figure 6.1 show the average contagious 
defaults per simulation (the former in terms of number of participants 
(banks or transfer accounts) with unsettled payments and the latter in 
terms of average value of unsettled payments, both due to contagious 
defaults per simulation). As argued above, we suggest using this 
information to derive a set of systemically relevant ARTIS 
participants. If we set the threshold
19 for example in terms of the value 
of contagious defaults, only participants that cause at least an average 
value of EUR 48.5 million in unsettled payments (or 0.1 per cent of 
average value of transactions settled across days), we see the number 
of systemically relevant participants shrink to 24 (17 banks, seven 
Transfer accounts). That equals about seven percent of the average of 
230 banks in ARTIS (during the sample period) and about two percent 
of the average of 850 banks in Austria. These results suggest that the 
supervision of operational risk in banks’ payment processing capacity 
could focus on a relatively small set of systemically relevant banks in 
Austria and on their business continuity arrangements. 
 
 
6.4  Univariate analysis of structure and stability 
Following the argument in Section 6.2 (choice of structural measures) 
and in Section 6.3 (choice of stability measures), we provide a 
selection of univariate results that in turn provide the intuition for our 
multivariate analysis in Section 6.5. We look at the variation of 
network indicators at the network-level across days (4.1) and at the 
node-level across stricken participants (4.2) to explain the variation of 




In the top two panels of Fiure 6.2 we depict the scatter plot for the 
value (left hand panel) and the volume of all payments (right hand 
panel) submitted to ARTIS on the y-axis and the number of 
contagious defaults in terms of the number of participants with 
unsettled payments (daily averages across scenarios) per day on the x-
axis. The variation of value explains 2 per cent and the variation of 
                                          
19 To some extent that threshold is arbitrary and depends on the risk aversion of the 
supervisory authority.  
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Figure 6.2  ARTIS Network Indicators (Network-level) 
      vs Contagion (Daily Average of Number of 
      Participants with Unsettled Payments 
     across  Scenarios) 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on daily ARTIS GSCC network indicator averages and 
on daily simulations of the 50 banks and 13 Transfer accounts that were part of the 
ARTIS GSCC from 16 November 2005 to 16 November 2007 (excluding Austrian 
holidays). 
                                          
20 Neither volume nor value is significant at the common confidence levels. 
Value (EUR bn) Volume (Thousand)
Average Path Length
Average Dissmilarity Index (%)
Average Degree
Average Betweenness Centrality (%) 
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The explanatory values of the variables value and volume are low. Do 
network indicators perform any better? In the four other panels of 
Figure 6.2 we look at the following indicators (in and out, unweighted, 
undirected): degree, average path length, betweenness centrality and 
dissimilarity index. The average path length (15 per cent) and 
betweenness centrality (13 per cent) have the highest explanatory 
values. The daily variation in degree explains 10 per cent of the 
variation in contagion and that of the dissimilarity index explains only 
3 per cent. Although the explanatory powers of three of the network 
indicators are higher than those of value and volume, the levels are 
still low, and tests of significance fail at all common confidence 
levels. 
  The highest explanatory power of any of the remaining 39 
indicators is 15.4 per cent (average number-weighted clustering 
coefficient), while a number of indicators have no explanatory power 
at all. The univariate analysis suggests that daily variations in network 
indicators at the network-level across days are of limited use in the 
stability analysis of ARTIS. However, this does not preclude that 
either (i) network indicators at the node-level or (ii) structural 
differences across networks might influence their (relative) resilience. 
  The study of the latter, for which we currently lack the data, could 
be subject of future research. Given the fact that other large value 
payment systems which display considerable differences in size share 
notable structural commonalities with ARTIS,
21 some doubt is 
justified as to whether network indicators at the network-level could 
explain contagious effects in other large value payment systems. That 
leaves the question whether the different positions of the nodes that 





In the two upper panels of Figure 6.3 we plot the value and volume of 
payments of the stricken node in each simulation against its contagion 
effect in terms of number of participants with unsettled payments. The 
variations in value and volume across simulations explain 73 per cent 
and 68 per cent of the variation of the contagion impact across 
                                          
21 As shown eg in the comparison of FedWire and ARTIS in Schmitz and Puhr (2007).  
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simulations.
22 The slopes have the expected signs: more active nodes 
cause more contagion. 
  Given the large number of data points (31311) and the variation of 
the stability measure across ARTIS participants,
23 we differentiate in 
Figure 6.3 between shocks to banks and Transfer accounts. In addition 
we highlight the three most active banks and the most active Transfer 
account. The differentiation reveals a pronounced grouping in both 
panels. In the right hand panel it also points to structural differences in 
contagion impact not accounted for by variations in volume. The most 
active Transfer account and one of the three banks tend to group 
below the regression line (ie they cause more contagion than estimated 
by volume of transactions) and the other two banks group above the 
regression line (ie they cause less contagion than estimated by volume 
of transactions). 
  Given the low explanatory values of the variables value and 
volume at the network-level, we asked whether network indicators at 
the network-level perform any better and found that they did, albeit at 
sill at modest levels. Given the already high explanatory power of 
value and volume at the node-level, we look at whether our four 
previously selected network indicators at the node-level
24 can again 
add to that. 
  We find that the explanatory values of all four network indicators 
are quite high;
25 the most simple measure degree yields an R
2 of 64 
per cent, variations in average path length across simulations account 
for 59 per cent of the variation in the number of contagious defaults 
across simulations. The more complex measures betweenness 
centrality and dissimilarity index yield R
2s of 52 and 62 per cent, 
respectively. The signs of all slopes are in line with expectations: 
simulations, in which more active and more central nodes are shocked, 
feature higher contagion impacts. Moreover, all indicators are highly 
significant at common confidence levels and also in the order of 
magnitude of the reported interaction between betweenness centrality 
and contagious defaults for the Austrian interbank market.
26 
 
                                          
22 Both volume and value are highly significant at all common confidence levels. 
23 As shown in Section 3, see for instance Figure 3.1. 
24 Previously selected network indicators include: degree, average path length, 
betweenness centrality and dissimilarity index. 
25 We present the simple linear regression results in order to provide an indication of 
relative performance and to motivate our approach in the panel data analysis rather than 
suggesting that OLS is appropriate per se. 
26 See Boss et al (2004).  
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Figure 6.3  ARTIS network indicators (network-level) 
      vs contagion (daily average of number of 
      participants with unsettled payments 
     across  scenarios) 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on daily node-level ARTIS GSCC network indicators 
and daily simulations of the 50 banks and 13 Transfer accounts that were part of the 
ARTIS GSCC every day from 16 November 2005 to 16 November 2007 (excluding 
Austrian holidays). 




Betweenness Centrality  
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The remaining 65 network indicators yield explanatory values 
between nil (number-weighted average path length based on payments 
received) and 77 per cent (relative volume of payments received).
27 
The results demonstrate that network indicators at the node-level seem 
to explain large parts of the variation in contagion across stricken 
participants in a univariate setting. However, they seem to add little to 
the high explanatory values of the traditional measures of activity 
(value and volume). Furthermore, the large set of available indicators 
and the huge differences in their explanatory values pose the problem 
of data mining. 
  The aforementioned differentiation according to the stricken 
ARTIS participant (bank or Transfer account) confirms the 
pronounced structural differences in contagion impacts not explained 
by variations in volume. In all four network indicator based panels of 
Figure 6.3 simulations based on the most active Transfer account 
cluster on the right hand side of the regression line, while those based 
on the two aforementioned banks cluster on the left side.
28 This result 
points to structural differences in contagion impact which are not 
explained by measures of activity or network indicators and which 
warrant further research. 
  We also investigate the interaction between network structure and 
network stability for other measures of contagion; as an example, we 
present the value of unsettled payments. As above, we start with an 
analysis of the explanatory value of node size (value and volume of 
payments originating at the node). Both values are lower than the 
respective previous results presented in Figure 6.3. Moreover, only 
value is significant, explaining 54 per cent of variation in contagion. 
Albeit the explanatory power of 39 per cent, volume is not significant 
at common confidence levels. 
  How well do the network indicators at the node-level fare in 
comparison? The R
2s of the four previously presented network 
indicators range between 24 and 29 per cent and are therefore 
considerably lower than (i) the respective values for the measures of 
node size above, but (ii) also their respective values when explaining 
                                          
27 Due to the large number of observations and the ensuing degrees of freedom, any 
indicator with an R
2 of 0.51 or higher is significant at all common confidence levels, 
whereas for indicators with an R
2 of 0.50 or below the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
28 The graphs might also be read as suggesting non-linearity; but we prefer the 
interpretation of structural differences, which we can then exploit in the panel data 
analysis.  
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contagion as measured by the number of participants with unsettled 
payments.
29 
  We conclude that if we measure contagion by the value of 
unsettled payments, network indicators are clearly dominated by the 
traditional measures of size. Comparing the results for the two 
measures of contagion, number of participants with unsettled 
payments versus value of unsettled payments, reveals that contagion 
under the latter measure is much harder to explain even by the 
superior traditional variables. 
 
Table 6.2  Correlations between ARTIS network 
     indicators  (node-level) 
 
  Volume Value Avg. PL Degree Conn. Clust. Btw. C. Dissim.
Volume 100.0% 89.0% 84.0% 83.0% -77.0% -57.0% 89.0% 85.0%
Value 100.0% 76.0% 75.0% -70.0% -52.0% 77.0% 78.0%
Avg. PL 100.0% 99.0% -96.0% -72.0% 85.0% 95.0%
Degree 100.0% -97.0% -72.0% 85.0% 93.0%
Conn. 100.0% 62.0% -79.0% -85.0%
Clust. 100.0% -56.0% -78.0%
Btw. C. 100.0% 87.0%
Dissim. 100.0%  
Source: Own calculations based on daily averages of the ARTIS GSCC from 16 
November 2005 to 16 November 2007 (excluding Austrian holidays). Network indicators 
include: Average Path Length (Avg. PL), Connectivity (Conn.), Clustering Index (Clust.), 
Betweenness Centrality (Btw. C.), Dissimilarity Index (Dissim.). 
 
 
In order to corroborate our findings from the univariate analysis, that 
network indicators at the node-level do not add much value to stability 
analysis, we present the correlations between traditional measures of 
activity (value and volume) and selected network indicators in Table 
6.2. The data reveal that particularly indicators of centrality are highly 
correlated with value and volume. Nevertheless, the question remains 




                                          
29 Individual explanatory values are as follows: degree 28 per cent, average path length 25 
percent, betweenness centrality 24 per cent and dissimilarity index 29 per cent, none of 
which are significant at common confidence levels.  
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6.5  Multivariate analysis of structure and 
stability 
In this section we study the robustness of our findings in the univariate 
setting of section 6.4 in an exploratory multivariate study. We focus 
on combining one of the traditional measures of node size (value) with 
network indicators at the node and at the network-level as well as 
additional control variables (eg beginning of day liquidity at 
individual nodes, dummy variable for Transfer accounts) in a panel 
data setting to answer the following four questions: 
 
1. What explains the variations in contagion across days within 
scenarios? 
2.  What explains the variations in contagion across scenarios on each 
day? 
3. Are network indicators at the network and/or at the node-level 
significant in this context? 
4.  What is the explanatory contribution of the network indicators at 
the network and/or at the node-level in the context of questions 1 
and 2? 
 
In Section 6.5.1 we introduce our measures of contagion as dependent 
variables. We try to explain their variation with the three groups of 
independent variables discussed in Section 6.5.2: first, the 
independent variables at the network-level, which are constant across 
panels but vary over time; second, the independent variables at the 
node-level that vary over both time and scenarios; third, we add a 
dummy variable for Transfer accounts to corroborate the findings of 
some of the hitherto unexplained structural particularities discovered 
in the scatter plots of Section 6.4. In Section 6.5.3 we introduce our 
model as well as its assumptions and the estimation method. In 
Section 6.5.4 we present the results. 
 
 
6.5.1 Dependent  variables 
As dependent variables we focus on our three measures of contagion 
(excluding the impact on the stricken bank). Three different measures 
of contagion provide a unique opportunity to check the robustness of 
the models and the parameter estimates. Table 6.3 shows that the 
means and standard deviations of the dependent variables differ 
substantially over time and across scenarios. First, the number of  
163 
participants with unsettled payments amounts to an overall daily 
average of 2.6 (overall standard deviation 3.8) with a minimum of 0 
and a maximum of 33. The variation between scenarios (between 
standard deviation 3.5) is much higher than the variation over time 
within scenarios (within standard deviation 1.4). Second, the average 
daily volume of unsettled payments is 7.6 per day (overall standard 
deviation 21.7). The lowest value is 0 the highest value 1 172. In this 
case the standard deviation between scenarios (14) is slightly lower 
than the one within scenarios (16.7). Third, the daily value of 
unsettled payments averages EUR 112 million with a range of 0 to 
10.7 billion. The overall standard deviation is EUR 335 million and 
the between standard deviation is much higher (EUR 284 million) 
than the within one (EUR 181 million). 
 
Table 6.3  Dependent variables 
      (measures of contagion) 
 
Variable   Mean  Std.Dev. Min.  Max. Obs. 
Number of participants 







0 33  N=31311 
n=63 
T=497 








0 1172  N=31311 
n=63 
T=497 
Value of unsettled 












Source: Own calculations based on the ARTIS GSCC data from 16 November 2005 to 16 




6.5.2 Independent  variables 
We split the independent variables into two groups, network-level and 
node-level. 
  First, the independent variables at the network-level are constant 
across panels but vary over time ([Z] in the model below): They 
include aggregate liquidity (Liquidity
30), a traditional measure of 
network size (aggregate value of all transactions (Value (Network)), 
and a range of network indicators at the network-level. 
                                          
30 It corresponds to our traditional measure of size value in the univariate analysis. We 
chose to rename here to facilitate economic interpretation and intuition.  
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  Table 6.4 displays the independent variables at the network level – 
Liquidity, Value(Network), and the network indicators at the network-
level (including mean and standard deviation for all variables). We 
define aggregate liquidity (Liquidity) in the system (mean: EUR 18.3 
billion, standard deviation: EUR 3.2 billion, Table 6.4) as the sum of 
beginning of day balances (EUR 7.5 billion; EUR 0.8 billion) and 
unencumbered collateral
31 (EUR 10.8 billion; EUR 2.9 billion) across 
participants in the system.
32 
  Turning to the network indicators at the network level, it is 
apparent that the relative standard deviations of the network indicators 
across days – often only small fractions of the respective means – are 




                                          
31 We simply aggregate across beginning of day balances and unencumbered collateral 
because the latter can be liquidised via interest free Daylight Overdrafts at OeNB within 
minutes (for details see Schmitz and Puhr, 2007). 
32 Focusing on real historical data might restrict the generalisation of the results to other 
payment systems in which participants might follow different liquidity policies. Eg in 
systems, that experience frequent operational outages, it might be rational for participants 
to hold sufficient liquidity to settle all outgoing payments. As a consequence there would 
be no contagion. 
33 While standard deviation is not the ideal parameter to describe the distributions of the 
network indicator, they are helpful in pointing out the differences between within and 
between scenario variation in our data set.  
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Table 6.4  Independent variables at the network level: 
      liquidity, netvalue, and network indicators 
     at  network-level 
 
 Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Liquidity (in EUR billion) overall 18.27 3.23 11.68 32.37 N=31311
between 0.00 n=63
within 3.23 T=497
Value (Network) overall 48.90 10.62 22.88 85.60 N=31311
(in EUR billion) between 0.00 n=63
within 10.62 T=497
Average overall 12.3 0.4 11.3 14.4 N=31311
Degree (Network) between 0.0 n=63
within 0.4 T=497
Average overall 0.040 0.003 0.030 0.050 N=31311
Connectivity (Network) between 0.000 n=63
within 0.003 T=497
Average overall 2.50 0.06 2.40 2.70 N=31311
Path Length (Network) between 0.00 n=63
within 0.06 T=497
Average overall 0.40 0.03 0.40 0.50 N=31311
Cluster Index (Network) between 0.00 n=63
within 0.03 T=497
Average Betweeness overall 0.0050 0.0003 0.0040 0.0060 N=31311
Centrality (Network) between 0.0000 n=63
within 0.0003 T=497
Average Dissimilarity overall 1.3 0.9 0.6 5.2 N=31311
Index (Network) between 0.0 n=63
within 0.9 T=497  
Source: Own calculations based on ARTIS data for the independent variables from 16 
November 2005 to 16 November 2007 (excluding Austrian holidays). Standard Deviation 
(Std.Dev.), Observations (Obs.). N.B. Data differs from that in Table 6.1 (network 
indicators for all accounts in the GSCC). 
 
 
Second, the independent variables at the node-level (Liquidity loss 
and the network indicators at the node level; Table 6.5 plus a dummy 
variable for Transfer accounts) vary, both over time and across 
scenarios ([X] in the model below). Liquidity Loss is measured as the 
value of payments that were due by the stricken bank but were not 
processed in the simulations due to operational problems at the 
stricken bank.
34 The dummy variable D for Transfer accounts took the 
values 0 or 1 and entered the models as D×Liquidity Loss to measure 
the deviation of the impact of the Liquidity Loss variable in the case 
of Transfer accounts from the average across all participants. 
 
                                          
34 We have also used alternative proxies for the impact of the operational problem of the 
stricken bank on liquidity in the system, such as liquidity drain and liquidity sink, which 
yield similar results both in terms of sign and significance.  
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Table 6.5  Independent variables at the node level: 
      liquidity loss and network indicators 
     at  node-level 
 
 Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Liquidity Loss overall 0.76 1.69 0.00 22.05 N=31311
(in EUR billion) between n=63
within T=497
Average overall 25.4 19.9 2 105 N=31311
Degree (Node) between 19.8 n=63
within 3 T=497
Average overall 0.200 0.15 0.015 0.800 N=31311
Connectivity (Node) between 0.150 n=63
within 0.02 T=497
Average overall 1.90 0.18 1.20 2.30 N=31311
Path Length (Node) between 0.18 n=63
within 0.02 T=497
Average overall 0.50 0.2 0.13 1.00 N=31311
Cluster Index (Node) between 0.19 n=63
within 0.08 T=497
Average Betweeness overall 0.1360 0.0349 0.0000 0.2760 N=31311
Centrality (Node) between 0.0341 n=63
within 0.0086 T=497
Average Dissimilarity overall 0.44 0.13 0.26 1.07 N=31311
Index (Node) between 0.1 n=63
within 0.03 T=497  
Source: Own calculations based on ARTIS data for the 63 accounts defining the scenarios 
from 16 November 2005 to 16 November 2007 (excluding Austrian holidays). Standard 
Deviation (Std.Dev.), Observations (Obs.). 
 
 
Table 6.5 also shows that the standard deviations of the network 
indicators at the node-level are much higher across scenarios than 
within scenarios over time. Similarly, their means and standard 
deviations are much higher than those of the network indicators at the 
network-level; eg the mean of the average degree at the network-level 
across days is 12.4 (standard deviation 0.4) while the mean of the 
degree at the node-level across scenarios and across days is 25.4 
(standard deviation 19.9). 
 
 
6.5.3  Models, specifications, and estimation 





















































































The dependent variables y1 to y63 are 497×1 vectors containing daily 
values for the dependent variable. The vector [y1 … y63] therefore has 
31311 elements. In theory, the matrices X1 to X63 would be 497×9 
dimensional, as they contain daily observations of the independent 
variables Liquidity Loss, D×Liquidity Loss, and the six network 
indicators at the node-level plus the constant term. However, in 
practice the six network indicators are highly correlated. Similarly, the 
vector Z would contain Liquidity and the network indicators at the 
network-level and would have 497×7 dimensions. But the network 
indicators at the node-level are also highly correlated (see Table 6.2), 
which could lead to multicollinearity. 
  The vectors of parameters βI and βII are to be estimated. The 63×1 
dimensional vector [ν1 … ν63] contains the scenario specific 
unobservable time-invariant regressors and the 497×1 dimensional 
vector [ε1 … ε63] consists of the standard error term for each 
observation (31311 elements). Our panel is balanced, as we conduct 
simulations for all scenarios in all periods and the number of 
simulations is equal for all days in the sample period. 
  In order to avoid multicolinearity, we estimated a basic model for 
each of the measures of contagion consisting of the independent 
variables Liquidity, Liquidity Loss and D×Liquidity (specification 1 
in Tables 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8). The choice of variables for this basic 
model rests on previous results and economic intuition, which indicate 
that i) the aggregate liquidity of the system (Liquidity) reduces 
contagion
35, ii) Liquidity Loss is significantly positively correlated 
with contagion in the univariate analysis, and iii) Transfer accounts 
display interesting particularities in the univariate analysis, which 
warrant further attention. To this model structure we add the variable 
Value (Network) (specification 2) or a particular network indicator at 
the network and at the node-level (specifications 3 to 8).
36 
  The following equation is specification 5 of model 1 and explains 
the variations in the number of participants with unsettled payments 
across days and scenarios by a constant and the standard ingredients 
Liquidity, Liquidity Loss and D×Liquidity Loss plus the average path 
length at the node-level and the network-level. 
 
                                          
35 See the papers in Leinonen (2005). 
36 Why does specification 2 only contain the network level variable and not the node level 
variable? Remember that the corresponding node level variable is already contained in 
the specification as Liquidity Loss.  
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Similarly specification 5 of model 2 would explain the variations of 
the number of unsettled payments across days and scenarios with the 
same independent variables 
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Similarly specification 5 of model 3 would contain the variations of 
the value of unsettled payments across days as dependent variable and 
the same independent variables. 
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There are some basic assumptions regarding static fixed effects 
models. One states that the error term ε is uncorrelated with past, 
present, and future values of the independent variables. This 
assumption of strict exogeneity ensures that the agents whose 
behaviour is modelled are not influenced by past realisations of the 
error term ε. Moreover, cross-panel and cross-time conditional 
homoskedasticity means that the conditional variance of the error term 
ε – given the time-invariant unobservable scenario specific effect ν – 
is constant across scenarios and across time. Furthermore serial 
independence presupposes that the error terms are serially independent 
within panels and cross-panel independence that they are independent 
across scenarios. 
  Do these assumptions hold in our dataset? The first one holds by 
virtue of the simulation design, since we do not model banks’ 
behavioural reactions to operational shocks. The values of explanatory 
variables are historic observations of a world without operational 
shocks and hence without contagion. Consequently, there are no 
observable, unexplained variations in contagion – past realisations of 
error terms – which could influence banks’ behaviour: eg banks 
cannot adjust their liquidity reserves or payment behaviour to account  
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for error terms which are the results of counterfactual simulations. The 
other three assumptions are not fulfilled.
37 Hence an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimate of a standard fixed-effects model would yield 
inconsistent and biased standard errors. We employ an alternative 
estimator that accounts for conditional heteroskedasticity, serial 
correlation, and cross-sectional dependence of the error terms ε. 
  We apply a panel-corrected standard error estimator with panel 
specific autocorrelations where the parameters are estimated by Prais-
Winsten regression. The parameter estimates are conditional on the 
estimates of autocorrelation parameters in each panel. The estimator 
uses a feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) estimate of the 
variance-covariance matrix which is asymptotically efficient under the 
assumed covariance structure of the disturbance terms 
(heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across panels). 
  The 63 panels produce 63 variance estimates and 1953 covariance 
estimates. Together with the 63 autocorrelation estimates and (up to) 6 
parameters, a total of 2085 parameter estimates are required. The 
estimation procedure yields consistent standard errors - at the expense 
of a large loss in degrees of freedom (2 079). However, with 31311 
observations, the degrees of freedom are still large. 
  Beck and Katz (1995) argue that full FGLS estimates are overly 
optimistic and that the Prais-Winsten estimator is superior. Although 
they derived their results for data comprising 10 to 20 panels and 10 to 
40 time periods, we also preferred the Prais-Winsten estimator for our 
larger data set, mainly because the large number of observations in 




6.5.4  Results of Model 1 (number of participants with 
unsettled payments) 
We present the results of the panel data estimates in three tables 
(Table 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8), one for each measure of contagion. Table 6.6 
summarises the results for the 8 specifications of Model 1. The 
dependent variable is the number of participants with unsettled 
payments, ie the number of banks (or transfer accounts; excluding the 
stricken bank/transfer accounts) with unsettled payments at the end of 
the day. 
 
                                          
37 See Annex – Test results for the static fixed effects model.  
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Table 6.6  Results Model 1 (number of participants 
      with unsettled payments) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  3.28 4.02 3.38 2.32 14.73 6.97  4.63  -0.93 
 13.71***  16.5***  3.8***  5.14***  10.1***  14.84*** 7.25***  -3.85*** 
Liquidity  -0.10  -0.10  -0.10  -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.12 
 -8.19***  -8.05*** -9.16*** -7.87*** -7.56***  -16***  -7.67***  -9.65*** 
Liquidity  Loss  1.65 1.66 0.78 0.81  1.01  1.43  1.07  0.94 
  59.21***  58.92*** 28.64*** 30.8***  38.61*** 55.18*** 33.78*** 33.17*** 
D x Liquidity Loss  0.25  0.25  0.61  0.60  0.53  0.26  0.54  0.51 
  8.99*** 8.93***  23.28*** 23.92*** 20.57*** 9.66*** 19.29*** 19.42*** 
Degree  (Node)      0.09        
      59.92***       
Connectivity  (Node)      12.23         
      59.88***        
Avg. Path Length (Node)          -8.09       
       -56.71***       
Cluter Index (Node)            -4.00     
         -51.65***    
Betw. Cenrality (Node)              33.80   
           26.37***   
Dissimilarity Index (Node)                11.13 
             40.07*** 
Value  (Network)    -0.02          
    -7.76***         
Degree  (Network)      -0.16        
      -2.24***       
Connectivity (Network)      -32.51         
      -3.25***        
Avg. Path Length (Network)          1.51       
       2.52***       
Cluter Index (Network)            -3.60     
         -3.42***    
Betw. Cenrality (Network)              -342.26   
           -3.00***   
Dissimilarity  Index             0.03 
(Network)             0.82 
R
2  69.23  69.35  69.96  72.41 71.58 70.88 66.54 68.69 
Relative Impact of                 
Transfer  Account  (in  %)  15%  15%  78%  74% 52% 18% 50% 54% 
 
Source: Own calculations based on daily network- and node-level ARTIS GSCC indicators and on daily simulations of the 
50 banks and 13 Transfer accounts in the ARTIS GSCC from 16 November 2005 to 16 November 2007 (excluding 
Austrian holidays). Numbers (1) to (8) provide results for the respective model specifications, each including the 
independent variables for which results are provided. These values are parameter estimates (upper) and corresponding z-
values (lower). * denotes significance at the 90 per cent confidence level, ** at 95 and *** at 99 per cent. 
 
 
First we estimated specification 1 – column (1) – as the most 
parsimonious model with only three explanatory variables: Liquidity, 
Liquidity Loss, and the dummy variable (D×Liquidity Loss). All three 
variables are highly significant and have the expected signs: higher 
values of aggregate liquidity in the system reduce contagion; large 
values of liquidity loss at the stricken bank increase contagion; and the 
contagion impact of operational shocks at Transfer accounts is 
significantly higher than that of the average participant in the system 
(as suggested by Figure 6.3 above). 
  These results are not particularly surprising, but it is reassuring for 
our approach that they are robust across all specifications. The  
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goodness of fit of specification 1 is high with an R
2 of 69.23.
38 The 
relative impact of a stricken Transfer account is 15 per cent higher 
than the average across stricken banks and Transfer accounts. The 
parameter values of the three explanatory variables are very robust 
across specifications. They remain highly significant in all 
specifications. 
  Secondly, we add further explanatory variables that capture either 
network or node characteristics. Since the various network indicators 
are highly correlated, we add only one indicator in each specification, 
for both node- and the network-level, in Specifications 3 to 8. In 
Specification 2 we include a traditional measure of network size 
(Value of all transactions settled on a specific day) to contrast the 
explanatory impact of this traditional measure with more sophisticated 
network indicators (degree, average path length etc.). A higher 
transactions value in the network is associated with lower contagion. 
However, the additional variable only has a very small impact on the 
model’s explanatory power (R
2 increases by 0.12 percentage point). 
  The network indicators at node-level are highly significant. 
Operational shocks at nodes with higher degree, higher connectivity, 
higher betweenness centrality or higher dissimilarity indices cause 
higher contagion. Similarly, nodes with higher average path length 
and higher cluster indices feature lower contagion. In sum, more 
connected, more central nodes, and nodes with less mutually 
connected neighbours cause relatively more contagion, even compared 
to i) nodes which cause similar liquidity losses, ii) nodes that are 
either also banks / Transfer accounts, and iii) nodes that experience 
operational shocks on days with the same level of aggregate liquidity. 
We conclude that in Model 1 the position of the stricken bank in the 
network indeed has an impact on contagion. 
  The network indicators at network-level are significant as well 
(except for the average dissimilarity index). Lower average degree, 
average connectivity, average cluster index and average betweenness 
centrality are associated with a higher contagious impact of an 
operational problem at a given bank / Transfer account across days. 
Higher average path length implies a higher contagious impact; ie the 
denser the network on a specific day, the lower the contagious impact 
                                          
38 The R
2s reported in the panel data analysis differs from the OLS R
2. While they are still 
a useful measure of the model and its specification, they are not equal to the fraction of 
variation of the dependent variable explained by the estimated equation. They can be 
interpreted as squared correlations between the estimated and observed dependent 
variable.  
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on that day in Model 1. Hence, the structure of the network on a given 
day in the sample significantly influences contagious. 
  The additional pairs of explanatory variables do not seem to 
improve the goodness of fit of the model, though it is somewhat 
higher than for the simple measure of network activity Value 
(Network). Adding connectivity at node-level and network-level – 
specification (4) – increases R
2 from 69.23 to 72.41 per cent. In this 
respect, the multivariate analysis indeed contradicts the univariate 
analysis in section 4 above. 
  The relative impact of Transfer accounts varies greatly across 
specifications, from roughly 15 per cent – specifications (1), (2), and 
(6) – to almost 80 per cent in specification (3). However, the relative 
impact is positive across all specifications and confirms the 
observation in Figure 6.3 above. 
 
 
6.5.5  Results of Model 2 (number of unsettled payments) 
Table 6.7 summarises the results for the eight specifications of Model 
2. The dependent variable is the number of unsettled payments at the 
end of the day (excluding those of the stricken bank). 
  In specification (1) the variables Liquidity, Liquidity Loss, and the 
dummy variable (D×Liquidity Loss) are highly significant and carry 
the expected signs. Again the parameters and z-values are robust 
across all specifications. Contagion is lower on days with higher 
aggregate liquidity. It is higher when the stricken bank planned to 
transact a higher value of payments on the day of the simulated 
operational problem. Operational shocks to Transfer accounts have a 
higher contagion impact than those to bank accounts. The relative 
impact is more than twice as high in specification (1) of Model 2 (36 
per cent) as in the comparable specification of Model 1 (15 per cent). 
The goodness of fit of the specification is lower in Model 2 (39.79 per 
cent) than in Model 1 (69.23 per cent). The variation in number of 
unsettled payments across days and across scenarios is harder to 
capture than that of the number of participants affected by contagion.  
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Table 6.7  Results Model 2 (number of unsettled 
     payments) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  7.32 9.90 -3.06 0.57 35.54 12.55 4.73  -0.36 
 7.95***  10.67*** -0.93  0.34  6.38***  6.93***  2.13**  -0.35 
Liquidity  -0.28  -0.25  -0.27  -0.20 -0.22 -0.25 -0.26 -0.29 
  -5.65***  -5.44*** -6.18*** -4.57*** -4.75*** -5.43*** -5.29*** -6.24*** 
Liquidity  Loss  6.61 6.67 4.97 4.94  5.32  6.29  5.60  5.40 
  41.91***  41.84*** 24.31*** 24.17*** 28.22*** 38.61*** 22.59*** 26.62*** 
D x Liquidity Loss  2.40  2.38  3.10  3.10  2.94  2.45  2.91  2.84 
 8.36***  8.29***  10.53*** 10.55*** 10.08***  8.49***  9.52***  9.72*** 
Degree  (Node)      0.18        
      13.51***       
Connectivity  (Node)      24.59         
      13.85***        
Avg. Path Length (Node)          -17.09       
       -13.92***       
Cluter Index (Node)            -6.25     
         -10.84***    
Betw. Cenrality (Node)              53.96   
           5.65***   
Dissimilarity Index (Node)                19.00 
             10.02*** 
Value  (Network)    -0.07          
    -8.15***         
Degree  (Network)      0.51        
      1.93**        
Connectivity  (Network)      30.93         
      0.86         
Avg. Path Length (Network)          1.21       
       0.56       
Cluter Index (Network)            -5.29     
         - 1 . 4 *      
Betw. Cenrality (Network)              426.79   
           1.09   
Dissimilarity  Index             0.05 
(Network)             0.52 
R
2  39.79  39.81  39.90  40.01 40.02 39.77 39.72 39.67 
Relative Impact of                 
Transfer  Account  (in  %)  36%  36%  62%  63% 55% 39% 52% 53% 
Source: Own calculations based on daily network- and node-level ARTIS GSCC indicators and on daily simulations of the 
50 banks and 13 Transfer accounts in the ARTIS GSCC from 16 November 2005 to 16 November 2007 (excluding 
Austrian holidays). Numbers (1) to (8) provide results for the respective model specifications, each including the 
independent variables for which results are provided. These values are parameter estimates (upper) and corresponding z-
values (lower). * denotes significance at the 90 per cent confidence level, ** at 95 and *** at 99 per cent. 
 
 
Similar to Model 1 all network indicators at node-level are highly 
significant and have the same signs as in the respective specifications 
of Model 1. A participant with higher node degree, connectivity, 
betweenness centrality and dissimilarity index, but lower average path 
length and cluster index causes a larger contagion effect than 
participants with similar values of out-going payments on that day. 
The position of the stricken node within the network has a significant 
influence on the contagion caused by an operational shock, even after 
controlling for aggregate liquidity, for liquidity loss due to operational 
problems at the stricken bank, and for whether it is a bank or a 
Transfer account. 
  Turning to the network indicators at network-level provides the 
following picture: only Value (Network) is significant at the 99 per  
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cent confidence level. Again, operational problems cause less 
contagion on days with more network activity. The degree is 
significant at the 95 per cent confidence level, ie a more connected 
network is subject to more contagion. This contradicts the finding in 
Model 1 and also the following finding in Model 2: The clustering 
index is significant at the 90 per cent level, which implies that a 
network experiences less contagion if it consists of nodes with more 
mutually connected neighbours. The other more sophisticated network 
indicators are not significant in Model 2. 
  The explanatory value of the additional explanatory variables in 
specifications (2) to (8) is very low. It increases from 39.79 per cent in 
specification (1) to at most 40.02 in specification (5). We conclude 
that network indicators (at both node and network-level) provide little 
explanation for variations in the number of unsettled payments across 
days and across scenarios. 
  The relative impact of an operational shock at a Transfer account 
varies substantially across specifications, with a minimum of 36 and a 
maximum of 63 per cent. The minimum is higher, but the maximum is 
lower in Model 2 than in Model 1. Nevertheless, the dummy is 
significant in all specifications. 
 
 
6.5.6  Results of Model 3 (value of unsettled payments) 
Table 6.8 summarises the results for the 8 specifications of Model 3. 
The dependent variable is the value of unsettled payments at the end 
of the day (excluding payments by the stricken bank). 
  Specification (1) represents the basic Model 3 with the dependent 
variable value of unsettled payments and independent variables 
Liquidity, Liquidity Loss, and the dummy variable (D×Liquidity 
Loss). All three latter variables are highly significant and have the 
expected signs. High aggregate liquidity in the system cushions the 
contagious effect of an operational shock. It increases with the value 
of payments that the stricken bank would have transferred under 
business as usual. Operational problems at Transfer accounts cause 
significantly more contagion than the average across accounts. The 
relative impact (166 per cent), however, is much larger than in Model 
1 (15 per cent) and Model 2 (36 per cent). Unlike in the other two 
models, the relative impact is quite stable across specifications (1) to 
(8), ranging from 163 to 174 per cent. The goodness of fit of 
specification (1) is high, with an R
2 of 70.62. 
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Table 6.8  Results Model 3 (value of unsettled 
     payments) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  5.22E-02  7.37E-02 2.47E-02 3.63E-02 2.87E-01 5.94E-02 4.24E-02 5.35E-02 
  5.3***  7.16*** 0.59  1.7** 4.08***  2.63*** 1.44* 4.59*** 
Liquidity  -2.66W-03  -2.19E-03 -2.70E-03 -2.50E-03 -2.08E-03 -2.68E-03 -2.63E-03 -2.72E-03 
 -5.01***  -4.29*** -5.08*** -4.72*** -3.57***  -4.77*** -4.8***  -4.97*** 
Liquidity  Loss  9.56E-02  9.60E-02 9.22E-02 9.04E-02 9.09E-02 9.72E-02 9.65E-02 9.57E-02 
  47.6*** 47.77*** 35.69*** 35.17*** 38.17*** 45.99*** 33.87*** 36.91*** 
D x Liquidity Loss  1.59E-01  1.59E-01 1.60E-01 1.61E-01 1.61E-01  1.58E-01 1.58E-01  1.59E-01 
 34.54***  34.48*** 34.24*** 34.39*** 34.55***  34.6***  33.08***  34.04*** 
Degree  (Node)      3.33E-04       
      2.34**        
Connectivity  (Node)      6.84E-02        
      3.63***         
Avg. Path Length (Node)          -5.76E-02       
       -4.42***       
Cluter Index (Node)            2.78E-02    
         3.66***     
Betw. Cenrality (Node)              -4.65E-02   
           - 0 . 5 3    
Dissimilarity Index (Node)                -2.52E-03 
             - 0 . 1 2  
Value  (Network)    -6.24E-04         
    -5.49***         
Degree  (Network)      1.76E-03       
      0.52        
Connectivity  (Network)      7.28E-02        
      0.16         
Avg. Path Length (Network)          -5.32E-02       
       -1.92**       
Cluter Index (Network)            -5.39E-02    
         - 1 . 1 1      
Betw. Cenrality (Network)              1.93E+00   
           0.36   
Dissimilarity  Index             5.25E-04 
(Network)             0.41 
R
2  70.62  70.63  70.64  70.65 70.69 70.68 70.60 70.61 
Relative Impact of                 
Transfer Account (in %)  166%  166%  174%  178%  177%  163%  164%  166% 
Source: Own calculations based on daily network- and node-level ARTIS GSCC indicators and on daily simulations of the 
50 banks and 13 Transfer accounts in the ARTIS GSCC from 16 November 2005 to 16 November 2007 (excluding 
Austrian holidays). Numbers (1) to (8) provide results for the respective model specifications, each including the 
independent variables for which results are provided. These values are parameter estimates (upper) and corresponding z-
values (lower). * denotes significance at the 90 per cent confidence level, ** at 95 and *** at 99 per cent. 
 
 
Four of the six network indicators at node-level are significant; the 
most sophisticated (betweenness centrality and dissimilarity index) are 
not. The stricken banks’ / Transfer accounts’ degree, connectivity, and 
average path length have the same signs as in the respective 
specifications in Models 1 and 2. Again we conclude that more central 
and more connected nodes cause more contagion. However, the 
cluster index is significant again but changes sign relative to two 
previous models, ie nodes with higher fractions of mutually connected 
nodes cause more contagion. 
  With the exception of the traditional measure Value (Network) and 
average path length, network indicators at network-level are not 
significant. Those two, however, have the same signs as in the 
respective specifications in Models 1 (and 2). On days with a higher  
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total transactions value and/or more dispersed network structure, 
contagion is lower. However, the more sophisticated network 
indicators at node and network-level seem to have little bearing on the 
goodness of fit. R
2 ranges from 70.60 in specification (7) to 70.69 in 





6.5.7  Overall results of the multivariate analysis 
The explanatory value of all three models is high for all eight 
specifications. It ranges from about 40 per cent for Model 2 to roughly 
70 per cent for Models 1 and 3. In the first case, the variation within 
scenarios is higher than between scenarios, while in the other two 
cases the opposite is true. Based on the higher R
2 values for Models 1 
and 3, we conclude that our models are better suited to explain 
variation of the contagion impact between scenarios than over time 
within scenarios. 
  The three variables aggregate Liquidity, Liquidity Loss, and the 
dummy variable for Transfer accounts (D×Liquidity Loss) are highly 
significant across all models and across all specifications. They have 
the same sign in all cases. We regard the following results as robust 
 
–  The contagion effect is lower on days with more aggregate 
liquidity in the system.
39 
–  The contagion effect is lower for scenarios and days with lower 
liquidity loss due to operational shocks. 
–  The system is significantly more vulnerable to operational shocks 
that hit Transfer accounts. These have special characteristics which 
are neither fully captured by the Liquidity Loss measure nor by the 
position within the network. 
 
Three network indicators at node-level are significant and have the 
same signs in Models 1 to 3: degree (+), connectivity (+), and average 
path length (–). We conclude that operational shocks at more 
connected and more central nodes cause more contagion, even after 
controlling for variations in liquidity loss (which can also be regarded 
as an indicator of their importance/activity in the payment system) and 
for whether they are Transfer accounts or banks. 
                                          
39 We re-estimated specifications (1) to (8) of Models 1 to 3 in sub-periods of the sample 
period. In one sub-period, Liquidity was not significant in some specifications.  
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  None of the more sophisticated network indicators at network-
level are significant in any of the three models. Only the traditional 
measure of network size (Value (Network), the aggregate value of 
payments in the network on a given day) is significant across models 
and features the same sign. Days with higher transaction activity are 
associated with lower contagion, even after controlling for aggregate 
liquidity and liquidity loss, and for whether the shock hits a Transfer 
account or a bank. 
  The additional explanatory power of network indicators at node- 
and network-level seems to be very limited. The liquidity situation of 
the system, the liquidity loss due to operational shock, and the hitherto 
unknown special characteristics of Transfer accounts can explain the 
variation in contagion across days and across scenarios already very 
well. The position of the stricken bank / Transfer account in the 
network and the structure of the network on the specific day of the 
shock add little explanatory value. 
  In further research we will focus on two main issues: first, the 
impact of different liquidity strategies of banks; in our approach 
aggregate liquidity conceals the potential impact of the distribution of 
liquidity in the system. Furthermore, we could run simulations on 
different levels of theoretical liquidity at individual banks and test for 
the impact of liquidity at individual-bank level. Second, we find that 
network indicators at network level add little to a stability analysis 
within a given network. However, combining simulation data from 
different networks might show that network indicators play a more 





The analysis of the network indicators of ARTIS shows that the 
network is compact. This is mostly due to the fact that almost all 
active nodes are linked to a small number of nodes at the centre of the 
network (the largest banks and the most active Transfer accounts). 
This network structure is quite stable across days. 
  We conducted 31311 simulations based on 63 different scenarios 
for 497 transaction days from 16 November 2005 to 16 November 
2007 (excluding Austrian holidays). Although the scenarios focus 
solely on banks and Transfer accounts in the GSCC on all days, more 
than a quarter of all simulations do not lead to contagion (in terms of 
the number of banks with unsettled payments), and two-fifths yield  
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only one or two contagious defaults. We arbitrarily define a 
conservative threshold for the systemic importance of an account 
based on the average contagion it causes across day. An account is 
deemed systemically important if it causes an average contagious 
impact of at least EUR 48.5 million in unsettled payments (0.1 per 
cent of average transactions settled across days). We find that only a 
very small number of participants are systemically important (seven 
per cent of banks in the network and about 50 per cent of Transfer 
accounts). The simulation results suggest that the ARTIS system is 
remarkably stable with respect to an operational incident at a single 
participant. The strong contagion impact of the Transfer accounts is an 
interesting feature revealed by the simulations and suggests that the 
removal of Transfer accounts by the single shared platform in 
TARGET 2 can improve resilience relative to the old TARGET 
system. 
  The simulation results reveal that contagion varies substantially 
across scenarios and across days. In order to explore the determinants 
of variation, we employ a panel data analysis. We test eight 
specifications of three models (based on three different measures of 
contagion). Specification (1) in each model is the most parsimonious 
one with three independent variables: Liquidity (aggregate liquidity in 
the system on any given day), Liquidity Loss (the value of payments 
due by the stricken account on any given day), and a dummy variable 
(D×Liquidity Loss) for the Transfer accounts in the panel. We find 
that the contagion effect is lower on days with more aggregate 
liquidity in the system as well as in scenarios and on days with lower 
liquidity loss due to operational shocks. Operational shocks at 
Transfer accounts render the network significantly more vulnerable to 
operational shocks. 
  Over recent years, payment system research has increasingly 
focused on network analysis. We apply our very rich data set to 
empirically test the interaction between network structure and network 
stability for the first time. Specifications (2) to (8) extend the basic 
model by including network indicators at node- and network level. 
The results for the network indicators at node level suggest that 
operational shocks at more connected and more central nodes cause 
more contagion. The results for the network indicators demonstrate 
that operational shocks on days with higher transaction activity cause 
less contagion. These results are highly robust across models and 
across specifications. But the more sophisticated network indicators at 
the network level are insignificant. 
  Furthermore, we find that the most parsimonious specification (1) 
features high goodness of fit for Models 1 and 3 (dependent variables  
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number of participants with unsettled payments and value of unsettled 
payments, respectively) and slightly lower for Model 2 (dependent 
variable value of unsettled payments). The additional explanatory 
value of the network indicators at node and network level is however 
very low. With respect to the interaction between network structure 
and network stability, we conclude that the position of a stricken node 
within the network has an impact on network stability in the face of an 
operational shock, although the explanatory value is small. The results 
for network indicators at network level raise serious doubt about the 
hypothesis that variations in network structure (within a given 
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The assumption of conditional homoskedasticity is tested by a 
likelihood ratio (LR) test which compares the log-likelihoods for the 
restricted model (homoskedastic errors) and the unrestricted model 
(heteroskedastic errors). Both models are estimated by iterated 
generalised least squares (IGLS). The tests statistics clearly reject the 
assumption of conditional homoskedasticity for all three models in 
specification (1). (This is to be expected, as some scenarios hardly 
generate contagion, so that the variance is extremely low.) The 
resulting test statistics and error probabilities are shown in table A6.1. 
 
Table A6.1  Test results – likelihood ratio test for 
     conditional  homoskedasticity 
 
 LR  Chi
2(62) Prob. 
Model 1  18501  0.00 
Model 2  103015  0.00 
Model 3  74980  0.00 
      Source: Own calculations based on data and model 
specifications as presented in Section 6.5. Likelihood Ratio 
(LR) and Error Probability (Prob.). 
 
 
To test for the assumption of serial independence we conduct a 
Wooldridge test on all three models in specification (1). The test is 
based on residuals of regressions in first differences, which are then 
regressed on their lagged values at t-1. The test is robust to conditional 
heteroskedasticity. The test statistics reject the assumption of serial 
independence for Models 1 and 3 in specification (1). The resulting 
test statistics and error probabilities are shown in table A6.2. 
 
Table A6.2  Test results – wooldrige test 
 
 F(1,62)  Prob. 
Model 1  20.3  0.00 
Model 2  2.3  0.14 
Model 3  13.5  0.00 
      Source: Own calculations based on data and model 





Three tests are available to check for cross-panel independence. They 
were suggested by Friedman (1937), Frees (1995), and Pesaran 
(2004), respectively. All three test statistics reject the assumption of 
cross-panel independence for all three models in specification (1) 
(Table A6.3). 
 
Table A6.3  Test results – friedman, fress, and 
     pesaran  tests 
 
  Friedman  Prob. Frees Prob.  Pesaran  Prob. 
Model  1  11728.05  0.00 11.12 0.00  363.11  0.00 
Model  2  7378.70  0.00 7.06 0.00  147.08  0.00 
Model  3  5744.16  0.00 4.81 0.00  120.80  0.00 
Source: Own calculations based on data and model specifications as presented in Section 
6.5. Error Probability (Prob.). 
 
 
The data exhibit high correlation between time-invariant unobservable 
scenario specific effects ν and the explanatory variables. 
Consequently, we test for fixed versus random effects. Table A6.4 
presents the results of Breusch-Pagan (1980) likelihood ratio (LR) 
tests of random effects for all three models in specification (1). 
 
Table A6.4  Test results – Breusch-Pagan likelihood 
     ratio  test 
 
 LR  Prob. 
Model 1  306000  0.00 
Model 2  43300  0.00 
Model 3  230000  0.00 
      Source: Own calculations based on data and model 
specifications as presented in Section 6.5. Likelihood Ratio 
(LR) and Error Probability (Prob.). 
 
 
Given the results of all four tests, an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimate of a standard fixed-effects model would yield inconsistent 
and biased standard errors. We need to apply an estimator that can 
handle conditional heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and cross-
sectional dependence of the error terms ε.  
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Appendix 2 
Definition of network indicators 
 
This appendix summarises the definitions and formulas for the 
network indicators used in the paper. In addition, we provide an 
illustrative example of a network which allows us to visualise 
different values of network indicators.  
 
Figure A6.1  A simple network example 
 
 
      Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
The network as provided in Figure A6.1 is an undirected, unweighted 
network with seven nodes (number of nodes n=7) and 8 undirected, 
unweighted links (number of links m=16
40). Table A6.5 summarizes 
the relevant network indicators from our paper for this network. 
 
                                          
40 There are eight connections in our network, between node i and j, and each of these can 
be seen as a link from node i to node j as well as from node j to node I, hence m, the total 
number of links is 16.  
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Table A6.5  A simple network example –  
     node-level  network  indicators 
 
 A  B  C  D  E  F  G  Network 
(Average)*  Degree 5  2  1 2 3 2 1  2.3 
(Average)* 
Connectivity  83.3%  33.3%  16.7% 33.3% 50.0% 33.3% 16.7% 38.1% 
(Average)* Clustering 
Coefficient  20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%  66.7%  100.0% 0.0%  41.0% 
Average  Path  Length  1.2  1.7  2.0 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.5 1.8 
(Average)* 
Betweenness 
Centrality 85.7%  35.7%  0.0%  0.0% 7.1% 0.0% 0.0% 18.4% 
(Average)* 
Dissimilarity  Index 1.5  1.6  1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4 3.1 1.7 
*) While the node level indicator of node h is not an average, the corresponding indicator on the network 
level is indeed the average across all nodes n. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
Measures of Network Structure
41 
 
The degree kh of node h is measured by the number of links 
originating (out-degree) or terminating (in-degree) at node h. In our 
case of an undirected network, the in- and out-degrees are identical. 
Take for instance node A, which has links to nodes B, C, D, E, and F, 
hence node A has a degree kA = 5 while the respective value for node 
B is kB = 2; ie node A is linked to five other nodes and B to just two. 
As the network is undirected, degree k remains the same for node A 
and B independent of whether we look at links that originate or 
terminate at each node. 
  On the network level, the average degree k of the network is 
calculated by summing across all links originating from each node 
(out-degree 
out
i k ) or terminating at each node (in-degree 
in
i k ) and than 














i = = = ∑ ∑ . In our example 
the average degree of the network is 2.3, based on dividing 16 direct 
links m by our seven nodes n. 
 The  connectivity of node h is its degree over the number of nodes 
n. In our example, node A has connectivity  =  83% while the 
respective value for node B is connectivity  =  33%; ie connectivity 
puts the absolute value of degree in relation to the size of the network 
(as measured by the number of nodes n). On a network level, average 
connectivity is defined by the number of actual (directed) links m over 
                                          
41 Where possible, we use the notation of Albert and Barabasi (2002), Soramäki et al 
(2006) and Zhou (2003).  
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the number of possible (directed) links n(n–1). In our example the 
average connectivity of the network is 38.1%, based on dividing 16 
direct links m by 42 potential (directed) links between our n nodes. 
 The  clustering coefficient CC(h) of an individual node h with kh 
neighbours measures how well the latter are connected with each 
other. The number of potential links between the kh neighbours is 
kh(kh–1)/2. Let the actual number of nodes between them be Eh, so 
that 







  The clustering coefficient of node A CC(A) = 20% and that of B 
CC(B) = 0%. Ie node A has five direct neighbours, so that the potential 
number of direct links is ten, but only two direct links exist (D-E and 
E-F). Therefore, the clustering coefficient of A is 20%. B has two 
neighbours with one possible direct link, but A and G are not linked, 
so that the clustering coefficient is 0%. 
  The average clustering coefficient of network CC is the average of 
all individual nodes’ clustering coefficients CC(i) and is hence defined 
as  ∑ =
i C C ) i ( C
n
1
C . In our example the average degree is 41.0%, 
based on our n nodes individual clustering coefficients. 
  An indicator of the distance dij between nodes is the lowest 
possible number of links that connects each node i with each other 
node j in the network. It is referred to as shortest path length. 
  We calculated the average path length lh for the originating node 
h by averaging over the shortest path lengths to each terminating node 
i. Therefore lh is defined as  ∑ ≠ −
=
i h hi h d
1 n
1
l .  
  In the example the average path length of node A is much lower 
(lA = 1.2) than that of node B (lB = 1.7), ie from node A any other 
node can be reached on the shortest path via an average of 1.2 links, 
while it takes 1.7 links from node B. 
  For the entire network, the average path length l is defined as the 
average path length over all originating nodes li divided by our seven 





 The  betweenness centrality CB(h) of node h provides a measure 
of how many shortest paths dij pass through node h. Let sij(h) be the 
number of shortest paths between all pairs of nodes i and j that pass 
through node h and let sij be the number of all shortest paths between 






j i h ij
) h ( ij
B s
s
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In our example there are 44 shortest paths. The lower boundary is 
given by 42 possible (directed) links n(n–1). To these 42 we must add 
another 2, as the shortest path from D-F and vice versa could either 
pass through A or E. By definition, we then have to exclude those 16 
paths that link directly with neighbouring nodes, which leaves 28 
shortest paths in the denominator. In our example 24 of those pass 
through node A and ten pass through node B. Therefore their 
betweenness centralities are given by CB(A) = 85.7%  and 
CB(B) = 35.7%. 
  For the entire network, the average betweenness centrality CB is 
defined as the average of all individual nodes’ betweenness 
centralities CB(i) and is thus  ) i ( C
n
1
C B B = . In our case the average 
betweenness centrality is 18.4%, based on our n nodes individual 
betweenness centrality. 




) 2 N (
d d
N









where dih and djh are distance measures from nodes i and j to node h. It 
provides a comparison of the view of the entire network from the 
perspective of all pairs of neighbouring nodes. For the entire network 




= Δ . 
  Our example serves to illustrate that, although for most other 
indicators node A is distinctly different from all other nodes in the 
network (particularly regarding our other ‘advanced’ network 
indicator, betweenness centrality), the view on the rest of the network 
is very similar, as A is the central node in a cluster. Hence, its 
dissimilarity index of 1.5 aligns it more or less with all of its direct 
neighbours. Node F, whose remote position may have gone unnoticed 
so far (at least based on other network indicators), is shown to be 
vastly different from the other nodes, however. These distinct features 
of betweenness centrality and dissimilarity index are also the reason 
why we introduced them in the first place.  
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Chapter 7 
Simulating the impact of a hybrid 
design on the efficiency 
of large-value payment systems 
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7  Simulating the impact of a hybrid 
design on the efficiency of large-
value payment systems 
Abstract 
This paper uses a simulation methodology to quantify the impact of 
introducing one particular type of ‘hybrid design’, a centralised 
receipt-reactive queue, on the liquidity demands faced by banks using 
large-value payment systems. Using real payments data for the UK we 
show that significant liquidity savings are achievable if banks choose 
to submit a high proportion of their payments into the queue. The 
relationship between values queued and savings achieved is found to 
be positive and non-linear. Liquidity savings are distributed unevenly; 
the largest users do not benefit significantly while the smaller users 
make significant savings. A synthetic payments dataset is used to 
demonstrate that these results hold more generally. The level of 
liquidity recycling in the existing payment system is shown to be a 




This paper uses real payment data to test the possibility that users of 
large value payment systems could benefit from the introduction of a 
hybrid payment system design. Simulations are used to quantify the 
impact of such a design change on users in terms of the impact on 
both their liquidity usage and the degree of settlement delay 
introduced. The first part of the analysis is carried out using historical 
data from CHAPS Sterling, the UK’s large-value payment system. 
Our analysis is then extended by generating synthetic payments data 
and using it to probe the extent to which our findings apply to large-
value payment systems more generally. 
  CHAPS Sterling is the UK’s large value payment system (LVPS) 
with a mean daily turnover of £284 billion.
1 It operates on a real-time 
                                          
1 Payment Systems Oversight Report 2008 (www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/psor/ 
psor2008.pdf).  
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gross settlement (RTGS) basis: payments are processed transaction by 
transaction with simultaneous debit of the payer and credit of the 
receiver in accounts held at the Bank of England. RTGS eliminates 
interbank credit risk by providing immediate finality of payments: 
once a transaction has settled it is irrevocable and cannot legally be 
unwound (for a detailed explanation of RTGS systems, see BIS, 
1997). This important feature of RTGS has led to its adoption in 
LVPSs worldwide, as banks and central banks have found the 
settlement risk inherent in deferred net settlement (DNS) systems to 
be too high given the size of interbank exposures that can occur. 
Although RTGS in central bank money eliminates settlement risk, it 
can have the undesired consequence of increasing the cost of making 
payments and potentially increasing liquidity risk faced by banks. 
When payments are settled gross rather than being netted out at the 
end of the day, banks typically require more liquidity to make their 
payments. CHAPS banks, for example, require on average three times 
more liquidity under RTGS than they would have needed under a 
DNS system with multilateral end-of-day netting.
2 
  The past decade has seen a growing trend of adoption of hybrid 
payment system designs for the settlement of large-value payments in 
developed countries.
3 Hybrid systems seek to be liquidity-efficient 
without introducing significant amounts of settlement risk by 
combining features of both RTGS and DNS systems. A defining 
feature of these systems is that payments can be centrally queued, with 
their release conditional on certain criteria, such as the arrival of 
offsetting payments. Offsetting occurs when two or more payments 
are settled simultaneously. Although in legal terms settlement is still 
gross (ie each transaction is settled with finality individually) 
payments that are offset can be thought of as having generated their 
own liquidity, as offsetting has the same economic effect as the 
netting of payments. 
  Two main types of hybrid systems have emerged to date. One 
type, which has evolved from DNS, is called continuous net 
settlement (CNS), the CHIPS system in the US is the leading example 
of a CNS design. Although settlement risk is significantly reduced in 
CNS systems (payments that are offset and settled with finality in 
batches intraday are not dependent on the subsequent settlement of 
                                          
2 Source: Bank of England payments database and authors’ calculation for December 
2006. 
3 Calculations in Bech et al (2008) show that in 1999 only 3% of wholesale payments by 
value in CPSS countries were settled over payment systems with a hybrid design, while 
in 2005 that had risen to 32%.  
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other payments in the system), it is not completely eliminated. The 
second type of hybrid system incorporates a queuing facility into 
RTGS, in effect creating multiple streams into which banks can 
channel their payments: typically a time-critical (RTGS) stream and 
an offsetting (queuing) stream. Examples of systems with this type of 
functionality are TARGET2, the centralised LVPS of the Eurosystem, 
and BOJ-NET. Such queue-augmented RTGS systems do not give rise 
to settlement risk,
4 as all queued payments are legally considered to be 
final at the time they are offset. For a more detailed explanation of 
hybrid system designs see McAndrews and Trundle (2001) and BIS 
(2005). 
  Although queue-augmented RTGS systems can help reduce 
liquidity risk without introducing settlement risk, they can introduce 
settlement delays which may impose additional costs on banks. A 
number of theoretical and empirical papers assess this fundamental 
trade-off between liquidity efficiency and settlement delay in an 
attempt to find the optimal settlement arrangement for LVPSs. 
Johnson, McAndrews and Soramaki (2004) use simulation techniques 
to assess the impact of various types of hybrid functionality on 
Fedwire, the RTGS system used to settle large value US dollar 
payments. The paper finds that one mechanism in particular, receipt-
reactive gross settlement (RRGS), can potentially reduce participants’ 
costs of obtaining intraday credit, whilst only modestly delaying the 
average time of settlement.
5 RRGS is a novel queue release 
mechanism proposed by the paper that conditions the settlement of 
queued payments on the arrival of incoming payments. This feature 
ensures that all the liquidity posted by a bank is reserved solely for 
making time-critical payments. Their paper recognises that the 
introduction of RRGS functionality would provide a good incentive 
for banks to submit payments earlier in the day, but does not attempt 
to incorporate this behaviour in its simulations. 
  Willison (2004) and Martin and McAndrews (2008) both use 
theoretic models to predict and compare equilibria for RTGS and 
hybrid system designs. Willison examines the trade-off between cost 
of liquidity and operational risk caused by payment delay, and finds 
                                          
4 As long as receiving banks do not anticipate payments they are due to receive in the 
queue and credit beneficiaries’ accounts before the payment has been settled / offset with 
finality.  To avoid this, some hybrid systems provide very limited information about 
payments in the central queue (payer, payee, value only) until finality has been achieved. 
5 This cost reduction is based on the Federal Reserve’s method of charging for intraday 
credit, which is a fee based on banks’ average overdrafts calculated at the end of each 
calendar minute, and does not necessarily apply to a system where intraday credit is free 
but collateralised, such as CHAPS.  
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that the first-best solution is unattainable under RTGS. He also finds 
that a hybrid payment system design outperforms RTGS when 
payments can be offset either in the morning or all day. Martin and 
McAndrews compare welfare among RTGS, receipt-reactive and 
balance-reactive hybrid system designs (a balance-reactive system is 
one where settlement of queued payments is conditional on a 
participant’s account balance). They find that a balance-reactive 
system can provide higher or lower welfare than RTGS depending on 
certain criteria, such as the cost of delaying payments in the system or 
the probability of participants facing liquidity shocks (modelled as an 
unexpected fall in their account balances as a result of a time-critical 
payment to an ancillary settlement system). Welfare is defined in 
terms of the cost of liquidity and cost of delay borne by the 
participants. A receipt-reactive system on the other hand is found to 
weakly dominate RTGS: it can achieve a level of welfare at least as 
high as, if not better than, RTGS. Finally, a receipt-reactive system 
can provide higher or lower welfare than a balance-reactive one 
depending on the cost of delaying payments in the system and the 
probability of liquidity shocks. They also suggest that by conditioning 
payments on the receipt of offsetting payments and having some 
insurance against the risk of having to borrow costly intra-day funds 
from the central bank, participants would be more willing to submit 
payments earlier under a hybrid system design than they would under 
RTGS. 
  The purpose of this paper is to investigate the possibility of 
achieving liquidity savings in CHAPS, and other large-value payment 
systems, by simulating the impact of receipt-reactive hybrid 
functionality
6 using both historical and synthetic payments data. We 
attempt to fill some of the existing gaps in the literature outlined 
above by: 
 
–  Analysing the aggregate impact of hybrid functionality on CHAPS 
banks in terms of costs of liquidity and degree of delay introduced 
                                          
6 CHAPS is not considered to be a hybrid system, although it does feature a central 
queue. A ‘circles’ process is run once a day, and can be run additionally by the RTGS 
system controller at any time during the day in order to resolve gridlock situations when 
participants have insufficient funds on their accounts, which momentarily locks payments 
waiting in the central queue and multilaterally attempts to offset as many of them as 
possible. This is not, however, used as a liquidity saving feature in its current form; banks 
prefer to queue payments in their internal schedulers rather than submit them to the 
central queue. A gridlock has never occurred to date due to the posting of ample amounts 
of liquidity by CHAPS banks at the start of each day.  
195 
by RRGS,
7 experimenting with different criteria for time-
criticality. We find that significant liquidity savings are achievable 
where banks choose to submit a very high proportion of payments 
(>  90%) into the receipt-reactive queue, and show that the 
relationship between values queued and savings achieved is 
positive and non-linear. The level of settlement delay introduced 
also increases in a non-linear fashion as queued values rise, but 
does not reach excessive levels under any assumptions used. 
 
–  Assessing the impact of hybrid functionality at the individual bank 
level. We show that liquidity savings are unevenly distributed 
across banks, with an inverse relationship between the value of 
payments made by a bank and the liquidity saving benefits to that 
bank from the introduction of RRGS. For the largest CHAPS 
banks liquidity demands can even rise slightly under RRGS. 
 
–  Endogenising banks’ likely payment submission behaviour under 
RRGS by submitting some non time-critical payments earlier in 
the day. We show that where significant levels of payment delay 
exist in an RTGS system, the value-weighted average time of 
settlement can be brought forward significantly by the introduction 
of receipt-reactive functionality due to the impact on payment 
behaviour. 
 
–  Generating synthetic payment data to probe the extent to which 
our findings are CHAPS specific and investigate the key 
determinants of the impact of hybrid functionality. We find that 
the impact of hybrid functionality is strongly influenced by the 
structure of payment flows, especially the level of liquidity 
recycling being achieved under RTGS, the number of direct 
participants in the system and the amount of payments they 
process. We corroborate that key aggregate and bank level 
findings for CHAPS hold more generally. The differences between 
real and synthetic data in the impact of RRGS on volatility of 
liquidity demands suggest that CHAPS banks already submit 
payments using strategies that reduce the volatility of their 
liquidity needs. 
 
                                          
7 We would also have liked to simulate a balance-reactive hybrid system design. 
Unfortunately, such a queuing algorithm is not available in the version of the Bank of 
Finland simulator (BoF-PSS2 v2.2.5) used in this work. Simulating this functionality 
would be an obvious extension to our work, once the functionality becomes available.  
196 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we 
explain our simulation methodology by defining RRGS and 
introducing the metrics we use to measure the impact of hybrid 
functionality on liquidity usage and payment delay. In Section 7.3, we 
report results of our simulations, interpreting them in Section 7.4 and 
examining possible policy implications. We conclude in Section 7.5 
by summarising our key results and outlining some possible 
extensions to our work. More detailed information on how we 





We run simulations to test the possibility of making liquidity savings 
in CHAPS by complementing the existing RTGS stream with RRGS, 
using a month of historical payments data.
8,9 We use the Bank of 
Finland payment and settlement simulator (BoF-PSS2), which is 
described in detail in Leinonen and Soramaki (2003). Section 7.2.1 
describes the RRGS functionality in more detail. Time-critical 
payments and the metrics used to measure the impact of our 
simulations are defined in sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3 respectively. 
Sections 7.2.4 and 7.2.5 explain how we endogenise banks’ payment 
submission behaviour and generate synthetic payments data. 
 
 
                                          
8 December 2006 – a ‘clean’ month with no CHAPS settlement extensions. 19 working 
days in total. 
9 In addition to the RRGS algorithm, the Bank of Finland offers a range of bilateral and 
multilateral offsetting algorithms whose impact on CHAPS could in principal be 
simulated. In practice, however, this is not a viable alternative as it is not possible to 
simulate the impact of such an algorithm while continuing to allow time-critical payments 
to be settled immediately without carrying out two distinct simulations: a pure RTGS 
simulation for time-critical payments, and a continuous net settlement (CNS) simulation 
with multilateral offsetting for the remaining transactions. Simulating such an 
arrangement using CHAPS data results in banks requiring more liquidity than where all 
the payments are settled RTGS (ie without offsetting) under one simulation. This occurs 
because liquidity recycling is disrupted by the ‘splitting’ of transactions between two 
accounts. A surplus of liquidity in one account cannot be used to fund a deficit in the 
other, requiring further liquidity injection, which would not have been the case if the 
funds had been posted onto a single account (as is the case, for example, with the RRGS 
algorithm which has multiple streams but uses a single account).  
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7.2.1 Receipt-reactive  gross  settlement 
The RRGS algorithm can be viewed as an extreme case of liquidity 
reservation functionality. All the liquidity posted by a bank into the 
system is reserved to allow payments which that bank designates as 
high priority to be settled immediately. The same bank’s low priority 
payment messages are released for settlement, on a first-in first-out 
(FIFO) basis, only where they can be settled using liquidity from the 
arrival of incoming funds within a pre-specified period of time. 
Johnson et al (2004) use calendar minutes as the time intervals in their 
paper: in any minute the algorithm allows the release of as many 
payments from the front of the queue as is possible to offset, but not 
exceed, the amount of incoming funds received in that minute. They 
use this approach because in Fedwire charges for banks’ daylight 
overdrafts are calculated at the end of each calendar minute. 
  In our simulations it is appropriate to take the entire CHAPS day 
as one continuous period,
10 as the key determinant of the cost of 
posting liquidity in CHAPS is the maximum liquidity needed 
throughout the day. This means that the RRGS algorithm runs on a 
continuous basis: a payment received at 9am can cause the release of a 
payment entered into the queue at 10am or even 4pm as long as 
aggregate payments received by bank i ≥ aggregate queued payments 
sent by bank i at that point in time, including the queued payment(s) 
being released. Under RRGS, a bank does not necessarily have to post 
liquidity to cover the gross value of all its outgoing time-critical 
payments: incoming funds can be used to finance both time-critical 
and non-time critical payments. 
  Finally, it is worth noting that although we refer to the term 
offsetting throughout the paper, this misleadingly suggests that offset 
payments are always released for settlement at the same instant. This 
can and often does happen, but there are also instances where a 
payment entered into the queue is conditionally released in response to 
a payment received much earlier in the day. RRGS should therefore be 
viewed as a mechanism for co-ordinating the immediate settlement of 
time-critical payments, together with the conditional release of the 
                                          
10 We also investigate whether adopting a greater number of distinct periods over which 
incoming payments are cumulated impacts our results by experimenting with 1 hour and 
5 minute intervals. We find that estimated collateral posting by banks is not significantly 
affected, as mean liquidity requirements across the month slightly decrease, but this is 
offset by an increase in volatility (standard deviation) across the 19 days: for a detailed 
explanation of the metrics used to quantify the liquidity burden faced by banks and their 
impact on estimated collateral postings see Sections 7.2.3.1 and 7.4.4 respectively.  
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remaining payments against incoming payments: where we use the 
term offsetting in the context of RRGS, we specifically mean 
offsetting through conditional release. Also, if there are any unsettled 
payments remaining in the queue at the end of the day, we assume 
these are settled on a multilateral net basis. The Figure below 
illustrates how the RRGS mechanism works. 
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Throughout our analysis we always require time-critical payments
11 to 
be settled immediately but allow the remaining payments to be 
queued, waiting for incoming payments to trigger their release. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests the main payment types of payments 
which are considered by CHAPS banks to be truly time-critical are 
 
                                          
11 The term time-critical payment refers to a payment for which the sender deems there 
are significant private or social costs to delay; indeed, in some cases, failure to pay at, or 
by, a given time intraday may constitute technical default.  
199 
payments that are either: (a) to or from the account of CLS;
12,13 (b) 
extremely large in value; or (c) require prompt settlement by 
customers eg house purchases. It is not possible to identify the last 
category of time-critical payments in our dataset but we always treat 
payments to and from CLS Bank’s CHAPS account as high priority 
and settle them RTGS. As we have no other obvious way of 
identifying precisely other categories of time-critical payments in our 
data, we experiment with two approaches to proxy time-criticality: 
 
(i) Payments of a size greater than or equal to a certain value 
threshold are time-critical and settled immediately; others only 
have to be settled sometime during that day (at the latest by the 
end of day) and could therefore be queued and offset. We 
experiment with different value thresholds by treating payments 
larger than £100m, £500m and £1bn as time-critical. 
 
(ii) A proportion (r) of payments in our sample are designated as time-
critical and settled immediately. This approach is used in Johnson 
et al (2004). For ease of comparison we adopt values of r to ensure 
that the same proportion of payments by value is treated as time-
critical under approaches (i) and (ii). 
 
In practice, banks’ time-critical payments are likely to be somewhere 
in between the two sets of payments we identify under the approaches 
above. Our method therefore enables us to report a range of possible 
liquidity saving / settlement delay trade-offs, from which both 
extremes of the impact of RRGS on CHAPS banks can be observed. 
 
 
                                          
12 CLS is the Continuous Linked Settlement system which provides payment versus 
payment settlement of FX transactions, see www.cls-services.com for more details. 
Users’ sterling pay-ins to CLS are made across CHAPS. 
13 More generally, pay-ins to all ancillary systems are typically viewed as highly time-
critical. However, CLS is the only payment of this type which is made across CHAPS. 
Settlement of BACS, the UK retail clearing system, takes place as a non-CHAPS transfer 
across banks’ RTGS accounts and is not included in our dataset. Similarly, liquidity 
transfers to CREST for settlement of DvP transactions occur across other liquidity 
transfer accounts.  
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7.2.3 Metrics  for  comparison 
Throughout the paper we compare metrics from our simulations with 
those obtained from a pure RTGS simulation. We focus on the 
following measurements to quantify the impact of RRGS on the trade-
off banks face between liquidity usage and settlement delay. 
 
 
7.2.3.1  Metrics used to quantify the liquidity burden faced by 
banks 
We use various measures to identify relevant indicators of banks’ 
liquidity posting requirements. One simple measure is the mean of the 
maximum daily net debit position faced by each bank across the 
month, which is then summed across banks to get an aggregate figure 
for the system. In practice it would not be feasible for banks to post 
this exact amount into the system ex ante as it is determined by the 
submission behaviour of all banks in the system, but it gives a good 
indicator of liquidity demands faced by banks. One potential 
drawback of this metric is that it cannot quantify changes in the 
volatility of liquidity demands that may be caused by RRGS. To 
capture this we quantify how the standard deviation of maximum daily 
net debit positions over the month changes for each bank. We also 
display results for the liquidity required by each bank to cover the 
single maximum net debit position faced across the entire month. 














n = number of CHAPS days being simulated 
MLRij = maximum liquidity requirement of bank i on day j 
 
Standard deviation of maximum liquidity requirement across the 
month for bank i 
 









Maximum of maximum liquidity requirement across the month for 
bank i 
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7.2.3.2  Metric used to quantify average settlement time 
The basic indicator that we consider to quantify the average settlement 
time under different simulations is the value-weighted average 














ts,i = settlement time of payment i 
ai = value of payment i 
 
Early settlement is desirable from an operational risk perspective: the 
earlier payments are settled, the lower the risk of having large 




7.2.3.3 Recycling  ratio 
We use the recycling ratio, r, to calculate the liquidity efficiency of the 
system before and after the introduction of RRGS. This is based on 















The recycling ratio measures on average how many times the system 
recycles a unit of liquidity by comparing the total value of payments 
submitted with the value of liquidity that needs to be posted by 
members of the system to allow settlement to occur.  
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7.2.4 Endogenising  payment submission behaviour 
Anecdotal evidence obtained from dialogue with CHAPS users 
explains how banks might alter their behaviour in response to a 
liquidity saving mechanism such as RRGS. Banks would have an 
incentive to submit payments to the central scheduler as early as 
possible to maximise the benefits of offsetting, safe in the knowledge 
that their liquidity posted at the start of day would be reserved solely 
for making time-critical payments. This incentive to submit payments 
earlier in the day is also predicted by recent literature (in Johnson et 
al, 2004, and implicitly in Willison, 2004). 
  We test the impact of this prediction by artificially changing the 
submission times of payments in some of our simulations. However, 
banks have made it clear to us that their ability to submit payments 
earlier in the day would depend on having prior knowledge of 
individual payments, which varies from bank to bank according to the 
mix of payments they process. We simulate the impact of these 
behavioural changes by submitting randomly selected 20, 50 and 80% 
of non-time critical payments greater than £1m at the start of day 
instead of their original submission times.
14 In doing this, we 
incorporate overnight loans data obtained via the Furfine method by 
bringing forward all loan repayments to the beginning of the day (as 
these are known in advance) and none of the new loans being 




7.2.5 Synthetic  payments 
We generate datasets of synthetic payments to test the extent to which 
our findings are CHAPS-specific (for detailed methodology, see 
Appendix 1). Using such data allows us to vary the numbers of banks 
in a system, the numbers of payments being settled, and the 
distribution of values and volumes of payments across banks to see 
what drives the impact of RRGS. 
                                          
14 Banks have told us that they tend to make their small value payments (we assume this 
means for value < £1m) immediately as they are received without queuing them in their 
internal schedulers, reflecting the fact these payments do not impose significant liquidity 
demands. It would not therefore be realistic to alter the submission times for these 
payments as they are not subject to delay. Similarly, we do not change the submission 
times for time-critical payments, since by definition these could not have been delayed. 
15 We identify overnight loan payments in CHAPS using a Matlab program which 
matches all the overnight loans in our dataset to loan repayments the following day. The 
program uses a similar methodology to that outlined in Millard and Polenghi (2004).  
203 
7.3 Results 
We display system-wide results using CHAPS data in Section 7.3.1 
(aggregate individual banks excluding Bank of England and CLS 
Bank
16) before looking at the impact of RRGS on individual CHAPS 
banks in Section 7.3.2. We then compare our findings with results 
obtained using a dataset of synthetic payments in Section 7.3.3. 
 
 
7.3.1 Aggregate  findings 
Table 7.1 overleaf shows that no significant liquidity savings or 
settlement delays are observed where only half of all payments by 
value are submitted to the receipt-reactive stream. Significant mean 
liquidity savings start to occur as the proportion of queued payments 
is raised; at the same time minor increases in settlement delay can be 
observed. The impact of both effects is increasing in the numbers of 
payments queued. 
  Mean liquidity savings are not influenced by the method through 
which time-critical payments are selected. By contrast, the volatility 
(standard deviation) of liquidity demands is affected. Volatility is 
unchanged or even increases slightly under RRGS where a value 
threshold is used, while volatility falls where a volume-based selection 
method is adopted. This difference in volatility is also evidenced by a 
corresponding difference in liquidity savings based on the maximum 
liquidity requirement measure. 
  Earlier submission to a central queue of a subset
17 of non-time 
critical payments has little impact on observed liquidity savings under 
RRGS, but can significantly bring forward the average time of 
settlement when compared to observed settlement times in CHAPS. 
 
                                          
16 We treat RBS and NatWest as a single entity throughout our simulations, even though 
they have separate CHAPS Sterling settlement accounts. We therefore report findings for 
only 12 banks in our results even though there are 15 direct CHAPS Sterling participants 
in our dataset. 
17 Based on certain criteria – see Section 7.2.4 for a detailed explanation.  
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Table 7.1  Impact of RRGS on CHAPS at the 
     aggregate  level 
 
Time-critical payments
a  Early 
submission
c 
% Δ Liquidity requirement Δ Settlement time 
Criteria Proportion






≥£100mn 54%  -  -2 +1  0  +00:01  00:00 
≥£500mn 12%  -  -10  +10  +3  +00:12  -00:01 
≥£1bn 4%  -  -38  0  -9  +00:37  +00:09 
              
Random 50% 51%  -  -1  -2  -1  +00:01  00:00 
Random 10% 11%  -  -12  -10  -8  +00:11  -00:01 
Random 3%  4%  -  -37  -18  -16  +00:25  +00:04 
              
≥£100mn 54%  Random  50%  0 +5  +1  -00:57  +00:01 
≥£500mn  12% Random  50%  -15 +9 0 -01:20  +00:06 
≥£1bn 4%  Random  50%  -37  +5  -4  -00:33  +00:30 
              
Random 10% 11%  Random 50%  -14  -12  -5  -01:15  +00:02 
Random 3%  4%  Random 50%  -39  -18  -16  -01:01  +00:12 
              
≥£1bn 4%  Random  20%  -37  +2  -8  +00:05  +00:15 
≥£1bn 4%  Random  80%  -37  +2  -7  -01:01  +00:43 
 
a CLS payments always treated as time-critical. 
b Proportion of all payments that are time-critical (by value). 
c A dash indicates that original (RTGS) payment submission times have not been altered. In 
subsequent simulations we extend our analysis by endogenising banks’ payment submission 
behaviour: banks submit all overnight loan repayments and a randomly selected % of payments 
(which are ≥ £1mn and non-time critical in both cases) to the RRGS queue at the start of day. 
Submission times of new overnight loans are left unchanged. 
d Change in value-weighted Average Settlement Time (AST) compared to RTGS AST of 
11:37am. 
e Change in standard deviation of settlement time across the month compared to RTGS. 
 
 
7.3.2 Bank  level  findings 
Table 7.2 overleaf shows disaggregated results for value (≥£1bn) and 
volume (random 3%) based time-criticality thresholds, grouping banks 
by the mean liquidity savings they experience when using RRGS. We 
see that the mean liquidity requirements of the largest two banks 
increase slightly as a result of the introduction of RRGS. Between 
them these banks settle half the value of both total payments and of 
time-critical payments. They both have high liquidity recycling ratios 
under RTGS. 
  We see another small group of medium sized banks settling an 
average of 10% of value and of time-critical payments, which 
experience moderate mean liquidity savings. Their liquidity recycling 
ratios prior to RRGS are also moderately high.  
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  Finally, the majority of banks are much smaller in terms of total 
value and proportion of time-critical payments settled (around 3–4%). 
They typically have very low recycling ratios under RTGS, and 
benefit the most from the introduction of an RRGS stream. This 
pattern of mean liquidity savings being broadly inversely correlated 
with recycling ratios under RTGS and the sizes of banks’ payment 
flows, is observed for both value and volume based time-criticality 
thresholds. 
 
Table 7.2  Impact of RRGS on CHAPS at grouped 
     bank  level 
 











≥£1bn time-critical          
MLRi > 0%  2  27%  25%  30  28 
0% > MLRi > -40%  2  9%  13%  14  21 
MLRi < -40%  8  3%  3%  9  24 
Random 3% time-critical          
MLRi > 0%  2  27%  30%  30  26 
0% > MLRi > -40%  1  10%  8%  17  25 
MLRi < -40%  9  4%  4%  9  23 
 
 
7.3.3  Results using a synthetic payments dataset 
Similar simulations were run using our synthetic dataset to attempt to 
replicate the results found using CHAPS data (ie those displayed in 
the first six rows of Table 7.1 and in Table 7.2). Baseline results are 
produced for simulations with 10 banks, with the value profile of 
payment flows and the distribution of payment volume across banks 
both being drawn from log normal distributions, and with a process of 
squaring-off of balances taking place during the second half of the 
payment day. Sensitivity analysis is carried out to examine how the 
impact of RRGS is altered where the number of banks making 
payments is increased (we simulate systems with 100 and 1000 
banks). 
  Our results can be found in Table 7.3. We observe some clear 
similarities between these results and those displayed in Table 7.1. In 
particular, no significant liquidity savings are observed where only 
half of all payments are put into the receipt-reactive stream, but 
significant mean savings do occur as the proportion of queued 
payments is raised, with the effect increasing in the value of payments  
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queued. Mean savings are of the same magnitude under value and 
volume based thresholds for time-critical payments. 
  One key difference is observed. With the synthetic payments 
dataset, the volatility of liquidity demands decreases by a greater 
amount than the decrease in mean liquidity demands for both time-
criticality thresholds. By contrast, volatility falls by less than the mean 
(and in the case of value based thresholds doesn’t fall at all) with our 
CHAPS dataset. 
  Our sensitivity analysis shows that there is a strong correlation 
between the number of banks in the payment system and liquidity 
savings seen under RRGS, with the largest savings observed in our 
dataset with 1000 banks. This seems to be linked to the observation 
that recycling ratios fall as the numbers of banks in the system is 
increased.
18 
  We also try a 10 bank simulation where we reduce the overall 
number of payments from 20,000 per day to 5,000. This halves the 
system’s recycling ratio under RTGS (from 47 to 23), possibly due to 
the probability of recycling payments falling when there are fewer 
payments to be made in the system. Correspondingly, the benefit of 
RRGS doubles on the mean liquidity requirement measure (from 17% 
to 37%), and the recycling ratio of the system improves by 50% after 
RRGS (from 23 to 36). 
 
                                          
18 Simulating a uniform distribution of bank sizes and payment values has a similar effect 
to increasing the number of banks: the less concentrated payments are among a few 
participants, the more opportunity there is for liquidity savings to be made from co-
ordinated settlement of non-urgent payments.  
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Table 7.3  Impact of RRGS using artificial payments 
     datasets 
      Log-normal distribution of payment values 






Recycling ratio  % Δ Liquidity requirement 
RTGS RRGS Mean  St  dev  Max 
Largest 50%  10  47  47  0  0  0 
Largest 10%  10  47  50  -7  -7  -7 
Largest 5%  10  47  56  -17  -14  -17 
            
Random 50%  10  47  47  -1  -2  -1 
Random 10%  10  47  50  -8  -14  -14 
Random 5%  10  47  58  -19  -28  -22 
            
Largest 5%  100  20  27  -28  -33  -29 
Random 5%  100  20  28  -30  -50  -38 
            
Largest 5%  1000  11  20  -45  -44  -40 
Random 5%  1000  11  21  -46  -68  -59 
            
100,000 payments             
Largest 5%  10  23  36  -37  -30  -33 
 
 
Figure 7.2 below shows how the value of payments submitted is 
distributed across the dataset of 1000 banks. Figure 7.3 illustrates how 
individual recycling ratios are linked to a bank’s size, as defined by 
the aggregate value of payments sent. Both Figures display the y-axis 
on a log scale. 
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Figure 7.2  Average value submitted (1000 banks) 
      Bank sizes and payment values log-normally 
















Figure 7.3  RTGS recycling ratios (1000 banks) 
      Bank sizes and payment values log-normally 














Figure 7.4 shows mean liquidity savings under RRGS where the 
largest 5% of payments are treated as time-critical, by averaging 
banks in ‘buckets’ of 50. Although not directly observable in the 
Figure due to averaging, those banks with the highest recycling ratios 
under RTGS see their liquidity demands increase under RRGS, the 
same pattern observed in our CHAPS data in Table 7.2. Again we see 
smaller banks with lower recycling ratios under RTGS making larger 
savings. The one caveat to this pattern is that the very smallest banks 
in the sample often do not see any savings as their volumes of 
payments are not sufficiently large for RRGS to give any benefit (ie 
on a typical day they do not have any offsetting benefits to take 
advantage of). 
 
Figure 7.4  Mean liquidity savings under RRGS 
      Bank sizes and payment values log-normally 
      distributed – largest 5% of payments 
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This section discusses some of the key findings reported in the 
previous section. Section 7.4.1 discusses aggregate findings from 
CHAPS data. The non-linear increase in aggregate liquidity savings 
seen as more payments are queued is examined in more detail. In 
addition the differing impact of volume and value based time- 
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criticality thresholds are discussed. Section 7.4.2 examines why 
significant differences in liquidity savings are observed across 
CHAPS banks. In section 7.4.3 the bias that might be introduced 
because our simulations cannot capture the use of bilateral monitoring 
by CHAPS banks is discussed, with particular reference to its impact 
on the average time of settlement measure. Section 7.4.4 considers 
how liquidity savings observed using CHAPS data might be translated 
into cost savings, using regression analysis borrowed from James and 
Willison (2004). Section 7.4.5 identifies general policy implications of 
our findings, drawing on similarities and differences observed in the 
results obtained between the real and generated payments datasets. 
 
 
7.4.1 Aggregate  findings 
Figure 7.5  Non-linear profile of mean liquidity 
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Figure 7.6  Non-linear profile of increase in average 
     settlement  time  (AST): 
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Figures 7.5 and 7.6 above illustrate the non-linear relationship 
between values queued and the liquidity saving and average 
settlement time metrics. The nature of this relationship suggests that 
the benefits of RRGS depend on having a critical mass of payments 
whose submission is being coordinated by the queue-release 
algorithm; for CHAPS this point is reached where 80–90% of 
payments by value are queued. It seems likely that the proportion of 
queued payments beyond which RRGS starts to offer significant 
savings will vary depending on the characteristics of the payment 
system under investigation, for example we might expect that where a 
system’s aggregate recycling level under RTGS is significantly lower 
than that seen in CHAPS, the effect would emerge at lower 
proportions of payments. Testing this proposition would be a useful 
extension to our analysis. 
  Although our aggregate results show that mean liquidity savings 
are similar under the value and volume based time-criticality 
thresholds (Section 7.3.1 – Table 7.1), we observe significant 
differences in the volatility of these savings across the two methods. 
The standard deviation increases when using the value based approach 
but decreases (although by less than the mean) under the volume 
based approach. The Figures below may provide some insight into this  
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difference. Figure 7.7 shows the distribution of time-critical payments 
through the day by aggregating all payments sent in half an hour 
intervals, and taking the mean across the month. As shown by the blue 
and red bars, the mean profiles for the value and volume based 
thresholds are very similar, which is consistent with our finding that 
mean liquidity requirements are not influenced by the method of 
selecting time-critical payments. In contrast, we see that the standard 
deviation of time-critical payments across the month is higher (and 
more volatile through the day) under the value based threshold. One 
likely factor here is that the number of payments classified as time-
critical is much lower under the value based threshold than the volume 
based threshold. It seems plausible that this translates into a greater 
volatility in the liquidity demands under RRGS because it makes the 
timing and destination of payments which provide the liquidity to 
initiate the settlement of queued payments more unpredictable. 
 
Figure 7.7  Value profile of time-critical payments in 



















Figure 7.8  Value profile of time-critical payments in 
      half hour intervals: s.d. across 19 days 
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7.4.2 Distribution  of RRGS benefits on individual banks 
Table 7.2 in section 7.3.2 shows large variations in the impact of 




Why does liquidity requirement under RRGS increase for some 
banks? 
 
Figures 7.9–7.12 overleaf display the profile of payments sent (netted 
against incoming payments) before and after RRGS for two banks: A 
and B. Bank A’s mean liquidity requirement slightly increases under 
RRGS, whereas Bank B is one of the biggest beneficiaries, seeing a 
large decrease in its mean liquidity requirement. 
  It appears that RRGS can potentially disrupt the recycling of 
payments for banks who already use liquidity very efficiently under 
RTGS, such as Bank A. Payments which they were due to receive 
from other banks, and subsequently use to fund their outgoing 
payments, are now being queued in the central scheduler (see the 
circled sections of Figures 7.9 and 7.10 below). Since they must make 
their time-critical payments without delay, they end up using more of 
their own liquidity to fund their outgoing payments under RRGS. In  
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contrast, banks whose payment profiles are not as liquidity efficient 
under RTGS, such as Bank B, benefit the most from RRGS (Figures 
7.11 and 7.12). 
 
Figure 7.9  Profile of payments sent under RTGS 
      (net of incoming payments) for Bank A: 
      mean value at half an hour intervals across 
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Figure 7.10  Profile of payments sent under RRGS 
      (net of incoming payments) for Bank A: 
      mean value at half an hour intervals across 
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Figure 7.11  Profile of payments sent under RTGS 
      (net of incoming payments) for Bank B: 
      mean value at half an hour intervals across 
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Figure 7.12  Profile of payments sent under RRGS 
      (net of incoming payments) for Bank B: 
      mean value at half an hour intervals across 
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Why do banks have markedly different recycling ratios under 
RTGS? 
 
The answer lies partly in the intra-day profile of banks’ payments. 
Becher et al (2007) suggest that structural differences in the 
underlying payment flows of banks may limit the extent to which 
payment timing can be managed so as to increase recycling ratios eg if 
certain banks (or their customers) routinely borrow in the overnight 
market, and others lend, the payment flows of the two groups will be 
correspondingly different. 
  Figures 7.13 and 7.14 below also help shed some light on the 
issue. Figure 7.13 shows that banks with high recycling ratios under 
RTGS see their liquidity demands increase (although they still remain 
the users with the highest recycling under RRGS), whereas those with 
the lowest ratios see the greatest savings. Figure 7.14 shows that 
larger banks typically have higher recycling ratios. This could be 
because a larger bank is likely to have more active links with the rest 
of the participants, increasing the probability of receiving incoming 
payments with which to recycle outgoing payments, especially in a 
system with extensive use of bilateral limits such as CHAPS. More 
fundamentally, the law of large numbers dictates that payment flows 
are more likely to be well balanced across the day where the volume 
of payments being made is greater. 
 
Figure 7.13  Impact of RTGS recycling ratio on banks’ 
      total liquidity requirements under RRGS 
















Figure 7.14  Relationship between banks’ total payment 
      value sent and recycling ratio under RTGS 
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7.4.3  Possible biases due to the use of bilateral monitoring 
One source of payment delay in CHAPS, as discussed in Becher et al 
(2007), is that CHAPS banks typically monitor the sending behaviour 
of other members on a bilateral basis, in order to enable them to 
quickly detect if either: (i) another member has suffered an operational 
problem which is preventing them from sending; or (ii) another 
member is deliberately delaying payments in order to reduce their 
liquidity needs. Where banks observe an interruption in normal flow 
of payments from a counterparty for either reason they will typically 
stop sending to that counterparty until normal flow is resumed. 
Incentives for bilateral monitoring will remain under RRGS, but we 
are not able to capture the effects of the constraints placed on payment 
submission due to bilateral monitoring in our simulation methodology. 
This implies that our methodology may underestimate the amount of 
settlement delay introduced by RRGS by unrealistically relaxing one 
set of constraints on payment submission. More generally, this 
highlights that further work remains to be done carefully analysing the 
incentives created by the introduction of RRGS and how this would 




7.4.4 Translating  liquidity  savings into cost savings 
As discussed in Section 7.2, it is unrealistic to expect banks to post 
their exact daily minimum liquidity requirements into the system ex 
ante. Although the summary statistics we report are good indicators of 
the impact of RRGS functionality on banks’ liquidity demands, their 
impact on banks’ collateral posting decisions is not very clear. In 
some simulations, for example, RRGS reduces aggregate mean daily 
liquidity requirements across the month, but increases the aggregate of 
the maximum liquidity requirement across the entire month. So we 
need to assess how banks react to changes in the mean and standard 
deviation of their liquidity demands. 
  This is done by following the method employed in James and 
Willison (2004) of taking observed collateral posting decisions of 
CHAPS members and using regression analysis to estimate the 
influence of the mean and standard deviation of banks’ max liquidity 
requirements on this decision. We use data for July-December 2006 to 
carry out a panel regression where the explanatory variables are the 
mean and the standard deviation of maximum collateral used on day t 
calculated over the 30 previous days in the sample; and the Libor / 
repo spread lagged by one day. In contrast to the methodology of 
James and Willison, a generalised least squares (GLS) estimator is 
used with correction made for serial correlation across time and within 
bank. The regression results are shown in Table 7.4. 
 
Table 7.4  Cross-sectional time-series GLS regression 
      of collateral posted: all banks 
      Including reserve account balances 
 
 Coefficient  Standard  error 
Mean of maximum collateral used  0.24*  0.05 
Standard deviation of maximum collateral used  0.98*  0.07 
Libor / repo spread  0.00  0.00 
Coefficients marked with * are statistically significant at 1% 
 
 
All coefficients except the Libor / repo spread are in logs. The results 
could therefore be interpreted as: (i) a 1% increase in the mean 
liquidity requirement leads to a 24 basis point increase in collateral 
posting; and (ii) a 1% increase in the standard deviation leads to a 98  
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basis point increase in collateral posting.
19 The Libor / repo spread has 
a statistically insignificant impact on collateral posting, possibly 
because the true opportunity cost of posting collateral is low for banks 
subject to the UK Stock Liquidity Regime, who between them submit 
the majority of CHAPS payments by value. 
  We can now interpret our simulation results more clearly, by 
estimating the impact of RRGS on banks’ collateral posting decisions 
using the above coefficients, our simulation results and the figure for 
mean collateral posting by a CHAPS bank in the 2nd half of 2006: 
£3.7 billion. This is shown in Table 7.5 below. 
 
Table 7.5  Estimating the impact of RRGS on banks’ 
      collateral posting decisions using James and 













(hh:mm)  Mean St  dev 
≥£500mn -  -10 +10  +0.3bn  +00:12 
≥£1bn - -38  0  -£0.3bn  +00:37 
          
Random 10%  -  -12  -10  -£0.5bn  +00:11 
Random 3%  -  -37  -18  -£1.0bn  +00:25 
          
≥£500mn Random  50% -15  +9  +0.2bn  -01:20 
≥£1bn Random  50% -37  +5  -£0.1bn  -00:33 
          
Random 10%  Random 50% -14  -12  -£0.6bn  -01:15 
Random 3%  Random 50% -39  -18  -£1.0bn  -01:01 
          
≥£1bn Random  20% -37  +2  -£0.3bn  +00:05 
≥£1bn Random  80% -37  +2  -£0.3bn  -01:01 
 
 
The key result in the above table is that the increase in volatility (as 
seen by the increase in standard deviation) causes mean savings under 
some simulations to disappear, and for two simulations results in 
higher collateral postings for the system as a whole: banks can post 
less collateral because their mean liquidity requirement is reduced, but 
they must post more to cover the extra volatility. As discussed in 
                                          
19 The collateral posting decision is four times more sensitive to the volatility in daily 
liquidity needs compared with the mean liquidity need, suggesting that banks may also 
choose to post collateral for precautionary reasons.  
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Section 7.4.1, the increase in volatility is always observed with the 
value based time-criticality thresholds. Therefore under this metric the 
method of identifying time-critical payments does lead to significant 
differences in the costs faced by CHAPS banks. 
 
 
7.4.5 Policy  implications 
Figure 7.15 shows the results of simulations where the ≥ £1bn time-
criticality threshold has been used. The estimated mean level of 
collateral that needs to be posted is plotted on the x-axis against the 
mean time of settlement on the y-axis, bringing together sections 7.4.3 
and 7.4.4. Unsurprisingly, RTGS requires the highest level of 
collateral. The blue observation is an RRGS simulation where 
historical payment data is taken as exogenous (which may be 
unrealistic). This shows banks face a trade-off: a decrease in collateral 
costs coupled with an increase in settlement delay. Altering banks’ 
payment submission behaviour is shown to be able to improve this 
trade-off, where a significant fraction of payments are submitted early 
we see unequivocal improvements in aggregate welfare due to the 
introduction of RRGS, estimated collateral costs fall and mean time of 
settlement moves earlier in the day. 
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Figure 7.15  Impact of different settlement and 
      submission arrangements on mean 
      collateral posting and average settlement 
     time 
     Payments  ≥ £1bn time-critical 
      Average settlement times are measured on the 
      24h clock eg 11:30 means settlement in the 
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The results in Figure 7.15 give some weight to the idea that the 
introduction of hybrid functionality would be beneficial to CHAPS 
users. However, to make a firm policy recommendation about whether 
CHAPS should incorporate hybrid functionality further investigation 
would be needed to analyse the following 
 
(i)  What is a realistic assumption about banks’ level of knowledge 
of their outgoing payments at the start of the day?
20 
(ii)  What would be the development costs of incorporating RRGS 
into CHAPS? 
(iii) Would banks trust the operational reliability of the central 
scheduler (anecdotal evidence suggests that this may be an 
issue)? 
                                          
20 Our dialogue with CHAPS users suggests a figure in the region of 20–50% may be 
realistic, although with significant variations seen across banks, primarily depending on 
the proportion of their payments that are associated with financial market flows.  
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(iv)  What bias is introduced by our inability to incorporate the effect 
of bilateral monitoring on payment submission behaviour? 
(v)  What opportunity costs do banks face both from posting liquidity 
in CHAPS and from settlement delays? 
 
If after considering these factors a decision were taken that RRGS 
would be beneficial, there are additional queuing functionalities that 
might bring further benefits if introduced in parallel. For example, a 
‘settlement no later than’ option might encourage banks to submit 
even some ‘semi time-critical’ payments to the central queue (ie 
payments which for example, have to be settled in two hours, but can 
be queued until then for potential offsetting). If the settlement no later 
than time is reached and a payment has not been released for RRGS 
settlement, the queue places the payment into the RTGS stream for 
immediate settlement. 
  Gridlock resolution tools such as multilateral offsetting algorithms 
or the ability to reorder queues might also provide further 
optimisation, where large payments hold up conditional release of 
smaller payments in the queue due to the FIFO rule. However, our 
analysis suggests that only around 2–3% of all payments remain in the 
queue at end of day and need to be settled multilaterally net. This is 
the case even where 96% of payments by value are submitted to the 
central queue and suggests that the FIFO rule works well for CHAPS. 
  Finally, the fact that savings from RRGS are unevenly distributed, 
and some CHAPS users may even face cost increases, suggests that 
some coordination problems may be faced in getting general 
agreement on investment in RRGS. However, the fact that the smallest 
CHAPS banks get most benefit from RRGS is of interest to policy 
makers. One area of interest for the Bank of England over recent years 
has been in analysing the exposures created in CHAPS due to the 
highly tiered nature of its membership. As Harrison et al (2005) 
explains, a tiered structure where a large number of users make 
payments across the system indirectly through a correspondent bank 
has the potential to create credit exposures between correspondent 
banks and their customers. Therefore, to the extent that RRGS 
functionality could make direct membership of CHAPS more 






The analysis in this paper has modelled the impact of introducing a 
particular form of liquidity saving functionality, receipt reactive gross 
settlement, to the CHAPS system. Our simulations indicate that there 
could be benefits for CHAPS banks from the introduction of RRGS 
functionality. Two distinct improvements could potentially be 
captured: a reduction in the amount of liquidity that banks would have 
to post to settle their payments, and earlier settlement of those 
payments. It seems that a key determinant of the magnitude of the 
liquidity saving would be the proportion of payments that could be 
submitted to the receipt-reactive queue, while the improvement in 
settlement timing would depend on the proportion of payments whose 
submission is currently delayed. 
  Our results support the findings of Martin and McAndrews (2008) 
that RRGS can achieve a level of welfare that weakly dominates that 
achievable under RTGS. Our simulation approach expands on this 
result by allowing an analysis of the distribution of benefits across 
banks, demonstrating that typically the liquidity savings achieved 
would not be evenly shared across banks. The precise distribution of 
benefits is likely to be dependent on a range of factors relating to the 
structure of individual banks’ payment flows under RTGS. In the case 
of CHAPS we find that banks with fewer payments typically face a 
proportionally higher liquidity need to settle these payments under a 
RTGS design. It is these banks who would benefit most from the 
introduction of a RRGS design. By contrast a subset of large banks 
who currently achieve high recycling ratios would see no savings and 
may even face a small increase in their liquidity needs. 
  We show that the value profile of time-critical payments can 
impact on collateral savings achievable under RRGS. In our 
simulations where the largest payments by value were time-critical, 
the volatility of liquidity demands faced by banks were typically 
higher than where values of time-critical payments were more evenly 
distributed in size. Volatility of liquidity needs is the key driver of 
banks’ observed collateral posting behaviour. 
  Through analysis of a synthetic payment dataset we provide 
evidence that the key results discussed above are likely to hold in 
RTGS system more generally, and are not specific to the structure of 
CHAPS. We confirm that a key determinant of the impact of RRGS 
functionality is the liquidity recycling ratio that banks achieve under 
RTGS.  We believe that this in turn is influenced by a number of 
factors including the number of direct members of the payment  
224 
system, the volume and value of payments being processed in that 
system, the network topology of the system and the profile of payment 
values. This may shed light on the observation that the majority of 
payment systems which have already adopted hybrid designs typically 
had a large number of direct participants prior to adoption.
21 
  Comparison of our results using the CHAPS and the synthetic 
datasets suggests that the existence of decentralised co-ordination 
mechanisms, such as bilateral monitoring, is already delivering some 
liquidity savings to CHAPS banks by reducing the volatility of their 
liquidity needs. 
  We have identified several promising avenues along which our 
work could be extended. When the Bank of Finland payment 
simulator is capable of replicating balance-reactive functionality then 
simulating the impact of its introduction to CHAPS would 
complement our analysis. More generally there is a wide range of 
liquidity saving functionality being employed in RTGS and hybrid 
systems at the present time, an extension of this methodology to a 
number of the leading approaches would be of interest. 
  A more detailed examination of the incentives banks face to 
submit payments to the queuing stream would be a worthwhile 
addition to our work, the benefits identified in our simulations are 
under the strict assumption that all banks will change their submission 
behaviour significantly to utilise RRGS. The differences in our 
findings depending on the method adopted to designate time-critical 
payments suggest there would be merit in exploring whether greater 
benefits could be achieved if banks co-ordinated on particular patterns 
of submission of time-critical payments early in the day to kick-start 
the release of queued payments. Finally, it would be interesting to 
explore the impact of RRGS under stressed circumstances ie where 
one or more CHAPS banks face an operational problem. 
                                          
21 Eg BI-REL in Italy (120 in September 2004) and RTGSplus in Germany (93 in 
December 2003): BIS (2005).  
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Methodology for generating synthetic payments dataset 
The basic method adopted to generate our artificial payments data was 
to use a Matlab program which implemented the following procedure 
 
(i)  Generate 4 columns (denoted A–D) of numbers of length n (the 
number of payments being generated) drawn from a log normal 
distribution. Generate an additional column (E) of length n drawn 
from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. 
 
(ii)  Rescale and round to the nearest integer the numbers in A–C so 
that they contain integers between 1 and b, where b is the number 
of banks being simulated. 
 
(iii)  Rescale the numbers in D so that it contains numbers between 1 
and m, where m is the largest possible payment being simulated. 
D represents the values of payments. 
 
(iv) Compare matching rows of A and B. If Ai = Bi, and Ei > 0.5, 
replace Bi with a number taken from C. Continue taking 
consecutive numbers from C until Ai  ≠ B i. Follow the same 
procedure, but replacing Ai with a number from C, if Ei ≤ 0.5. 
Repeat process until all Ai ≠ Bi. A denotes the sending bank, B 
denotes the receiving bank, the procedure is done to ensure no 
payments are sent and received by the same bank. Draws from Ei 
to decide whether the sending or receiving bank is replaced are 
intended to ensure that no bias is introduced to the probabilities 
of a particular bank being a sender or receiver of payments. 
 
(v)  Combine A, B and D with a column of payment times (T) which 
contains n entries evenly spaced between o (system open) and c 
(system close) to complete the dataset of artificial payments. 
 
One extension to this method we used to make the dataset more 
realistic was to add some squaring-off payments at defined intervals 
through the day, which have the effect of ensuring that all banks end 
the day with zero balances. At the first two squaring-off points (after 
payments n/2 and 3n/4) each bank squares off half its accumulated 
balance, provided that balance has the same sign as its final balance at 
end of day. At end of day the remaining position is squared-off.  
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Rather than explicitly modelling squaring-off payments between 
banks we assume that all squaring-off payments are made with Bank 
b+1 which is introduced solely for this purpose. Throughout we quote 
results from a dataset including squaring-off payments. 
  We believe the introduction of squaring-off makes our dataset 
more realistic. In practice payment banks typically face a non-zero net 
payment flow on behalf of customers on each day, as payments sent 
are unlikely to perfectly match payments received. However, this net 
redemption is typically managed through overnight market 
transactions with counterparts, leaving most banks with final net 
balances that are close to zero.
22 
 
                                          
22 The residual size of net flows is to some extent dictated by the monetary policy 
implementation regime being followed in a country. For example in the UK, since the 
introduction of reserve averaging in May 2006, banks do not face a requirement to 
completely square-off their net positions as this can be absorbed to some extent by 
changes to their overnight balances at the Bank of England. By contrast, prior to the 
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8  Liquidity saving mechanisms and 
bank behaviour 
Abstract 
We investigate the benefits of liquidity saving mechanisms in 
interbank payment systems. We set up, simulate and compare two 
models, representing respectively a ‘vanilla’ payment system and a 
payment system with a liquidity saving mechanism. 
  In the first system, banks can route payments into a real-time gross 
payment stream (RTGS) or can queue them internally. In the second 
system, banks choose between the RTGS stream and a central 
liquidity saving mechanism (LSM), or central queue, that nets 
offsetting payments. 
  In both systems, at the start of the day, banks choose their opening 
liquidity balances for the RTGS stream. At the end of the day, they 
pay costs that depend on i) the chosen liquidity (liquidity costs) and 
ii) the delays experienced during the day (delay costs). As liquidity 
can be ‘recycled’, the delays suffered by any single bank depend on 
decisions of all the banks. 
  We compare the equilibrium choices in the two models with each 
other and with the choices of a benevolent planner. By so doing, we 





Interbank payment systems are used by banks to settle claims that 
arise from their trading with each other, or from customer transfers of 
funds from one bank or another. These systems form the backbone of 
the financial architecture, and their safety and efficiency are of great 
importance to the whole economy. The daily flow of payments in 
interbank payment systems generally amounts to 10% of a country’s 
annual gross domestic product (Bech et al, 2008). The main direct 
costs for banks in these systems (in addition to operations costs) are 
costs related to liquidity that is needed to settle the payments. On the 
other hand, banks may incur costs for delaying settlement. 
  Most large-value interbank payment systems use real-time gross 
settlement (RTGS) as the modality for settling payments. In RTGS,  
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payments are settled individually and only if cover for their settlement 
is available. As a consequence, pure RTGS payment systems require 
large amounts of liquidity: if two banks have to make payments to 
each other, these transfers cannot be offset against each other: both 
banks must send the full payment to its counterparty. However, once a 
bank receives funds, it can ‘recycle’ them to execute its own 
payments. 
  This structure incentivizes free-riding: a bank may find it 
convenient to delay its payments (placing it in an internal queue), to 
wait for incoming funds and thus avoid the burden of acquiring 
expensive liquidity in the first place. There are three main reasons 
why such ‘waiting strategies’ in practice are limited, so that payment 
systems actually work: first, intervention by system controllers who 
typically penalize free riding behaviour, when detected. Second, peer 
pressure: the system’s participants themselves typically agree on 
common market practices and may punish non-cooperative behaviour. 
And third, delay costs: banks have an interest to make payments in a 
timely fashion; the cost of withholding a payment may eventually 
exceed the cost of acquiring the liquidity required for its execution, 
and so banks do not wait indefinitely. 
  However, it is well known that a certain volume of payments is 
internally queued for a while. While kept in the internal schedulers, 
these payments do not contribute to ‘recycling liquidity’, as they are 
kept out of the settlement process. A tempting idea is therefore to pool 
these payments in a central queue, to settle them more efficiently in a 
coordinated way; in particular, payments which offset each other 
could be settled without requiring any costly liquidity.
1 
  Such central queues are called ‘liquidity saving mechanisms’ 
(LSMs) and systems employing them are generally termed hybrid 
systems. There are many varieties of hybrid systems but commonly 
they combine some form of net settlement for less urgent payments, 
while retaining the RTGS mode for more urgent ones. 
  Given the amounts of liquidity circulating in payment systems, the 
gains from hybrid features may be large. For example: to execute their 
payments, banks in the UK CHAPS system borrow from the Bank of 
England between 20 and 50 billion Pound Sterling on a daily basis, 
against high-quality collateral. And, the argument goes, this collateral 
                                          
1 It should be noted that if the mere submission to a central queue does not have legal 
implications in terms of settlement (ie payments are not settled until perfectly offset), 
then the settlement risk which led to the demise of end-of-day-netting systems, is not re-
introduced. Hence, central queues with offsetting do not defeat the purpose of the gross 
payment modality.  
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may have more profitable uses elsewhere – for example, to 
collateralize securities clearing, interbank loans, or to generate income 
from securities lending. From another perspective: for a fixed amount 
of liquidity, if a payment system adopts an LSM, it may become more 
efficient, as the speed of settlement can be increased. Liquidity saving 
mechanisms have been on the agenda of policy makers for over a 
decade, and now many payment systems implement various central 
queuing facilities. While in 1999 hybrid systems accounted to 3% of 
the value of payments settled in industrialized countries, in 2005 their 
share was 32% (Bech et al, 2008). There is also a vast variety of them, 
differing in a number of dimensions. For example: how often should 
the controller look for payment cycles that can be netted? Should the 
LSM settle only perfectly netting cycles that require no liquidity at all, 
or should banks have the option of contributing any missing liquidity 
to accelerate the settlement process? Are submissions to the LSM 
irrevocable, or can banks retract payments from it, and when? Can 
individual banks monitor the central queue? 
  Liquidity saving mechanisms have been extensively studied via 
simulations, and existing systems have evaluated the effectiveness of 
their algorithms before implementation. Leinonen (2005 and 2007) 
provide collections of such investigations. Johnson et al (2004) 
proposes an innovative ‘receipt reactive’ settlement mechanism as an 
effective LSM. Both Guenzter et al (1998), and Shafransky and 
Doudkin (2006) develop approximate algorithms for solving the Bank 
Clearing Problem (the problem of selecting the largest subset of 
payments that can be settled with given liquidity), from an operations 
research perspective. Recently McAndrews and Martin (2008) 
developed theoretical models on liquidity saving mechanisms 
incorporating bank behaviour. Galbiati and Soramäki (2008), who 
study liquidity choices in an agent-based model of a payment system, 
forms the basis for this paper. 
  We argue that different LSMs give rise to different ‘games’ 
between system participants, who face differently shaped tradeoffs 
between liquidity and delay costs. This paper is a first exploration into 
these strategic aspects. Our very simple model includes the essential 
elements described above: payments, liquidity recycling, liquidity 
costs, internal queues, possible central queues, and delay costs. 
  We first model a benchmark case: a plain RTGS system with a 
queuing facility
2 where banks choose i) the amounts of liquidity to 
                                          
2 If a bank submits a payment to the system but does not have enough liquidity to settle it, 
the payment is placed in a queue and released immediately as liquidity becomes available 
from an incoming payment.  
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devote to settlement and ii) how many (and which) payments to hold 
in internal schedulers. Then, this case is compared to the case where 
an LSM is available. Here banks decide i) the amount of liquidity, as 
in the previous scenario, and ii) how many (and which) payments to 
submit to the LSM stream, In the LSM stream, payments are pooled 
and settled at zero liquidity cost by finding cycles of offsetting 
payments. Looking at these scenarios, we try to answer the following 
questions: 
 
1.  What is the outcome of a plain RTGS system where banks can 
internally queue payments? What are banks’ equilibrium 
liquidity/queuing options when they have no mechanism to 
coordinate their actions? How do they compare to the choices of a 
‘benevolent planner’ who maximizes social welfare? 
 
2. By how much can our LSM theoretically reduce the needed 
liquidity and the delays? This is simply a question about the 
mechanical properties of the LSM. 
 
3.  What is the outcome of an RTGS system with an LSM? Is this 
efficient? How does this compare with the outcome without an 
LSM? 
 
To anticipate some of the answers: 1) we find that in the system with 
only internal queues, individual banks underprovide liquidity and 
queue internally too much compared to what is socially optimal. This 
is due to the externalities in liquidity / queuing choices mentioned 
above (see eg Angelini, 1998). On point 2): when handled by a 
benevolent planner, our LSM may largely reduce liquidity needs. 
However, this is true only if the planner is not overly exigent 
regarding acceptable delays. Indeed, if delays must be reduced below 
a certain level, no payments can be queued and at that point having or 
not having LSM is irrelevant, as an LSM trades liquidity needs against 
delays. Finally on point 3), for an intermediate-range price of 
liquidity, an LSM may generate two different outcomes. One involves 
lower costs than without LSM – a ‘good’ equilibrium. However, the 
other outcome, under certain parameter values, entails higher costs 
than those in the absence of an LSM. Interestingly (and despite our 
initial intuition), the ‘bad’ equilibria are those with over-use of the 
central queue and higher liquidity usage. 
  These findings suggest clear policy implications: liquidity saving 
mechanisms are useful tools, but they require active management by  
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the system’s controller, or a coordination tool to ensure that banks 
adopt the low-cost equilibrium. 
  The paper is organized as follows: Section 8.2 describes the 




8.2 General  framework 
Our general framework is a simple model, adjusted in two different 
ways to describe the two systems that we compare. The model 
features N banks using a payment system. Banks make choices – to be 
illustrated later – that jointly determine system performance and hence 
the banks’ costs or payoffs. The game-theoretic structure of the model 
is straightforward: a single simultaneous-move game, for which we 
find the Nash equilibria. 
  As described later, the model has an implicit time dimension. 
However, this only pertains to the settlement process, ie to the 
machinery used to derive the banks’ payoffs. However, once the 
choices are simultaneously made, the expected-value payoffs are 
determined, so that there is no dynamic interaction between banks in a 
strategic sense. A main innovation of the paper is the way payoffs are 
determined: these are numerically generated by an algorithm which 
mimics a payment system in a fairly realistic way. We allow banks to 
exchange hundreds of payments over thousands of time-intervals, 
generating complex liquidity flows with ‘queues’, ‘gridlocks’ and 
‘cascades’ (See Beyeler et al, 2007, for details on the physical 
dynamics of this process). We argue that this enhances realism by 
trying to incorporate the complex system’s internal liquidity dynamics 
into the payoff function. Summing up, the model is a straightforward 
game-theoretic representation of a payment system whose complexity 
is encapsulated in the payoff function. And, such payoff function is 
computed via simulations. 
 
 
8.2.1  Payment instruction arrival 
Our model consists of N banks, which receive payment instructions 
(orders) from exogenous clients throughout a ‘day’. 
  Each instruction is an order to pay one unit of liquidity to another 
bank. An instruction is therefore a triplet (i, j, u), where the first two  
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indices represent the payer and payee and the third represents the 
payment’s urgency (discussed below). 
  Payment instructions are randomly generated from time 0 (start of 
day) to time T (end of day) according to a Poisson process with given 
intensity. We assume that, at any time, any instruction (i, j, u) is 
equally likely to be generated. As a consequence, the payment system 
forms a complete and symmetric network, in a statistical sense: on 
average, the number of payments sent and received by a given bank 
vis-à-vis the other banks are equal. However, the days may differ: on 
one day a bank may be a net receiver, on others a net payer. And the 
order in which instructions arrive is also random. 
  The urgency parameter u, drawn from a uniform distribution 
U~[0,1], reflects the relative importance of settling the payment early: 
if payment r, with urgency ur, is delayed by t time-intervals, it will 
cost the bank urt. Symmetry and completeness of the payment network 
are simplifying assumptions. However, they may be not be greatly 
unrealistic for many systems such as UK CHAPS, where specifically 
completeness is the typical case. Symmetry will be useful for 
technical reasons explained later on. 
 
 
8.2.2 Payment  settlement 
A bank can route each payment into either of two streams: i) the 
RTGS stream or ii) a second stream. Payments submitted into the 
RTGS stream settle immediately upon submission, but only if the 
sender bank has enough liquidity. If the sender lacks sufficient 
liquidity, the payment is queued in RTGS and is released for 
settlement when the sender’s liquidity balance is replenished by an 
incoming RTGS payment. Upon settlement, liquidity is transferred 
from payer to payee. For stream ii) we consider two cases, 
corresponding to two models. 
  The first model, without LSM, assumes that internal queues work 
in a very simple way: queued payments are withheld for the whole day 
and are submitted in gross terms to the RTGS stream at time T. A 
bank may want to queue a payment in order to reserve liquidity for 
more urgent payments. On the other hand, this model of internal 
queues is extremely simplified: in reality, banks delay payments only 
for a certain time, following more sophisticated rules. But our ultimate 
aim is to gauge the effects of introducing an LSM. To do so, it may  
236 
makes sense to use as a benchmark an ‘extreme’ case where internal 
queues are managed in the simplest possible way.
3 
  In the second model, banks have the option of routing payments 
into either RTGS or a liquidity saving mechanism (LSM). The LSM 
continuously nets payments on a multilateral basis; that is, it 
continuously searches and ‘deletes’ payments that form cycles of any 
size. To find offsetting payments, we use the Bech and Soramäki 
(2001) algorithm, which finds maximal cycles, under the constraint 
that each bank’s payments are settled according to a strict order – 
here, by urgency. Payments settle in LSM only if they are exactly 
offsetting; hence the LSM requires no liquidity. However, any LSM 
payment that is unsettled at the end of the day, is moved into the 
RTGS stream and settled according to RTGS rules. 
  Our aim is to compare the benchmark system ‘RTGS with internal 
queues’ with the ‘RTGS with LSM’ system. The first system is a 
natural benchmark, because the option of internal queues is always 
available to banks. The second system is a specific example of a dual-
stream system. Other LSMs could be considered, or other rules of 
interaction between streams could be considered. We choose the 
Bech-Soramäki algorithm for its simplicity and because it ensures an 
optimal outcome when payments are settled in a strict order, in our 
case by urgency. Finally, the possibility of combining RTGS to LSM 
with internal queues is ignored because, from the perspective of a 
single bank, LSM dominates internal queues: both mechanisms 
require very little intraday liquidity (only at end of day), but delays are 
slightly longer in internal queues (as there is a chance that a payment 
is settled before the end of the day with LSM). Hence, no rational 




8.2.3  The game: choices and costs 
At the start of the day each bank makes two choices: i) its opening 
intraday liquidity in the RTGS system λi∈[0,Λ] and ii) an urgency 
threshold τi∈[0,1]. Payment instructions with urgency greater than τi 
are settled in the RTGS system; the others are either queued internally 
or routed to LSM, depending on the model.
4 As the urgency parameter 
                                          
3 Note also that holding payments in an internal queue is always feasible for a bank. 
4 More complex routing rules are conceivable. We restrict attention to this for simplicity.  
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is drawn from U~[0,1], τi is also the percentage of payments that bank 
i queues internally or routes to LSM. 
  Once banks have chosen their opening intraday liquidity and 
urgency threshold, settlement of payments takes place mechanically: 
banks receive payment instructions and process them according to 
urgency. 
  Costs are defined as in Galbiati and Soramäki (2008). At the end 
of the day each bank pays a total cost, defined as the sum of a) the 
liquidity costs incurred in acquiring the opening intraday liquidity and 
b) the delay costs, which depend on the delays experienced during the 
day. Given a profile of choices σ={σ1,σ2,...σN} where σi = (λi,τi) is 
bank i’s strategy, the costs borne by i are 
 
) t t ( u
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where  α is the price of liquidity and (tr–tr′) is the lag between 
reception and execution of payment r with urgency ur. Delay costs 
thus increase linearly with payment urgency. The dependency of Ci on 
τi and all other σj’s comes via the delays, which depend on the τ’s and 




The model has N players, actions λi and τi for each player, and 
costs/payoffs determined as described in the above section. We 
concentrate on the symmetric equilibria of this game, ie on those 
choices profiles ((λ1,τ1),..(λi,τi),..(λN,τN)) such that: i) all banks choose 
the same actions ((λi,τi) = (λj,τj)∀i, j) and ii) each (λi,τi) is a best reply 
to others’ choices. 
  By restricting attention to symmetric equilibria, we may miss 
equilibria where banks adopt different, albeit mutually optimal, 
choices. However, extra-model considerations suggest that such 
asymmetric equilibria (should they exist) would be unlikely to survive 
in reality. First, symmetry seems ‘reasonable’, as banks are 
homogeneous. Second, if a bank posted less liquidity than its partners, 
it might be seen to ‘free-ride’ and would be penalized in the long run. 
Finally, in the real world, banks do not know the choices of their 
counterparties; what they typically do know is some average indicator 
of the whole system, and this is what they play against. If N is large,  
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all banks will face the same ‘average opponent’, and being identical, 
they will all choose the same best reply to that, which confirms that 





We illustrate first the mechanics of settlement; that is, we show how 
delay costs depend on banks’ choices of liquidity and thresholds in the 
various streams. Then we illustrate the dependence of costs on banks’ 
choices – this is the banks’ payoff function. Finally, we identify and 
compare the corresponding equilibria. 
  All results are obtained by simulating the settlement process for 
different combinations of banks’ choices.
6 As we look for symmetric 
Nash equilibria, we need run only simulations for each combination of 
‘my choices’ vs ‘others’ choices where they do the same. This reduces 
the size of the parameter space to ([0,Λ]×[0,t])
2, from ([0,Λ]×[0,t])
N. 
Details on the numerical exploration of the delay and cost function are 
given in the Appendix. In most of what follows, we take the viewpoint 
of a single bank (I), facing the rest of the system (Them). 
 
 
8.3.1 Settlement  mechanics 
Total delay costs D (see 8.1) accrue from delays in both RTGS
7 and in 
internal queues or the LSM mechanism. We show how these two 
sources of delays depend on the banks’ choices. 
 
 
                                          
5 Equilibria where banks choose the same liquidity but different thresholds are unlikely 
for theoretical reasons. The more i uses the LSM, the more any other j should use it. The 
liquidity choices are different. Here, the substitutability effects may well induce 
asymmetric equilibrium behaviour: for example, low-li, high-lj may be part of an 
equilibrium because, from i’s viewpoint, j’s liquidity is a substitute for i’s own liquidity. 
6 As for the other parameters: the number of banks N is set at 15. The Poisson process 
generating payments is parameterized so that each bank sends on average 30 payments 
per day. We run ~200 days for each parameter combination. 
7 If a bank submits a payment but does not have sufficient liquidity.  
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8.3.1.1 RTGS  delays 
Figure 8.1 shows how delay costs in RTGS depend on λ and τ when 
all banks make the same choices (we choose this representation for 
clarity; in reality ‘my’ delays depend on four variables: my choices of 
λ and τ, and their choices of λ and τ). 
 
Figure 8.1  Delay costs in RTGS as a function of 





Obviously, delay costs are reduced by increasing liquidity (unless 
τ = 1, because then no payment is actually directed into RTGS). And 
‘returns on liquidity’ are decreasing, ie an additional unit of liquidity 
reduces delays more when liquidity is low than when it is high. 
  An increase in the threshold (ie less payments routed to RTGS) 
increases delay costs for low levels of τ – the more so, the less the 
available liquidity. This is probably due to the fact that, as low 
urgency payments are subtracted from RTGS, ‘liquidity recycling’ is 
disrupted. This effect is eventually balanced by the fact that fewer 
payments can be settled swiftly with less liquidity. Interestingly, 
liquidity has a stronger impact in reducing delays when not all 
payments are routed to RTGS (τ  >  0). Indeed, if all payments are 
routed to RTGS, liquidity is absorbed by less urgent payments too, so 
its ‘returns’ in terms of decreasing delay costs are reduced.  
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  The relationship between τ and RTGS delay costs is generally non-
monotonic: when liquidity is scarce, it is not convenient to route too 
many payments to RTGS: low-urgency payments may clog the system 
and cause more urgent ones to be unduly delayed. When liquidity is 




8.3.1.2 Second-stream  delays 
Delay costs in internal queues are simple. Obviously they are 
independent of λ, as internal queues consume no liquidity during the 
day.
8 On the other hand, internal queues’ delay costs are a quadratic 
function of τ. Indeed, every payment settles at the end of the day, so 
the average time spent in the queue is half a day, ie T/2. The urgency 
of each payment is uniformly drawn from [0,τ], so it is τ/2 on average. 
Hence, directing a volume of payments τ through internal queues 
produces delay costs totalling (T/2)(τ/2)τ = (1/4)Tτ
2. 
 
                                          
8 Only at the end of the day, are queued payments sent to RTGS and settled there. But, as 
they are added to the RTGS balance, the total amount of non-executed payments will 
equal the difference between incoming and outgoing payment orders. This is exogenous 
and so independent of banks’ choices.  
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Figure 8.2  Delay costs from internal queues and 





Delay costs in LSM are also independent of λ. More specifically total 
delays can be calculated as x·(τ/2)·τ, where x is the average time 
delayed, (τ/2) the average urgency and τ the volume routed to RTGS. 
Simulations show that total delays scale as α·τ, so one deduces that 
x~α·1/τ. In a sense, LSM displays increasing returns to scale with 
respect to processed volumes. The larger the pool of payments from 
which the algorithm can search for cycles, the more likely these cycles 
will be found. Delay costs generated by internal queues and by the 
LSM are compared in Figure 8.2. 
 
 
8.3.1.3 Overall  delays 
Figure 8.3 shows how overall delay costs depend on λ and τ in the two 
systems (for illustrative purposes again we select the case of all banks 
making the same choice). Overall delay costs can be substantially 





Figure 8.3  Total delay costs for RTGS with internal 
      queues (top surface) and RTGS with LSM 





Figures 8.4 and 8.5 show the decomposition of delay costs into its two 
components: RTGS and second-stream (the four panels) are for 
increasing levels of liquidity. 
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Figure 8.4  Total delay costs: RTGS with internal 
      queues as a function of threshold. Each 
      chart in the panel represents a given level of 






Figure 8.5  Total delay costs: RTGS with LSM as a 
      function of threshold. Each chart in the 
      panel represents a given level of liquidity in 






The remainder of the paper looks at the equilibria reached by the 
banks in the two systems. A key parameter in the model is the price of 
liquidity,  α, in Eq (8.1). This is arguably the variable over which 
central banks and policy makers have the greatest influence. Thus we 
look at how the equilibrium varies when the price of liquidity α 
changes. Because an accurate calibration of the model is beyond the 
scope of this paper, we let the parameter α vary in a range wide 
enough for the equilibria to span the whole strategy space – keeping 




8.3.2.1  RTGS with internal queues 
Figure 8.6 shows how the equilibrium in RTGS with LSM changes 
when the price of liquidity varies (increases, from left to right). 
Equilibrium choices are represented by dots, to be compared with the 
choices of a planner who minimizes the costs of the whole system. 
The background gradient shows system-wide costs. System-wide costs 
are minimized at the planner’s choice; hence, the background gradient 
also shows how much higher the costs are at any (λ,τ) than at the 
planner’s choice (dark blue = little higher, dark red = much higher). 
  Figure 8.6 shows that when the relative price of liquidity rises, 
banks post less liquidity and resort more to internal queues. More 
importantly, the equilibrium is inefficient: a cost-minimizing planner 
would provide more liquidity to the system and would delay less. 
Equilibrium costs are always more than 15% higher than the social 
optimum, reaching multiples thereof at high liquidity prices. Only 
when the liquidity price is extremely high, the equilibrium coincide 
with the planner’s optimal choice, both being λ=0, τ=1. 
  The reason for this inefficiency is explained by two externalities. 
On the one hand, a positive externality in liquidity provision: 
incoming payments to a bank can be recycled for making other 
payments, so liquidity is in a sense a common good, as in Angelini 
(1998) and Galbiati and Soramäki (2008). Due to this, equilibrium 
liquidity provision (λ) falls short of the social optimum. On the other 
hand, internal queues generate a negative externality: banks have an 
incentive to delay the less urgent payments and use liquidity for more 
urgent ones. But by doing so, they slow the beneficial liquidity 
recycling in RTGS, which harms other banks. Hence banks queue 
more than they should from a social perspective – ie τ exceeds the 
level that would be chosen by the planner. 
  It should be noted that the planner’s choice of τ is dichotomous: 
either all payments are settled in RTGS, or they are all queued 
internally until the end of the day. 
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Figure 8.6  Equilibria for RTGS with internal queues. 
      Each chart in the panel represents costs and 
      equilibria for a given price of liquidity 




8.3.2.2 RTGS  with  LSM 
As with internal queues, LSM allows banks to reserve liquidity for 
urgent payments. However, internal queues merely postpone 
settlement until the end of the day, whereas our LSM allows for 
settlement as soon as offsetting cycles are found, without making use 
of liquidity. LSM therefore both reduces settlement delays and 
reduces liquidity demand. 
  Increased efficiency of the second stream induces banks to use 
LSM more intensely, with a reduction in costs. However, increase in τ 
also causes a reduction in RTGS volumes, which in turn causes this 
stream to loose in efficiency. Hence, there is a tradeoff between the 
efficiency levels of the two streams.
9 When ‘played with’ by 
individual banks, these effects produce unexpected outcomes, as we 
see next. 
  When liquidity costs change, the equilibria change essentially as in 
the RTGS with internal queues shown in Figure 8.6 (above). In 
particular: i) when the price of liquidity (α) rises, liquidity provision 
(λ) decreases and usage of LSM (τ) increases; ii) the equilibrium 
liquidity falls short of the social optimum and queued payments (τ) are 
in excess; iii) for very high relative prices of liquidity, both banks and 
the planner use exclusively the second stream – at which point the 
equilibrium is efficient; iv) the planner never uses both streams at the 
same time. 
  The main novelty with an LSM is that, for an intermediate range of 
liquidity costs, multiple equilibria emerge, as illustrated in Figure 8.7. 
Again, here we present the system’s equilibria as the price of liquidity 
varies. For technical reasons,
10 we do not look at Nash equilibria, but 
at  ε-Nash equilibria, ie at strategy profiles from which unilateral 
deviation yields a gain not exceeding a (small
11) ε. These approximate 
equilibria are shown in Figure 8.7 as ‘clouds’ of dots; the socially 
optimal choice (planner’s choice) is shown as a star. 
                                          
9 This is not the case with internal queues, where average delay times are independent of 
τ. 
10 The simulations show that, for certain levels of the price of liquidity, the payoffs 
become relatively insensitive to banks’ liquidity-threshold choices. Because payoffs are 
numerically computed on a finite grid of choices, it is difficult to distinguish whether 
certain strategy profiles are exact equilibria or almost equilibria (ie deviations yield some 
gain). 
11 Figure 6 is obtained for ε = 0.001: a deviation does not improve payoffs by more than 
0.1%.  
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  The results are shown in Figure 8.7. When the price of liquidity 
exceeds a critical point, a corner equilibrium emerges, where banks 
acquire no liquidity and send all payments to LSM. 
  As the price of liquidity increases even further, the λ=0,  τ=1 
equilibrium persists, but other equilibria where banks use both streams 
and some liquidity emerge. Those with low λ display low costs – these 
are ‘good’ equilibria. The others are ‘bad’. Apart from the corner 
equilibrium, the bad equilibria are somewhat paradoxical: they feature 
higher costs, higher liquidity usage (λ) and higher LSM usage (τ). The 
existence of such equilibria is probably explained as follows. LSM 
features economies of scale (see Section 8.3.1.2), so that high usage of 
it may be self-sustaining. But, as mentioned at the start of this section, 
over-use of LSM is detrimental to the RTGS stream – which may then 
require higher amounts of liquidity. 
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Figure 8.7  Equilibria for RTGS with LSM. Each chart 
      in the panel represents costs and equilibria 
      for a given price of liquidity 




8.3.2.3  Comparison of the two systems 
The key comparison of this paper is between two systems: RTGS with 
internal queues and RTGS with LSM. With LSM we have ‘clouds’ of 
ε-equilibria; hence, for each cloud, we pick average values of costs, 
liquidity and thresholds. A ‘bad’ cloud is then determined by the 
highest average costs, and a ‘good’ one by the lowest average costs. 
  The blue lines in Figure 8.8 show the equilibrium costs attained 
with an LSM, normalized by the corresponding costs obtained without 
LSM – solid line for ‘good cloud’ values and dots for ‘bad cloud’ 
values. The chart on the right shows a sub-area of the left chart for 
intermediate liquidity price values. Eg. when liquidity price α=13, the 
good LSM equilibria are about 5% cheaper than the equilibrium with 
internal queues. Savings become more sizable at higher prices of 
liquidity. 
 
Figure 8.8  Ratio of cost, liquidity and threshold 
      between the good and bad equilibria 







This paper compares two stylized payment systems. In both of them, 
banks can queue non-urgent payments, to reserve liquidity for the 
urgent ones. In the first system, queued payments are held ‘internally’, 
and are settled at the end of the day. In the second system, queued 
payments are placed in a central queue (LSM) and are settled 
throughout the day as cycles form. As expected, central queuing 
(LSM) is more efficient than decentralized queuing (as in a system 
with internal queues). However, we find that the ‘mechanical’ 
advantages of an LSM can be nullified by strategic behaviour: as the 
model shows, there exist ‘bad’ equilibria with high liquidity usage, 
intense use of the LSM, and yet costs that exceed those obtained in a 
system without LSM. These findings suggest that liquidity saving 
mechanisms are useful tools, but they may need some coordination 
device, to ensure that banks arrive at a ‘good’ equilibrium. 
  A necessary caveat is that this paper considers one specific 
liquidity saving mechanism and compares it to another specific (rather 
extreme) model of internal queues. Other LSMs, perhaps associated 
with different settlement rules, may yield different outcomes.  
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To compute the payoff function of bank i (Eq. 8.1), we need to find 
the delays experienced by i when the rest of the system chooses 
{(λjτj)}_{j≠i}. As mentioned in the main text, we can treat the ‘rest of 
the system’ as one player and assign to it symmetric action profiles 
(λjτj)={(λ1τ1),(λ2τ2),..} such that (λ1τ1) = (λ2τ2)  =.... This greatly 
reduces the action profiles to explore, because now the delays 
Di((λiτi),(λiτj)) are a function of 4 variables only. We compute them as 
follow. 
  We run simulations for a restricted number of 2-player action 
profiles. In particular, we simulate the settlement process for λ taking 
on all integers in [0,10], and τ any number in [0,0.2,0.4,..1]. That is, 
we compute 112 = 121 values of the delay function, for just as many 
action profiles. To do so, because payment orders arrive in a random 
order, we need to simulate at least 200 ‘days’ for each action profile to 
obtain a reliable estimate of the ‘average day’. Hence, we simulate 
200∗112 = 24’200 days in total. 
  Yet, 11 choices for each bank are not enough to obtain ‘smooth’ 
results: when computing the equilibria, undesired artefacts emerge. 
Hence, we numerically smooth out and interpolate the delay function 
Di((λiτi),(λiτj)) on a refined grid, a 4-dimensional cube with 
414 =  2’825’761 points, which correspond to banks choosing λ in 
[0,10] in steps of 0.25 (41 liquidity levels) and τ in [0,1] in steps of 
0.025 (41 threshold levels). This is the delay function Di((λiτi),(λiτj)) = 
D(σ). Adding liquidity costs, we obtain the cost, or payoff function 
defined in Eq. 8.1). Using such payoff function, equilibria are 
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9 Participants’  internal  intraday 
limits in large value payment 
systems 
Abstract 
Participants in large value payment systems can manage their intraday 
liquidity and risk related to intermediation of payments with 
procedures which control the flow of transactions. One alternative is 
to implement a cap for the net outflow of liquidity towards a given 
counterparty based on the values of received and sent payments during 
the day. These caps are called bilateral intraday counterparty limits. 
Such limits can cause negative externalities if delays are increased in 
the processing of payments through the payment system. 
  Participants can implement bilateral counterparty limits in their 
internal systems. This paper proposes a simple simulation based 
methodology, which can be used to implicitly estimate the level of 
such internal limits from transaction data of the payment system. The 
method is used for data from BoF-RTGS, the Finnish large value 
payment system, from years 2002–2007. The estimated levels are used 
in linear regression, where the observed values are explained with 
external variables related to counterparty risk. Secondly the estimated 
values are compared to overnight loan positions between the same 
participants. 
  No stable levels of bilateral counterparty limits were observed in 
the study from Finnish data. In the regression analysis there was no 
clear connection between counterparty risk related variables or 
overnight loan positions and the estimated limits. Several possible 




In a modern market economy, payment systems can be considered a 
basic part of the society’s infrastructure because all economic 
transactions in the real economy are eventually settled in some manner 
in the payment systems. Large value payment systems (LVPS) 
constitute the core network of the payment systems. The most 
common LVPS structure is real-time gross settlement (RTGS), where  
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transactions are settled in central bank money and are final 
immediately upon settlement. 
  To enable settlement of transactions, banks in an RTGS system 
must have liquidity in their central bank account during the day. The 
word liquidity refers here to funds that enable immediate settlement of 
transactions in central bank money. The three possible sources of such 
liquidity are credit from the central banks provided preferably against 
collateral, interbank markets and incoming payments from 
counterparties. Studies of intraday liquidity management in RTGS 
systems have shown that banks may have an incentive to delay 
transactions if intraday liquidity is costly. This may cause 
inefficiencies in the overall level of the respective payment system 
because of negative externalities.
1 
  One possible tool for payment system participants’ intraday 
liquidity management is to implement limits for intraday counterparty 
positions. Such limits restrict the outflow of payments and liquidity 
provided to counterparties, unless there are also incoming payments. 
Bilateral limits can be explicitly defined in some LVPSs, as in 
TARGET2 in the euro area and LVTS in Canada.
2 However, if the 
system does not provide facilities for defining bilateral limits on 
liquidity flows, banks can implement limits in their internal systems. 
Based on anecdotal evidence, many banks have such systems in place. 
  Another line of research, which shares some aspects with the 
current paper, comprises the studies of operational incidents in large 
value payment systems and their impacts on participants’ behaviour. 
One example is Bedford et al (2005), which reports simulations of 
operational incidents in UK’s Chaps system. In that study the 
reactions of other system participants were explicitly modelled as 
internal stop sending rules, where payments to the failed participant 
are suspended or postponed. Such behaviour requires close monitoring 
of payment streams and facilities similar to internal bilateral intraday 
limits. Another related example is by Klee (2007), who reported an 
analysis of the existence of operational incidents in Fedwire and their 
impact on the money market. 
  This study proposes a methodology for identifying internal 
intraday counterparty limits of banks empirically from payment 
system data. The method is tested with transaction data for the Finnish 
                                          
1 See eg Angelini (1998), Bech-Garratt (2002) and also Hellqvist (2005). 
2 Limits in Canada’s LVTS system are due to the difference in the basic structure of the 
system, which is based on credit flows between system participants instead of immediate 
transfers of liquidity as in an RTGS system. See Dingle (1998) or Arjani and McVanel 
(2006).  
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LVPS (BoF-RTGS) from the years 2002–2007. For estimating the 
internal limits from payment flows, the system setup is replicated via 
the Bank of Finland Payment and settlement system simulator.
3 
  The validity of the method and received estimates for internal 
bilateral counterparty limits are tested using two approaches. Both are 
based on assumption that intraday liquidity management reflects 
counterparty risk management: if a counterparty is more highly 
trusted, a larger intraday exposure vis-à-vis that counterparty would be 
allowed. In the first test the estimated levels of counterparty limits are 
included in a regression where the independent variables are external 
market based measures of counterparty risk. In the second approach, 
the magnitude of intraday positions is compared to overnight loan 
exposures. These are identified from payment system data via a 
commonly used methodology (Furfine, 1999). The magnitude of 
intraday exposures should correlate with the overnight loans if there 
are some counterparty credit lines in place and these are successfully 
captured in the estimates. 
  The proposed methodology can be useful for oversight of payment 
systems. Some possibilities for its application are discussed, such as 
monitoring the changes in intraday liquidity usage or identifying free 
riding participants who may adversely affect the efficiency of the 
payment systems. 
  The paper is structured as follows. Section 9.2 presents the 
estimation of internal limits and the data used in this phase; section 




9.2  Estimation of participants’ internal bilateral 
limits 
The proposed method of estimating participants’ internal bilateral 
limits is based on transaction data from a payment system. For each 
transaction, the timing, the involved participants and the value must be 
known. When the processing logic of the system is known in detail, 
the flow of payments and resulting participants’ balances can be 
reconstructed and recorded at any time. 
  For this study, the Bank of Finland Payment and settlement system 
simulator was used to replicate the processing pattern of the payment 
                                          
3 See www.bof.fi/sc/bof-pss/ for more details on the simulator.  
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system. For estimating the internal limits, the bilateral limits feature of 
BoF-PSS2 is used. In a simulation with this feature, bilateral intraday 
positions are automatically calculated and it is possible to define 
explicit bilateral sending limits, which cannot be exceeded during the 
simulated settlement process. In the input data for the simulator, the 
bilateral limits are set at sufficient high values to make them non-
binding constraints. When transaction flows and bookings are 
reproduced identically to the actual history, the observed bilateral 
positions remain within the assumed – but unknown – binding 
constraints, ie the bilateral limits that were in place  in the 
participants’ internal systems. This enables implicit estimation of the 
bilateral limits set by the participants. 
  When the internal limits are measured via the proposed approach, 
some specific characteristics have to be considered. Participants’ 
bilateral balances can be viewed as a stochastic process, where settled 
transactions change the balance. In artificial setups, transactions 
values in large value payment systems have been approximated with 
lognormal distribution (eg Baksys and Sakalauskas, 2006). When this 
is combined with normal payment processing procedures, such as the 
first in first out rule (FIFO), large transactions can block the process 
even if the balance is far from the actual limit. This can make 
identification of existing limits challenging. On the other hand, banks 
may be able to reorder payment instructions or allow smaller payment 
to bypass larger ones in their internal queues if there is not enough 
liquidity to settle a large payment without violating the counterparty 
limits. If one assumes there are internal limits and thus willingness to 
delay at least some transactions, the possibility of reordering the 
payments and bypassing the FIFO rule is a natural addition. This 
could make it easier to observe the limits if such are used in real 
systems. One observed realisation of the bilateral positions between 




Figure 9.1  Example of bilateral intraday positions 
      between two banks after each individual 
      transaction on the four fist days of year 
      2007. Balance is plotted only for the 





The simplest approach to estimate the bilateral limit is to select a 
period of time and use the minimum bilateral position between the 
given participants as the estimated limit. Discussions with 
practitioners imply that while there are systems with counterparty 
limits in place, such limits can also be rather flexibly changed or 
bypassed by prioritized transactions. This would cause the simple 
minima of bilateral balance to become a biased estimator for the 
actual counterparty limit. As an alternative, quantile estimates of the 
limit were calculated. In quantile estimation, most cases are assumed 
to stay within a given fixed limit and a small number of transactions is 
allowed to cause bilateral positions which violate the limit. The 
quantile can be calculated so that only eg 1% or 5% of all transactions 
exceed the limit.  This decreases the impact of possible outliers or 
manual changes in the estimated limit. The method is a rather coarse 
heuristic approximation, but since the objective is to capture the 
magnitudes of limits, not their exact values, this is perhaps not a big  
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problem. Figure 9.2 shows the bilateral position over a longer period 
and monthly minimum positions as well as monthly 10% quantile 
estimates of the bilateral limit. 
  An alternative method using penalty functions was also tested. In 
that approach, the limit was searched with maximization of the limit 
value and a linear or quadratic penalty term was included in the 
objective function for each bilateral position violating the limit. The 
heuristic quantile method was however used instead of penalty 
functions because it was found to be a simpler, robust and equally 
accurate way to estimate the magnitudes of assumed internal limits. 
 
Figure 9.2  Bilateral positions for two banks during 
      five months, monthly minimum and 10% 





The system under study in this paper is BoF-RTGS, the LVPS 
operated
4 by Bank of Finland. Data consisted of all transactions from 
March 2002 to end-December 2007, which came to 1494 individual 
days and 70 months. The estimation of counterparty limits was done 
for daily and in monthly frequencies at several quantile levels. In all, 
                                          
4 BoF-RTGS was closed in February 2008 when Finland joined the TARGET2 system.  
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24 participants were included. The total number of accounts in the 
data set is higher, but some special participants and account classes 
were excluded (eg Bank of Finland or technical accounts). The data 
set includes all the largest banks operating in Finland. 
 
 
9.3  Validity of limit estimates 
Estimated counterparty limits were tested in two ways which are 
related to the assumption of bilateral limits as a tool or reflection of 
counterparty risk management. These were a regression analysis 
versus external variables associated with counterparty riskiness and a 
comparison of intraday bilateral positions with the magnitudes of 
overnight loans. Both tests are presented in detail below. 
 
 
9.3.1  Regression for counterparty risk measures 
If participants’ internal bilateral limits are used for limiting intraday 
counterparty risk, the level of observed limits should correlate with 
external variables describing the soundness or riskiness of each 
counterparty. The assumption was tested via regression analysis with 
the estimated internal intraday limit as the dependent variable. The 
regressions were performed using both ordinary least squares and 
stepwise regression. Before any regressions were run, Dickey-Fuller 
unit root tests were performed on the estimated internal intraday limit 
values. Only the results of such cases where the estimated limit data 
passed this unit root test at the 0.05 confidence level are reported 
below. 
  All regressions were computed for both daily and monthly level 
data sets. Four different quantile levels for the dependent variable 
were tested
5 for the daily level data and seven for the monthly data. 
With multiple quantile estimates, it was possible to check for 
differences in how well the different levels are explained by the 
independent variables. 
  Two external variables were used to approximate counterparty 
riskiness. One is a distance-to-default indicator (DD) calculated from 
counterparties’ equity prices and balance sheet data based on the 
                                          
5 At the daily level, minima and 1%, 2.5% and 5% quantiles for the bilateral position 
were studied. At the monthly level, minima and 0.5%, 1%, 2.5%, 5%, 7.5% and 10% 
were used correspondingly.  
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option pricing model of Merton (1974). Distance to default or similar 
indicators are commonly used as a credit risk management tool. Data 
for the five publicly listed banks
6 included in the current dataset were 
based on an earlier study at the Bank of Finland (Lehto, 2005). 
  The second independent variable was the spread between 
collateralized and uncollateralized three month Euribor and Eurepo 
interbank rates. The interest rate spread (IS) is used as a general 
measure of the confidence between market participants. This data are 
available as from March 2002, when the Eurepo interest rate was 
launched, which defined the data period for the whole study. 
  The third independent variable was the moving average over the 
previous 20 days
7 of daily total incoming transaction volumes (TV) 
for a given counterparty. It can also be considered as a partial risk 
management measure, since two banks that engage in many mutual 
transactions should each have good knowledge of the other as a 
counterparty and mutual trust. Even more, this variable should 
describe the intraday liquidity management since, if you expect to 
receive a high value of payments from a particular counterparty, you 
will likely also send payments to that party. 
  Three variations of the two first independent variables were tested: 
the simple face value of DD and IS values; the interaction of DD or IS 
with the number of payments sent to a given participant; and the 
interaction with the logarithm of the number of corresponding 
payments sent. The last two options are motivated by the relatively 
small transaction volumes. With very few transactions, it is likely that 
the limit will not be reached – even if such is in place. As a result, the 
estimated value of a limit can become smaller than the actual limit in 
the real system. With a larger number of transactions, it is more likely 
that the limit becomes effective and thus the importance of variables 
related to counterparty riskiness should increase. However, if there are 
very many transactions and the same limit is assumed to be binding, 
an increase in the number of transactions should not have such a large 
impact, which motivates the use of logarithm for transaction volumes. 
The moving average of transaction volumes over the 20 last days was 
used for the interaction variables. 
  All independent variables were available for five of the 24 
counterparties. Thus it was possible to test 115 bilateral pairs of 
                                          
6 Oko, Nordea, Sampo, Ålandsbanken and eQ. 
7 Time windows of 1,5,10 and 20 days were tested for calculation of moving averages. 
Moving average with 20 day period was most often a significant independent variable.  
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counterparties.
8 For each individual pair, an independent OLS 
regression was run if the limit series, ie the dependent variable, passed 
the unit root test. Thus the IS data were the same in each individual 
regression as it is general and market level variable. The DD data 
were specific to the receiving participant and thus shared by all 
regressions with that given counterparty. Only the dependent variable 
data and the coefficients or independent variables derived from the 
transaction flows were unique for each pair of banks. 
  There were no significant differences in the regression outcomes 
for dependent variables estimated with different quantile levels of 
daily data. The reason for this is in the relatively low daily transaction 
volumes in the system, which further on causes only very small 
differences in the daily limit data at the different quantile levels used. 
All the results below are from regressions with daily minima as the 
dependent variable.  DD and IS variables were included in the final 
daily model multiplied by the transaction volume logarithms. A 
summary of the regression results for daily level data is presented in 
Table 9.1 below. 
 
Table 9.1  Descriptive values of one selected regression 
      with daily level data of bilateral limit 
      estimates and counterparty risk measures 
 
Different independent variables in regressions 
with daily time series 
Number of times 
when significant, 
(before 1-root filter) 
Sign of the 
coefficient 
Log(20-day mean volume)*Distance to default 
(DD) 
14 (16)  ? 
Log(20-day mean volume)*Interest rate spread 
(IS) 
24 (31)  ? 
20-day mean value, incoming payments (TV)  50 (58)  negative 
    
Nr significant independent variables    
cases filtered based on unit root test  7%   
0 43%   
1 25%   
2 22%   
3 3%   
Highest individual R
2 value  0,528   
 
 
                                          
8 115 pairs were formed from 5 participants against 24 counterparties, excluding the 
meaningless (bank x, bank x) pairs.  
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Based on the results, in 50% of the cases one or more of the 
independent variables was statistically significant. Figure 9.3 below 
presents the statistically significant estimated coefficients from the 
regressions. The figure also shows the histogram of R
2 statistics from 
all of the regressions. Transaction value was the only independent 
variable with good explanatory power for the estimated limits. The 
negative sign of the coefficient accords with intuition, since the limits 
have negative values in the data. The results for the DD and IS 
variables were mixed, and the sign of the impact was not clear. 
 
Figure 9.3  R
2 statistics and estimated coefficient for 
      all individual bank pairs from regressions 





With monthly data, a larger scale of possible quantile levels was tried, 
and there were some differences in estimated limits and regression 
results with different quantiles. However, when the R
2 values for 
regressions with different quantile levels were compared with 
statistical testing,
9 there was no evidence of a difference between the 
distributions of R
2 values. This holds for all pair-wise tests between 
the quantile levels, even when only the nonzero R
2 values were used. 
Thus no such quantile level was found that would fit better than others 
                                          
9 Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test was used to test the hypothesis of whether the 
distributions of R
2 values observed in regressions with different dependent variables (see 
footnote 5) are the same.  
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in the set of independent variables, and all the results are again 
reported from regressions based on minimum bilateral balances data. 
  The first significant difference between monthly and daily data 
was found in the unit root tests. In fact, 73% of possible pairs of banks 
(84 out of 115) were filtered out in this phase. For the rest of the 
cases, the results were similar to those for the daily regressions. The 
regression results for the plain IS and DD are summarized in Table 9.2 
below. The histogram of R
2 values and values of statistically 
significant coefficients are also displayed in Figure 9.4. 
 
Table 9.2  Descriptive values of one selected regression 
      with monthly level data of bilateral limit 
      estimates and counterparty risk measures 
 
Different independent variables  Number of times 
when significant 
(before 1-root filter) 
Sign of 
coefficient 
DD 19  (19)  ? 
IS  19 (33)  – (?) 
    
Nr significant independent variables  Nr of cases   
cases filtered based on unit root test  73%   
0 10%   
1 0%   
2 17%   
Highest individual R
2 value  0,449%   
 
 
The results do not clearly indicate the signs of the coefficients, at least 
for the DD variable. For IS, it was found that in all cases where the 
variables have some explanatory power the sign was negative. The 
estimated limits were in the data with negative values, and so it might 
be that if the interest rate spread (IS) has an impact on internal 
counterparty limits, a wider spread between collateralized and 
uncollateralized interbank credit could make the banks more eager to 
allow large intraday positions. 
  
267 
Figure 9.4  R
2-statistics and coefficients from a set of 





If the value of the payment inflow is included as the third independent 
variable, the variations in the dependent variable are explained slightly 
better. Some individual cases with high R
2 values or almost perfect fit 
are also found. However, the correlation of monthly transaction 
volume with DD values is relatively high.
10 Moreover, when the 
payment inflow is included, it becomes the only independent variable 
for which the sign of the coefficient could be reliably observed (see 
Figure 9.5 below). 
 
                                          
10 The correlation between monthly DD and incoming liquidity was 0.76.  
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Figure 9.5  Regression statistics for monthly level data 





9.3.2  Comparison of intraday positions with overnight 
lending volumes 
As an alternative test for the internal counterparty limits, their 
magnitudes are compared to overnight loan positions, which can also 
be estimated from the payment system data. If the intraday bilateral 
limits are actually used as a limit for the counterparty risk, the level of 
allowed intraday position should also accord with the acceptable 
maximum for the overnight positions. This approach avoids some 
problems of regression between estimated bilateral limits and 
counterparty risk measures, since the real credit limit against each 
counterparty, including all liabilities, should be almost the same 
during a given day and at the end of the same day. 
  A frequently used method for identifying overnight loans from 
payment system data has been presented by Furfine (99). The idea is 
to locate transactions between banks A and B where the value is a 
large round number and where there is a transaction in the opposite 
direction on the next possible date with principal and interest closely 
matching the interbank rate. In this paper, multiples of 10 000 Euros 
were searched and at most a 50bsp difference versus the Eonia 
overnight interest rate was allowed. 
  For this comparison, overnight loans were sought only from year 
2007 data. There were in all 8607 transaction pairs located,  
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corresponding to 2.6% of the total transaction volume. Of these 
transactions, 2022 were between 12 of the 24 banks studied in the 
regressions. The rest were primarily cross border overnight loan 
transactions. 
  Correlations were calculated for the daily data of estimated 
intraday bilateral limit and total value of overnight loans for each pair 
of banks using Pearson’s linear correlation coefficient. For each 
correlation coefficient, also a P-value was calculated from Student’s t 
distribution based on the number of observations. The values of 
correlations and corresponding P-values are shown in Figure 9.6 
below against the number of days from which the value of overnight 
loans could be identified for the pair of banks in question. 
 
Figure 9.6  Correlation of daily values of overnight 
      loans and value of minimum intraday 
      bilateral positions calculated independently 
      for each pair of banks. 
 
X-axis gives the number of observations (days) with some identified 
overnight loans for the given pair of banks.Three cases for which the 







No clear sign for the correlation can be seen since the three cases out 
of 56 with P-value smaller than 0.05 are likely to be just random 
noise. In addition, the presented analysis did not include filters for unit 
roots as in the regression results presented earlier. 
  The overall magnitude of intraday and overnight positions can also 
be compared. Minimum intraday bilateral positions for each month 
were compared to maximum daily overnight positions from the same 
month and for each bilateral pair of banks. Below in Figure 9.7 the 
average of these ratios from the year-2007 data are shown as a 
function of the number of months for which the ratio was available for 
a given pair of banks. 
 
Figure 9.7  Average ratios of the magnitude of monthly 
      minima of intraday position and maximum 
      overnight position between individual pairs 
      of banks. Relation is plotted on logarithmic 
      scale as a function of number of 





The ratios are very large. The smallest average value is 0.1, which 
implies intraday exposures ten times the overnight exposures against 
the same counterparty. The largest individual ratio, averaged over ten 
months, was overnight exposures: one hundred thousand times the 
smallest intraday position. The wide variations are also visible within  
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the ratios of individual banks; the same bank may have a very small 
ratio of overnight vs intraday positions against one counterparty and a 
high one against another. 
 
 
9.4  Summary and discussion 
Transactions from the Finnish large value payment system, BoF-
RTGS, were used to identify assumed internal bilateral limits for the 
intraday counterparty positions. The data consisted of all transactions 
settled in BoF-RTGS between March 2002 and December 2007. 
  Regression analysis was performed between the estimated intraday 
position limits and independent variables related to counterparty risk 
and the value or volume of transaction flows. The explanatory power 
of the counterparty risk-related independent variables was weak. If 
internal bilateral limits are used by Finnish banks, it is more likely 
they are used for intraday liquidity management. There is clearly no 
common practice among all participants to adjust or set bilateral 
intraday limits for counterparties based on counterparty risk 
management measures. 
  One finding of this study is that the difference between the 
uncollateralized and collateralized interbank interest rate may be 
positively correlated with the size of allowed intraday positions. Thus 
higher uncertainty could occur together with wider intraday limits. 
This could be understood as reluctance to reveal any type of liquidity 
problems to counterparties if the level of confidence between market 
participants is low. This observation is related to the recent period of 
liquidity turbulence, since before August 2007 there was practically 
no significant difference between the Euribor and Eurepo interest 
rates. However, a further study is required to confirm the observation. 
  A second test for the estimated levels of bilateral intraday limits 
was performed by comparing them with the overnight positions 
between the same participants. These were similarly identified from 
the payment data using a common methodology. No statistically 
significant correlation could be found in the current data between the 
value of overnight positions and the value of estimated bilateral limits. 
  The overall level of intraday positions was noticed to vary greatly 
as compared to overnight loan positions. The wide range of ratios can 
be explained on the basis of at least two factors. The first possibility is 
that the structure of overnight lending markets and intraday payment 
flows is very different and thus those banks which are used for 
overnight credit are not the same as those to whom most payments are  
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sent during the day. This alternative is not dependent on the existence 
of internal limits. The second alternative is that banks have limits for 
their intraday positions after all, and with these limits the intraday 
positions against some counterparties are kept small enough for the 
high value of ratios to emerge. The latter case would mean that limits 
were mainly for intraday liquidity management, which would be 
possible if intraday and overnight activities are taking place between 
the same counterparties. Analysis and comparison of the network 
structure of the intraday payment flows and overnight exposures 
would be needed to determine the reason for the observed ratios. 
  There are some known shortcomings in the current analysis. Only 
transactions taking place in one LVPS are considered. In real life, 
banks may have intraday positions against each other in many other 
systems such as securities settlement systems, foreign exchange 
settlement, retail payment systems and private large value payment 
systems or even other central banks’ RTGS systems. If there is an in-
house system for intraday positions and limits, it would ideally cover 
all these positions. In this study, only the data from the Finnish large 
value payment system were used with the assumption that it should 
contain the relevant part of the value of intraday positions between the 
market participants who are active in Finland. 
  In real systems, the banks may or may not include the operations 
performed on behalf of their customers in their bilateral positions 
controlled by the bilateral limits. If limits are used for counterparty 
risk management, executing payments for the bank’s customers 
should not perhaps be limited. However, if the limits are primarily for 
intraday liquidity management, the original reason for a payment may 
be irrelevant. 
  One basic assumption in this study is that bilateral limits are stable 
and fixed at least for each day or even for each month. Based on 
anecdotal evidence, this may not be the case. Instead, the limits may 
be quite flexibly changed and, for example, may as a rule be initially 
low and then gradually relaxed. The approach of this study did allow 
outlier transactions to bypass the rigid limits, since quantile estimates 
were tested, which increases flexibility. Also the assumption of the 
more stable or fixed level of intraday limit can be understood as the 
final level to which the real, and possibly variable, limit can be 
extended. Such ‘backbone’ limit should indeed be based on more 
stable variables such as perceptions of counterparty riskiness or 
overall intraday liquidity capacity. 
  Based on the data characteristics, time series analysis or co-
integration analysis could be more suitable approaches than the 
ordinary least squares regression used here. Also, in this study all the  
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pair-wise regressions were managed as one homogeneous group. In 
the real world, the practices and thus the results for individual 
institutions are likely to be different. Filtering or grouping the 
estimation and tests based on the sender bank would allow for analysis 
of the practices of individual banks against all of their counterparties. 
These analyses are left for future studies. 
  Transaction volumes in large value payment system are not very 
high. This can make the estimation of bilateral limits more difficult; a 
larger number of observations would more likely reveal the level of 
the estimated implicit limit. This idea could also be used to test the 
estimated limits. First, it should be assumed that there is a given 
binding limit for the bilateral position between banks A and B set by 
the bank A. The bilateral position after each transaction can be 
considered a random walk, which will hit the limit more likely when 
there are more steps, ie a higher volume. Thus the observed value of 
the limit should increase when the transaction volume is low and 
increases. After some level, which is the actual real limit, the increase 
in volume no longer has an impact on the expected value of the 
observed limit. 
  This approach can be seen as a test for the use of bilateral limits as 
an intraday liquidity management tool because it is based on the 
process of liquidity flows and no external variables are needed. 
However, the test has to be performed for each participant pair 
separately and for some pairs there are no very high volume days 
available. Also, a rather large sample size is needed and thus it will 
not be easy to track changes in the limit levels. 
  New developments in LVPS’s allow more advanced liquidity 
management within the centralized payment system. As an example, 
TARGET2 includes the possibility to explicitly define bilateral 
sending limits. In such a case the proposed indirect method is not 
necessary and the efficiency of the system or rationale for the levels of 
the limits could be analyzed directly. Explicit limits also allow 
development and testing of the proposed indirect method, which could 
be useful in other systems without explicit limits. All these tasks are 
left for future studies. 
  Transaction data from payment systems is quantitative data with 
high accuracy and high frequency that can be used for identification of 
positions and actions of participants in payment systems. Although 
this study did not find a clear rationale for the observed intraday 
positions, which would be based on counterparty risk measures, the 
methodology can provide valuable insight for oversight purposes. 
  Comparison of participants’ intraday and overnight positions 
should reveal the sizes of counterparty positions in different time  
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scales or maturities. Also the analysis can reveal whether there any 
implicit limits in the systems or whether there are changes in the 
levels of these limits due, for example, to changes in market 
conditions. 
  Analysis of intraday behaviour of payment system participants 
would also reveal which participants are repeatedly using more than 
average incoming payments to fund their intraday liquidity needs. If 
such free riding is observed, some policies for safeguarding the 
efficiency of liquidity circulation in the system can be considered. 
Such possibilities might be changes in the settlement logic to render 
the process more efficient and reduce the incentive to delay payments. 
  Finally, the findings presented in this paper will depend on the 
market practices or market specific features of any particular system. 
Thus the results from one system should not be generalized without 
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10  The sterling unsecured loan 
market during 2006–2008: 
insights from network topology 
Abstract 
We visualise the unsecured overnight market in the UK as a network 
of relationships and examine how it has changed over the period of 
market turmoil. Using established network techniques, we find strong 
evidence of the existence of a ‘core’ of the most connected banks. We 
find that this core has become more important during the crisis, and 
that the widened reserve target bands have allowed banks to exercise 
more discretion in forming relationships. However, when for a short 
while the core banks appear risky, correspondents prefer to diversify 




Financial innovation in general, and securitisation in particular, 
feature heavily in common explanations of the sources of the recent 
market turmoil. Yet, in many ways this period has seen a number of 
classic disintermediation forces at work.
1 In this paper, we aim to 
illustrate this disintermediation by examining data for the UK 
unsecured interbank market throughout 2006–2008. Using a unique 
set of individual trades in the UK CHAPS interbank payment system, 
we employ topology methods to assess how the network of lending 
relationships between individual banks changed. 
  Although overnight unsecured sterling activity is not necessarily 
lower during the crisis compared to pre-crisis levels, we do find a 
reduction in the number of bilateral relationships, suggesting that the 
network has become characterised by a core of relatively few banks 
regarded as bearing less risk to their counterparties. Although this core 
exists pre-crisis, we suggest that it becomes more important during the 
crisis phases as participants become more aware of counterparty risk. 
We also observe that when for a short while the core banks appear 
                                          
1 See eg Borio (2008) and Brunnermeier (2008).  
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more risky, correspondents prefer to diversify and reduce their 
reliance on the core. 
  Our results are consistent with many of the classic features of 
disintermediation explained by the theoretical banking literature. First, 
theoretical models tell us that interbank lending activity frequently 
falls during crises, as banks reduce their credit exposures. Flannery 
(1996) shows that financial intermediaries reduce their lending when 
they become more concerned about their ability to assess their 
counterparties’ credit worthiness. Moreover, during a crisis, individual 
banks in their model are no longer able to diversify their loan portfolio 
as markets become less liquid. Consequently, they abstain from 
lending activity altogether. Freixas and Jorge (2007) model the impact 
of an aggregate liquidity shock and show how severe liquidity 
shortages may arise. Together with asymmetric information, this 
causes liquidity in the interbank market to flow towards the most 
liquid banks, at the expense of the less liquid ones. Likewise, Acharya 
et al (2008) show that during a liquidity crisis, liquidity-poor banks 
will find access to the interbank market greatly reduced, as liquidity-
rich banks exert their market power and charge higher rates. This 
forces the former to exit the interbank market and rely on asset sales 
instead. 
  Taken together, the theoretical literature suggests that interbank 
markets may cease to function efficiently when concerns about credit 
worthiness increase and banks are hit by aggregate liquidity shocks. 
The result is an overall reduction in interbank activity, often 
accompanied by a reallocation of flows away from weaker banks. 
  There is a second mechanism at work. The banking literature also 
demonstrates that, when faced with unexpected shocks, banks may 
want to build up their own liquidity reserves. Freixas et al (2000) 
consider a situation where lenders withdraw from the market because 
they are uncertain about their own ability to borrow in the future. 
  Allen et al (2008) show that banks reduce their interbank lending 
when there is uncertainty about the overall demand for liquidity in the 
banking system. In this model too, banks cease to use the interbank 
market and start hoarding liquidity. Caballero and Krishnamurthy 
(2008) demonstrate that when Knightean uncertainty (ie uncertainty 
about future states of the world) increases, financial intermediaries are 
inclined to assume the worst-case scenario and hoard liquidity. This 
type of hoarding typically occurs when unexpected events happen and 
coincides with investors reducing their risk exposures. Hence, this 
second line of research points to an overall reduction of lending 
activity which takes the form of a flight to higher-quality, and hence 
more liquid assets.  
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  In a recent paper, Ashcraft et al (2008) challenge this view and 
argue that faced with increased uncertainty about intraday liquidity 
shocks, banks may hoard liquidity in the early part of the day. But 
later in the day, as their payment obligations become clearer, they are 
more willing to lend their excess reserves overnight. This would 
explain both rises in overnight lending activity and large intraday 
variations in overnight rates. Furthermore, they show how smaller 
banks, who typically face greater liquidity constraints, build up larger 
intraday reserves and tend to be net lenders to the larger banks. 
  Empirical studies of interbank markets generally support this 
paper’s conclusions, but add some interesting insights. Furfine 
(2001a) finds no evidence that interbank activity (in the federal funds 
market) declined following the 1998 events (Russian default, near-
collapse of LTCM). Instead, he shows that, apart from the days 
surrounding the LTCM rescue, volumes in the second half of 1998 
were higher than in the first half. He attributes this to increased dealer 
activity. At the same time, he finds some evidence of reduced 
borrowing by the most active and risky banks, which is consistent 
with the conclusions of Freixas and Jorge and Acharya et al. 
  Halsall et al (2008) find evidence that the timing of overnight loan 
transactions has shifted following the onset of the 2007 market 
turmoil. They suggest that this shift in activity was the result of 
lenders making their liquidity available later in the day (ie after 2pm) 
when they had greater certainty about their own funding needs. They 
further find that, after the Bank of England widened the range around 
the banks’ target reserve bands, lending shifted back to the earlier part 
of the day 
  A third group of papers, relevant for our study, look at the 
importance of relationships in interbank markets. In a seminal paper, 
Rochet and Tirole (1996) model the monitoring role of banks in these 
markets. They show that banks have strong incentives to monitor each 
other when interbank loans are large and unsecured. But these 
incentives can be undermined if banks believe that large financial 
institutions would never be allowed to fail. 
  Furfine (2001b) confirms this risk monitoring role showing that 
US federal funds rates do indeed differentiate between banks in ways 
which plausibly reflect counterparty credit risk. At the same time, he 
finds that access to this market can rapidly dry up, partly as a result of 
banks’ reluctance to signal to the market that they need funds, and 
partly because other banks wish to limit their credit risk exposure. In 
other words, Furfine finds evidence of credit rationing rather than an 
increase in the rates charged to individual banks when their condition 
deteriorates. Cocco et al (2003) highlight the importance of  
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relationships in the interbank market in providing banks with 
insurance against liquidity risk, in the form of both unexpected 
shortages and surpluses of funds. Using data for the Portuguese 
interbank market, they find evidence of riskier borrowers relying on 
established relationships. Furthermore, they find that during the 1998 
crisis, when overall liquidity fell, borrowers relied more than usual on 
banks with which they had an existing lending relationship. 
  Building on these insights, the present paper uses methods 
developed in statistical mechanics and network science to examine 
whether the network characteristics of the UK unsecured overnight 
market changed during the recent market turmoil. Statistical 
mechanics of networks (developed in the physics community and used 
to study complex networks such as the World Wide Web) has recently 
been applied to the study of patterns of payment and loan flows in 
various systems. This methodology is particularly suited for our 
purpose as it provides a series of summary statistics that reveal the 
complexities of borrowing and lending relationships at the individual 
bank level. 
  Specifically, we ask whether overall activity in the interbank 
market has changed since August 2007, either showing a decline 
related to credit rationing or an increase reflecting greater market 
trading activity. This is our first hypothesis. To test our second 
hypothesis – whether the nature of interbank flows has changed – we 
examine whether relationships between banks have changed and 
whether there is evidence of re-grouping, as some lending 
relationships are scaled down or others are strengthened. As explained 
earlier in this Section, the former could be the result of credit 
rationing. The latter could happen if banks chose to rely more on well-
established relationships. Alternatively, banks may have decided to 
diversify their counterparty exposure by setting up lending 
relationships with more counterparties. 
  The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. After 
providing an overview of the sterling money market (Section 10.2) 
and the methodology (Section 10.3), we take a first look at the data in 
Section 10.4 and propose some conjectures about changes in the 
overnight market in Section 10.5. Section 10.6 tests these conjectures 
against network measures, and Section 10.7 assesses the robustness of 




10.2 Overview of the market turmoil 
Conditions in global money markets have been unusually stressed 
since summer 2007. Market liquidity has fallen sharply, particularly at 
maturities beyond one month, and spreads over policy rates have 
widened. Many banks have therefore found it difficult to access 
longer-term funding on acceptable terms. In the United Kingdom too, 
term money markets have seen a fall in liquidity and term spreads 
remain wide compared to pre-August 2007 levels. At shorter dates, 
however, market activity has been less impaired and rates have stayed 
closer to policy rates.
2 
  During this period central banks have continued to provide 
liquidity via the normal channels (open market operations, reserves 
management, standing facilities) to keep short-term market rates close 
to policy rates. In addition, central banks have responded to the 
continued strains in money markets by introducing a range of extra-
ordinary measures, ranging from auctions offering longer-term 
funding to widening collateral lists and broadening the range of 
counterparties (CGFS, 2008). 
  The UK money market framework introduced in May 2006 
allowed banks to choose their own reserve targets. Each bank’s 
average reserve balance over the maintenance period (which last four 
or five weeks between monthly Monetary Policy Committee 
meetings) had to be within a certain band around this target in order to 
be remunerated at Bank rate. If the balance fell short, the bank would 
be forced to borrow the shortfall from the Bank of England at a 
penalty rate. If the balance was over the target, the bank would earn 
no interest on the excess. 
  In response to the strains in sterling money markets, the Bank of 
England widened the range around banks’ reserve targets in 
September 2007, thereby giving banks greater flexibility in managing 
their reserve accounts. In addition, banks’ reserves targets in 
aggregate have risen since August 2007.
3 In a further reflection of the 
demand for short-term liquidity, UK banks have increased their own 
liquidity buffers in the form of high-quality collateral. 
  The Bank of England’s operational framework also allows banks 
to borrow or lend on an overnight basis using the standing facilities. 
Initially, use of these overnight standing facilities was published on 
                                          
2 See Bank of England (2008a), chart 1.5; Bank of England (2008b), chart 23; and Bank 
of England (2008c), chart 2. 
3 See Bank of England (2008c), chart 30.  
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the following day. During summer 2007, stigma became attached to 
the borrowing facilities and banks ceased to use them. In October 
2008, the Bank of England announced reforms to the facilities in order 
to reduce the stigma attached to their use. 
  The broad picture for 2007 and 2008 is therefore one of increased 
demand for short-term money (partly to replace longer-term funding 
and partly to create buffers), and a reduction of longer-term supply. In 
the remainder of this paper, we examine how these general market 
developments have manifested themselves in interbank relationships 
in the sterling overnight market. 
 
 
10.3 Methodology and data 
10.3.1  Network topology literature 
The study of networks has been applied to a wide range of fields, such 
as social interactions, epidemiology and the world-wide web. A large 
amount of work from the physics community has focused on the 
structure of complex networks – that is, those displaying features that 
are neither regular nor purely random.
4 Recently, economists have 
started using these methods to analyse the patterns in payment and 
loan flows, and assess the stability of these networks. 
  Boss et al (2004) and Inaoka et al (2004) were among the first to 
use topology in empirical studies of interbank markets, examining the 
Austrian and Japanese banking and payment systems respectively. 
These papers confirm that topology measures are suitable to describe 
financial networks in general and their resilience to shocks in 
particular. 
  Soramäki et al (2007) examine the network topology of interbank 
payments across the Fedwire Funds Service in the US. They find that 
participation in the payment system fell following the attacks of 11th 
September 2001, both in terms of number of active banks and number 
of transactions. There is evidence of less coordination between banks, 
most likely as a result of both the operational problems faced by some 
participants and the responses by others to the resulting liquidity 
problems. However, once the operational problems were over, activity 
rose to above-average levels as banks settled their backlogs of 
payments. 
                                          
4 See eg Dorogovtsev and Mendes (2003), Albert and Barabási (2002) and Newman 
(2003).  
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  Becher, Millard and Soramäki (2008) examine interbank payments 
across CHAPS Sterling. They investigate the impact on the network of 
an operational outage of a major settlement bank, and find both that 
the network topology did not look significantly different during the 
outage day and that non-stricken banks were able to manage their 
liquidity effectively so that payment flows between them were much 
as normal. 
  Papers by Pröpper et al (2008) and Lublóy (2006) use payment 
data from the Dutch and Hungarian payment systems, respectively. 
Pröpper et al find that payment activity has been considerably higher 
since the market turmoil of 2007 began, but network properties have 
been relatively unaffected. Lublóy looks at the permanence of 
linkages over time and finds that, although there are relatively few 
pairs of banks which lend to each other every single day, those that do 
account for the majority of payment orders by value. 
  Topology measures are also used in a number of recent papers 
which look at the overnight money market. Iori et al (2008) study the 
Italian money market and find that the network has changed over time. 
Here, banks have increased the number of counterparties they borrow 
from, while decreasing the number they lend to. They further 
document that a few large banks borrow from a large number of small 
counterparties. Bech and Atalay (2007) and Bonde and Bech (2008) 




10.3.2 The  data 
Our paper uses a set of well-established network measures. These are 
briefly explained in next Section. To carry out the topology analysis, 
we use the data on payments in the large-value payment system 
CHAPS Sterling available to the Bank of England in its role as 
operator of the underlying RTGS processor. From the raw data, it is 
difficult to distinguish cash payments from loan payments (either 
advancement of principal or repayment of principal plus interest). 
Following Halsall et al (2008), we use a variation of the algorithm 
developed by Furfine (1999) which identifies pairs of payments on 
consecutive days that could be interpreted as overnight loan advances 
and repayments. Appendix 1 discusses the construction of the data set 
in detail. 
  Our sample period runs from 18 May 2006 to 16 December 2008. 
To test our hypotheses, we consider a pre-crisis phase (18 May 2006 –  
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8 August 2007) and several crisis periods as the turmoil evolves. We 
identify the following key dates during the period of turbulence: 
 
•  9 August 2007: the commonly accepted date for the start of the 
liquidity crisis in the UK.
5 
•  4 October 2007: the Bank of England pre-announces an increase in 
the bands around the reserve target at which reserves are 
remunerated at Bank rate.
6 
•  15 September 2008: the default of Lehman Brothers, heralding the 
worst period of the crisis so far. 
•  8 October 2008: the UK government announces a recapitalisation 
scheme for UK banks. 
 
This yields five phases for our analysis: 
 
•  Phase 0: from 18 May 2006 to 8 August 2007 
•  Phase 1: from 9 August 2007 to 3 October 2007 
•  Phase 2: from 4 October 2007 to 12 September 2008 
•  Phase 3: from 15 September 2008 to 7 October 2008 
•  Phase 4: from 8 October 2008 to 16 December 2008 
 
As outlined in Section 10.1, we wish to test two hypotheses: i) 
whether overall activity in the interbank market has declined since 




10.3.3  Interbank loan markets as networks 
In the next Section, we will define our various network measures and 
explain how to interpret them in the context of loan markets. Before 
doing so, we introduce the basic network definitions. More detail is 
given in Appendix 2. 
  We model the series of unsecured loan payments between banks as 
an evolving network. Each bank is represented by a node, and a loan 
                                          
5 See, for example, Borio (2008). 
6 The bands had been widened in September 2007 too, but this was announced after the 
maintenance period began on 6 September 2007. Therefore banks’ reserve management 
behaviour during the period may have changed. The maintenance period beginning 4 
October 2007 was the first where banks were aware beforehand of a widening of the 
bands.  
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advance between two banks as a directed link between nodes from the 
lending bank to the borrowing bank. 
  Turning to the loan markets we are interested in, we model the 
series of bilateral unsecured loan payments between banks as an 
evolving network. Each bank is symbolised by a node, and a payment 
between two banks by a directed link between nodes. The directed 
link originates from the lending bank and points to the borrowing 
bank. We take a business day as our unit of time, and do not look at 
intraday networks. This is because a bank’s reserve management – 
and thus lending and borrowing – behaviour is driven to a large extent 
by its daily target. 
 
 
10.4 A first look at the data 
10.4.1  Values and volumes 
Figure 10.1 and Table 10.1 provide a picture of the unsecured 
overnight sterling market. A new settlement member joined CHAPS 
in October 2007 and another ceased direct membership in September 
2008, so we use an average daily figure. 
 
Figure 10.1  Total daily advances in overnight 
      unsecured sterling – 21-day rolling average 
      (value £m on left-hand axis; volume on 






















































































































































































The data show that average daily values of loan advances were higher 
during the entire crisis period, increasing from £27.0bn in phase 0 to 
£33.9bn in phase 4. Despite the presence of a thirteenth bank during 
parts of phases 2 and 3, average daily lending per bank was higher as 
well. The volume of loan contracts increased too during the crisis 
period, but not to the same extent. During phase 2 the number of 
contracts per bank per day was actually slightly lower than during 
phase 0. 
 
Table 10.1  Summary statistics 
 
 Phase 
   A l l 01234  



















  Daily average £m  29,522 27,015 36,699 30,333 34,659 33,897 
Per node £m  2,387 2,251 3,058 2,335 2,819 2,825 
t-statistic 13.8 3.2 6.0 11.6 







  Daily average  469 460 509 469 487 487 
Per node  38 38 42 36 40 41 
t-statistic 10.8 -11.4 1.7 5.9 
p-value  ***0.0% ***0.0% 10.5% ***0.0% 
 
 
The t-statistics in Table 10.1 are obtained from Welch’s t-test on the 
hypothesis that the daily mean value/volume (per node) in the phase is 
significantly different from the mean in phase 0.
7 We can see that in 
all phases the daily value per node is significantly higher than in phase 
0, while volume is significantly higher in phases 1 and 4 (and 
significantly lower in phase 2). 
  Summarising the results so far, we have seen that overall overnight 
loan activity increased slightly post August 2007 (our first 
hypothesis). Of course, our data allows us only to comment on the 
unsecured overnight markets and not loan activity in general. In what 
follows, we examine to what extent relationships between 
counterparties have been affected by the crisis (our second 
hypothesis). This is done by looking at four different network 
                                          
7 Welch’s t-test uses the null hypothesis of equality of means. It requires that the 
underlying observations are normally distributed: for the longer phases we can appeal to 
the central limit theorem but we should be wary of drawing strong conclusions about 
phase 3. In all our tables, one asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level, two for the 
5% level, and three for the 1% level. Throughout this paper, we say a result is 
‘significant’ if the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level.  
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measures: connectivity, reciprocity, clustering and persistence. We 
first define the measures and then present our results. 
 
 
10.4.2 Network  graphics 
In this section we present the network graphically, using the software 
Pajek.
8 Obviously the structure of the network changes over time so 
here we display six pictures for each of the key dates (plus the start 
and end of the period) described in section 10.3.2. In these pictures, a 
link is represented by a black line between two nodes. The arrow 
shows the direction of the link. The thickness of the line represents the 
value of loans between the nodes. Where a link exists in both 
directions, the line is coloured blue. Note that the order of the nodes 
has been permuted between pictures to preserve the anonymity of 
individual banks. 
 
                                          
8 For more information regarding Pajek, see http://pajek.imfm.si/doku.php?id=pajek.  
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Network graphics on each of the key dates 
 
(1) 18 May 2006  (2) 9 August 2007 
 
(3) 4 October 2007  (4) 15 September 2008 
 




Loan (arrow points to borrower) 




At first sight, the interbank network has not changed greatly. On all 
six days, a significant number of relationships are in place, indicating 
that most banks are active in the market and lending to one another. 
The network does not become noticeably less connected during the 
crisis. Furthermore, on all six days, a small number of banks dominate 
overnight activity, though we cannot say whether the identity of these 
‘core’ banks remains unchanged. It appears that the proportion of 
connections involving the core increases as the crisis intensifies. We 
also observe that bilateral relationships become less reciprocal during 
the crisis, as there are fewer blue lines and more black. In other words, 
for each pair of banks, it is more likely that there is a link in one 
direction only. In the remainder of the paper, we use more rigorous 
measures to see whether these observations are an accurate description 




10.5.1  Do core banks become more important? 
The network graphs suggest the existence of a small group of banks 
which are dominant in the overnight market. For any given node, there 
is a higher probability of a link (either in or out) to a core node than 
there is to a non-core node. In other words, given any node i, any core 
node j and any non-core node k, we have P(i→j) > P(i→k) and P(j→i) 
> P(k→i).
9 
  As explained in the introduction, theory suggests that when banks 
become more concerned about liquidity risk across the market, they 
may attempt to reduce risk exposure by relying more on established 
relationships. That suggests examining the data for two possible 
changes: (i) whether the banks increase their reliance on existing 
relationships as the crisis unfolds and (ii) whether the core banks 
benefit relatively more from this concentration. We would expect to 
observe both effects in our data during the crisis phases 1 and 2. 
Specifically, we would expect a greater proportion of links to have a 
core node as one or both counterparties. 
  We would also expect the core to become relatively less important 
in phases 3 and 4. There are two reasons for this. The first is that the 
market-wide turmoil in September and October 2008 revealed that 
                                          
9 Here P(a→b) denotes the probability that a link from node a to node b is formed. Nodes 
i, j and k are distinct.  
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even banks regarded as reliable could face problems.
10 Therefore 
banks may have started to rely on the core a little less, and diversified 
their counterparties. Once the government’s recapitalisation plan was 
announced at the beginning of phase 4, general counterparty risk may 
have been adjudged to have decreased across the market.
11 This again 
made the core slightly less special than before. But we still expect the 
core to be more important than in phase 0. 
 
 
10.5.2  Is there an asymmetry between lender and borrower 
behaviour? 
Counterparty risk is a concern for both borrowers and lenders in the 
overnight unsecured market. If a lender develops liquidity problems, it 
may choose to cut down on the amount of funding rolled. But a 
borrower would need to have very severe liquidity problems before 
failing to repay its overnight loan. For a borrower, failure to repay 
may trigger a credit event, but a lender is free to decide not to roll a 
loan (unless of course it is a committed line). With this argument in 
mind, we examine the data to see whether money market relationship 
became less reciprocal and more asymmetric during the crisis. In 
addition, we want to see whether banks looking for a lender became 
more likely to choose a counterparty from the core than those looking 
for a borrower. 
  As access to term markets becomes more difficult during the crisis, 
borrowers may have to rely more on the overnight market, and would 
need to monitor the risk of their lender choosing not to roll over 
funding. In contrast, we would expect the risk affecting lenders to 
increase by a much smaller margin. Hence, it seems likely that during 
phases 1 to 3 borrowers would increasingly rely on the core, relative 
to lenders. With term markets resuming in phase 4 to a limited extent, 




                                          
10 Bank of England (2008a), p. 17–19. 
11 Bank of England (2008a), p. 29–30. 
12 Bank of England (2008a), p. 34.  
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10.5.3  Have the widened reserve bands had an impact? 
One reason for banks to participate in the overnight market is to 
manage their reserve account balances close to the target, as described 
in Section 10.2. Although the target only binds on the last day of the 
maintenance period, banks actively manage their end of day balances 
throughout the maintenance period. If a bank is long or short near the 
end of the day, it may choose to lend or borrow overnight rather than 
miss its target. See Appendix 3.2 for changes to the bands during the 
period. 
  Since this reserve management activity behaviour is largely 
discretionary, we might expect it to be strongly affected by the 
heightened counterparty concern during the crisis. But the bands 
remained relatively tight at ±1% until the end of phase 1, so banks did 
not have much room to manoeuvre. 
  However, the Bank of England widened the bands in September 
2007, and the first day of phase 2 (4 October 2007) is the start of next 
the maintenance period. Thus we might expect banks to respond much 
more strongly to the crisis in phases 2 and 3 than in phase 1. In phase 
4 the bands start to contract again so, along with the effect of the 
recapitalisation plan, we might expect reaction to the crisis to be more 
muted in phase 4. But there still is a crisis – and bands remain wider 
than in phase 0 – so we should still see some impact. 
  In conclusion, we expect to see: 
 
•  Evidence of a core throughout the entire period; 
•  More dependence on the core during the crisis, and especially in 
phases 2–4; 
•  Greatest dependence on the core in phase 2; 




10.6 Analysis of network measures 
In this section, we discuss our results, looking at measures of 
connectivity, reciprocity, clustering and persistence. We focus on 
network-wide measures rather than studying individual nodes, since 
the phases identified are defined by market-wide and not bank-







First, we define degree as the number of links in the network. This is a 
simple measure, but it has the disadvantage of not adjusting for 
changes to the number of nodes in the network. As the number of 
nodes in our network varies over time, we need a measure which takes 
this into account. 
 The  connectivity of a node is the proportion of potential links that 
exist. Thus, for a network with n nodes, connectivity is equal to 
degree divided by n(n-1). Connectivity can be thought of as the 





Figure 10.2 below shows how the connectivity of the network changes 
over the period. The black line shows the backward-looking 21-day 
rolling average, while the blue diamonds denote the first day of a new 
phase. There appears to be a very large drop in the early part of phase 
2, after which connectivity remains at a lower level before a 
considerable rise starting around the beginning of phase 3. Since the 















































































































































































Table 10.2 below shows mean connectivity during each phase in the 
period, and tests for differences from the mean value in phase 0. We 
see that although connectivity does not decline significantly in the 
initial stage of the crisis (phase 1), it is considerably lower during the 
period between the widening of reserve target bands (start of phase 2) 
and the announcement of the UK government’s measures (end of 
phase 3). 
 
Table 10.2  Mean connectivity during each phase 
 
  Phase 0  Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
Mean 42.10%  41.51% 37.12% 39.63% 42.05% 
Variance 0.07%  0.09% 0.09% 0.18% 0.06% 
t-statistic   -1.2 -20.3 -2.3 -0.1 
p-value   25.0% ***0.0% **3.2% 89.3% 
 
 
Connectivity is significantly lower during much of the crisis period. 
This is consistent with our conjecture that banks become more wary of 
counterparty risk and are less likely to form relationships with non-
core banks. As explained in 10.5.3, the effect is less pronounced  
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during phase 1, when banks are more constrained in their reserves 
management. Connectivity returns to pre-crisis levels after the UK 






Reciprocity is defined only for directed networks, and is the 
probability that a link between two nodes exists, given that the link in 
the opposite direction between the same two nodes exists. 
  Reciprocity can be thought of as the strength of bilateral 
relationships. If reciprocity is high, then banks tend to use the same 
counterparties for both lending and borrowing. Banks form links with 
the core more often than they do with non-core banks. Since the core 
is a relatively small group of nodes, this means that banks’ borrowing 
and lending is likely to be correlated. When a bank chooses a lender, it 
is likely they will choose a member of the core, and it is likely that the 
core member will lend to that bank too. Thus we might expect 
reciprocity to be higher than connectivity, which is the probability of 
linking to any other bank, core or not. Moreover, we might expect it to 
increase relative to connectivity during the crisis period. 
  In fact, reciprocity does not rise during the crisis period, even 
though we predicted greater use of the core and thus more correlation. 
But this may reflect the overall fall in the probability of any 
relationship after October 2007 (see section 10.6.1), rather than 
reduced willingness to enter into borrowing and lending relationships 
with the same counterparties. To separate the two effects and ascertain 
whether reciprocity has risen relative to connectivity, we calculate a 
new measure called normalised reciprocity. This is calculated as 




                                          
13 Suppose we have a ‘prior’ of a random network – that is, one where the probability of 
each link existing is identical (probability p, say) and independent of the existence of 
other links. Then both connectivity and reciprocity have expected value p. Thus, if we 
observe a decrease in reciprocity, how can we distinguish between the case where p has 
declined, and the case where reciprocated links have become less likely (ie the network is 
no longer random)? An obvious solution is to ‘normalise’ reciprocity by dividing by 
connectivity. The expected value of this normalised measure would be constant and equal 
to 1 in a random network, and so we could tell whether the likelihood of reciprocated 




Figure 10.3 below shows how this normalised reciprocity measure has 
changed over the period. The Figure shows a slight increase in the 
second half of phase 2, ending shortly before the Lehman default (start 
of phase 3). Phase 3 sees a sudden drop, followed by a slight rise in 
the second half of phase 4. 
  Since normalised reciprocity is greater than 1 in all five phases, we 
can surmise that reciprocity is always greater than connectivity and 
the core plays a role even in non-crisis times. The increase in 
normalised reciprocity throughout the crisis means greater correlation 
between borrowing and lending counterparties, and could be 
interpreted as greater dependence on the core. 
 
Figure 10.3  Normalised reciprocity of the network over 












































































































































































Normalised reciprocity in phase 4 appears closer to phase 0 levels. As 
suggested earlier, this could indicate that the recapitalisation plan has 
reduced the importance of the core, meaning that relationships with 
non-core banks become relatively more likely.  
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  Table 10.3 below confirms this story, with the strongest effect seen 
in phase 2 (when the mean is significantly different to the phase 0 
mean). In phases 1 and 3 the core banks are less important – as 
explained in Section 5 – and the results are not significant. 
 
Table 10.3  Mean normalised reciprocity during each 
     phase 
 
  Phase 0  Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
Mean 1.66  1.71 1.81 1.75 1.64 
Variance 0.03  0.03 0.04 0.07 0.02 
t-statistic   1.5 9.3 1.4 -0.9 






In-clustering is the probability that two nodes which both have a link 
to the node in question also have a link with each other (in either 
direction). Similarly we can define out-clustering. Since in-clustering 
for the whole network will not necessarily equal out-clustering, we 
examine them separately. In-clustering allows us to consider whether 
banks with a common borrower tend to lend to each other too. 
Similarly, out-clustering tells us the probability that banks which 
borrow from the same third party also lend to one another. 
 
   
 
 
Consider a bank with two lenders. As the core becomes more 
important, it is more likely that one or both of those lenders are 
members of the core. There is then an increased chance of those banks 
forming a relationship as well. Thus in-clustering should be higher 
than connectivity. A similar argument applies to out-clustering. 
According to the argument set out in section 10.5.2, we might expect  
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borrowers to have a greater propensity to choose counterparties from 
the core than lenders, and so in-clustering should be higher than out-
clustering. 
  If we expect the core to become more important during the crisis, 
then in-clustering should increase relative to connectivity. A similar 
argument applies to out-clustering. But as borrowers are more likely 
to choose counterparties from the core than lenders, in-clustering 
should increase by more than out-clustering (relative to connectivity). 
  As discussed in section 10.6.2, we need to distinguish between the 
cases where changes in clustering are due to changes in the probability 
of all links being formed (ie a change in connectivity), and those 
where the probability of clustering has changed relative to other links. 
For a random network where links are formed independently with 
probability p, the expected values of connectivity, in- and out-
clustering are all p. Thus we look at the clustering scores divided 





The charts for normalised in- and out-clustering are rather dissimilar. 
Most noticeably, normalised in-clustering tends to be higher than out-
clustering. The sharp peak in in-clustering around the start of 2008 is 
not seen in the out-clustering chart. The only notable common feature 
is an increase in the latter part of phase 4. 
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Figure 10.4a  Normalised in-clustering of the network 












































































































































































Figure 10.4b  Normalised out-clustering of the network 











































































































































































According to Table 10.4 normalised in-clustering is higher than phase 
0 in all four of the crisis phases, while out-clustering is only 
significantly higher in phase 2. Thus it does appear that in-clustering 
is higher relative to connectivity when the core becomes more 
important, and the effect persists even in phase 4 when the core is not 
as strong. 
  However, normalised out-clustering is only significantly higher in 
phase 2, which is when we expect the core to be most important. This 
suggests perhaps that the probability of lending to the core does not 
increase by much during the crisis; the changes in connectivity and 
normalised reciprocity we saw earlier are driven much more by an 
increased probability of borrowing from the core banks rather than 
lending to them. 
 
Table 10.4  Mean normalised in- and out-clustering 
      during each phase 
 
in-clustering  Phase 0 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
Mean 1.37 1.45 1.56 1.60 1.55 
Variance 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.02 
t-statistic 2.8 12.6 3.9 8.1 
p-value ***0.7% ***0.0% ***0.1% ***0.0% 
 
out-clustering  Phase 0 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
Mean 1.34 1.34 1.40 1.38 1.35 
Variance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
t-statistic 0.081 6.373 1.312 0.399 
p-value 93.6% ***0.0% 20.7% 69.1% 
 
 
Furthermore, a test for a significant difference between normalised in- 
and out-clustering finds that there is a very significant (at the 1% 
level) difference between the two. This confirms that normalised in-
clustering is indeed higher than out-.clustering 
 
 
10.6.4  Persistence of relations 
Definition 
 
An important part of our theory is that banks wish to choose reliable 
lenders as they are dependent on the rolling of overnight funding. It 
may also be that, during times of heightened counterparty risk, banks 
rely more upon established relationships so that liquidity risk can be 
monitored more easily – this is the insurance factor mentioned in  
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Section 10.1. In this sub-section we measure the propensity to roll 
overnight funding. 
 We  define  persistence as the probability that, given a loan is 
extended on day t, another loan is extended from the same lender to 
the same borrower on day t+1. This is particularly important in the 
overnight market, since we might expect that a significant proportion 
of overnight loans are rolled over every day. Rolling an overnight loan 
would involve the same lender and borrower on consecutive days. 
Thus persistence may be a guide to increased use of overnight funds 
instead of term lending in the market. 
  Of course, just because we observe loans between the same two 
parties on consecutive days it does not mean we have a rolled loan. 
There could be other reasons for high persistence, such as some banks 
tending to lend more than borrow or vice versa, or seasonal patterns 
leading to correlation between consecutive days. But we argue that an 
increase in rolling activity across the market would result in an 
increase in persistence. 
  On any given day, we argue that banks are likely to form 
relationships with counterparties in the core. Since the core consists of 
a small subset of banks, we would then expect relationships on 
consecutive days to be positively correlated. Thus persistence should 
be higher than connectivity – if the two were equal, this would suggest 
that there was no correlation between links on consecutive days. 
Moreover, we expect it to increase relative to connectivity as the core 
becomes more important. 
  As with reciprocity and clustering, we need to strip out the effect 
of changes in connectivity. Since the expected value of persistence in 
a random graph on day t is p
(t+1), the probability of any link existing on 
day t+1, we define normalised persistence on day t as persistence on 





Figure 10.5 shows that normalised persistence increases during phase 
2 and drops again in phases 3 and 4. However, in all four crisis phases 
it appears to be higher than in phase 0. This provides evidence for the 
increased importance of the core during the crisis, and for a slight 
reduction in importance in phase 4. 
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Figure 10.5  Normalised persistence of the network over 











































































































































































Table 10.5 shows that throughout the crisis period, normalised 
persistence is significantly higher than in phase 0 in every phase of the 
crisis. Again, the highest values occur in phases 2 and 3, when the 
core appears to be most important. This may also suggest that banks 
become more dependent on rolling overnight funding during these 
phases, as the term funding markets have become impaired. 
 
Table 10.5  Mean normalised persistence during each 
     phase 
 
  Phase 0 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
Mean 1.96 2.02 2.23 2.11 2.09 
Variance 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 
t-statistic 2.4 19.1 3.3 7.7 




10.7 Robustness checks 
So far we have argued that the network can be described as a core of a 
small number of banks with high connectivity, surrounded by a larger 
number of non-core banks. The most significant results are obtained in 
phases 2 and 3. These phases coincide with changes in the underlying 
membership of CHAPS. One bank became a direct member in 
October 2007 and another ceased its direct membership in September 
2008. These dates are close to the start of phase 2 and the end of phase 
3 respectively. It is possible that these changes have had an impact on 
the structure of the network. 
  We can attempt to control for these changes by considering a 
scenario where neither of the ‘floating’ banks was ever a direct 
CHAPS member, and instead all of their overnight activity was done 
through their former/later correspondent bank during the entire period. 
This gives us a network with 11 nodes. We refer to this as the ‘merged 
network’. 
  We can find that connectivity in the merged network is higher than 
the original score most of the time. The difference is particularly 
obvious during the period when there were 13 banks in the network (8 
October 2007 – 19 September 2008). There is no longer a significant 
drop at the start of phase 2 or rise at the start of phase 3. 
  However, there are limitations to this analysis. We do not know 
that banks would have kept their lending and borrowing behaviour the 
same if the floating banks had been second-tier members throughout 
the entire sample period. For example, lending or borrowing from a 
customer bank makes no difference to the settlement bank’s reserve 
account balance, so its actions may well have been different when the 
customer was a direct member of the network. 
  In summary, although there is evidence that changes in CHAPS 
membership may have contributed to our results, we have no 
conclusive evidence that they alone explain the observed changes in 
the network since we cannot say for certain what the counterfactual 




10.8 Concluding remarks 
To summarise our analysis of the overnight market, we find no 
evidence of an overall reduction in overnight loan activity – in fact 
loan flows are up a little – but some banks may have changed their 
behaviour. First, our network results indicate that there exists a core of 
a small number of banks which account for a large portion of 
overnight activity. When concerns about counterparty risk increase, 
banks in the network prefer to borrow from or (to a lesser extent) lend 
to the core rather than non-core banks. However, we also observe that 
it was not until the reserve target bands were widened in September 
2007 that banks were able to adjust their liquidity management to 
reduce the number of counterparties. 
  The turmoil in autumn 2008 raised widespread concerns about 
counterparty risk, reducing reliance on the core and encouraging 
banks to diversify their range of counterparties. And the 
recapitalisation plan in October 2008 reduced concerns about all 
banks, making it less necessary to rely on the core. Thus it is in the 
period October 2007 – August 2008 that we see the core at its most 
important. 
  Second, we observe a reduction in the number of relationships, 
indicating that the network has become less connected and less 
reciprocal. None of the differences are large, but they are statistically 
significant. To explain these changes, we suggest that during the crisis 
period, banks have become more concerned about counterparty 
liquidity risk. Many borrowers use the overnight market to obtain term 
lending by rolling overnight loans to the next day. Thus borrowers are 
keen to obtain their funds from a counterparty that is likely to agree to 
roll over the loan the next day. That in turn implies that they will be 
concerned about changes in their counterparties’ liquidity risk: if the 
lender suffers a liquidity shock then they might be less likely to agree 
to roll over the loan. 
  Counterparty liquidity risk is a concern for lenders too. If a 
borrower cannot find the funds to repay a loan, the lender will either 
have to roll over the loan or consider the borrower to be in default. 
But being in default sends a very negative signal to the market, and a 
borrower is likely to seek to avoid this at all costs. Thus the borrower 
will repay the loan if it is able to. In contrast, a lender suffering 
liquidity constraints can decide not to roll over a loan without (direct) 
adverse effects. Hence, we argue that increased concerns about 
counterparty risk affect choice of lender more than choice of 
borrower.   
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  We do not attempt to measure whether the impact of market events 
was greater or less than the impact of policy events. This question 
could be important when attempting to gauge the efficacy of central 
bank actions. For example, increased access to central bank liquidity 
as a result of policy changes during the crisis may have crowded out 
private provision, affecting the relationships that private banks have 
with each other. 
  In conclusion, our network analysis of the overnight money market 
indicates that the structure of relationships between banks changed as 
the crisis unfolded. But the analysis also suggests that the observed 
changes were small, and that underlying trading activity was 
unaffected. More work is needed to understand how activity in the 
overnight unsecured market was affected by changes in the term 
markets and in the secured markets, and what conclusions we can 
draw about the resilience of liquidity in the money markets and the 
need for infrastructure changes. We leave this for future research.  
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Appendix 1 
Finding overnight loans from payment data 
The Furfine method for finding overnight loans employed in this 
paper can be summarised as follows: 
 
1.  Generally loan principal amounts are in fairly round numbers. On 
day t, find all payments in round numbers and label them as 
possible overnight loan advances. For overnight loans, we define a 
‘round number’ as being of value £1m or above and divisible by 
£100,000. Thus we only consider loans of value £1m or more. 
 
2.  On day t+1 label all payments of value £1m or above and not a 
‘round number’ as possible overnight loan repayments. For each of 
these, calculate the implied principal amount by rounding down to 
the nearest £100,000, or round down to the nearest £1m if the 
repayment amount is greater than £250m.
14 
 
3.  Match possible advances on day t with implied principal amounts 
from repayments on day t+1. For each potential matched pair, 
check: 
 
  a.  The advance has not already been matched with another 
repayment, and vice versa; 
  b.  The payer of the advance matches the payee of the repayment, 
and vice versa; 
  c.  The implied interest rate falls within ±2% of the Bank of 
England rate; 
  d.  The implied interest rate is plausible, meaning that is an exact 
number of basis points or half-points. To allow for rounding 
errors, we accept interest rates within 0.01 basis points of an 
exact number. 
 
                                          
14 There may appear to be a danger here of making an error if the repayment amount is 
slightly more than a multiple of £100,000 or £1m. But if a loan of size ≤ £250m and the 
interest is ≥ £100k, then the implied annualised interest rate is over 14%, which is 
unreasonable considering prevailing interbank rates in the UK during the period studied. 
And if a loan commands interest of ≥ £1m, then even at a rate of 8% (very high compared 
to 3-month Libor over the period), the principal amount would be over £4.5bn. Payments 
of this magnitude are very rare, and there have been none on consecutive days between 
the same pairs of banks over the period we are examining.  
311 
This algorithm is relatively accurate for overnight loans. It is unlikely 
to be 100% accurate since it could happen that opposing payments on 
consecutive days look like a loan advance and repayment without 
being part of loan. Also there is a problem of ambiguity if there are 
payments on three or more consecutive days that could be advances 
and repayments (in this case the algorithm assumes an advance on the 
first day and repayment on the second). But the likelihood of these 
coincidences is low enough to justify use of the method. We also lose 
any overnight loans that are less than £1m in value, but again this 
should not have a major impact. Halsall et al (2008) conduct 
robustness checks on this data set and confirm that the data are 
representative of the sterling unsecured overnight market. 
  But there is a further complication in that the CHAPS database 
includes only payments made between the 13 clearing banks which 
are CHAPS members, and therefore excludes loan payments between 
direct and indirect participants and loan payments between two 
customers of the same settlement bank, which are settled across that 
bank’s books rather than in CHAPS. Data on these are not available.  
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Appendix 2 
Algebraic definitions of topology measures  
Nodes: Given n nodes, we label them {1,2,…,n}. The topology 
measures are invariant under permutations of this labelling. 
  Links: If there is a link from node i to node j, then lij = 1. If there 
is no such link, then lij = 0. As no node can have a link to itself, lii = 0 
for all i. 
  For the entire network, we compute the following 
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Major events during the 2007-08 UK market turmoil 
 
Date Event 
July 07  First real signs of a crisis. Bear Stearns announces that two subprime 
hedge funds have rapidly declined in value. 
9 Aug 07  Generally accepted start of crisis. ECB and Federal Reserve inject 
around £45bn of funds into the financial markets. 
20 Aug 07  First use of standing facilities during the crisis; clear signs that 
borrowing on facilities carries stigma. 
13 Sep 07  Bank of England announces a widening of reserve bands for the current 
maintenance period. 
14 Sep 07  Northern Rock granted liquidity support facility from Bank of England. 
8 Oct 07  UBS joins CHAPS as a direct member. 
17 Mar 08  JP Morgan Chase agrees to buy Bear Stearns. 
21 Apr 08  Bank of England launches Special Liquidity Scheme, which allows 
commercial banks to borrow Treasury bills in exchange for less liquid 
collateral. 
15 Sep 08  Bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. 
17 Sep 08  Disclosure of merger talks between HBOS and Lloyds TSB. 
22 Sep 08  ABN Amro ceases its direct membership of CHAPS. 
29 Sep 08  Bradford & Bingley, a UK mortgage bank, part-nationalised. 
8 Oct 08  Announcement of UK bank recapitalisation plan. 




Range around reserve targets within which reserves are 
remunerated at Bank rate 
 
Announcement Band Effective  Announcement Band  Effective 
18 May 06  ±1%  18 May 06  18 Sep 08  ±40%  4 Sep 08 
13 Sep 07  ±37.5%  6 Sep 07  1 Oct 08  ±60%  4 Sep 08 
20 Sep 07  ±60%  6 Sep 07  6 Oct 08  ±40%  9 Oct 08 
2 Oct 07  ±30%  4 Oct 07  3 Nov 08  ±20%  6 Nov 08 
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11  An agent-based model of 
payment systems 
Abstract 
This paper lays out and simulates a multi-agent, multi-period model of 
an RTGS payment system. At the beginning of the day, banks choose 
how much costly liquidity to allocate to the settlement process. Then, 
they use it to execute an exogenous, random stream of payment 
orders. If a bank’s liquidity stock is depleted, payments are queued 
until new liquidity arrives from other banks, imposing costs on the 
delaying bank. The paper studies the equilibrium level of liquidity 
posted in the system, performing some comparative statics and 
obtaining: i) a liquidity demand curve which links liquidity to delay 





A large share of all economic transactions is ultimately settled via 
money transfers between banks, taking place on ‘large-value payment 
systems’ (LVPSs). In 2006, the annual value of interbank payments 
made in the European system TARGET totalled €533 trillion (about 
$670 trillion), amounting to more than 50 times the value of the 
corresponding countries’ gross domestic products. The sheer size of 
these transactions, and their importance for the functioning of the 
economy, explains why policymakers are interested in LVPSs, and in 
the behaviour of their participants. 
  In the past, most payment systems worked on a deferred, net 
settlement basis. During a business day the banks would exchange 
promises of payments, deferring the actual transfer of funds to the end 
of the day, when only net positions were settled. The advantage of this 
arrangement was that only net debtors had to actually provide funds, 
and only in a quantity sufficient to cover their net position. Because 
net positions are typically small (compared to gross payments), the 
system as a whole would require little liquidity to function. Today 
instead, most LVPSs work on a gross settlement basis: there is no 
netting, and a payment obligation is legally discharged only when the 
corresponding full amount is transferred across accounts held at a  
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central bank. This apparent backward step, strongly encouraged by 
monetary authorities worldwide, was motivated by credit risk 
concerns. Suppose indeed that, in a net system, at the end of the day a 
bank is unable to make good its final position. Its creditors may face 
losses too large to be sustained, so their payments too might have to 
be cancelled, creating a domino effect with significant consequences 
for financial stability. Gross settlement eliminates this risk but 
requires more liquidity, as the benefits (not only the risks) of netting 
are foregone. These arguments suggest that the provision of liquidity 
is an essential issue to modern payment systems. 
  Real-time gross systems are more ‘liquidity hungry’ than deferred 
net systems. However, they allow for liquidity ‘recycling’: when a 
bank receives a payment, it can use the received funds to make other 
payments of its own. To make an analogy, in a football game the ball 
can be passed between the players many times; similarly, a same unit 
of liquidity can be used to settle many payments. Consider however 
what happens if the ball is expensive to buy – maybe no one would 
like to pay for it in the first place. Unfortunately the analogy carries on 
to payment systems, where liquidity (the ball) bears a cost for 
commercial banks. This is an interest cost (typically charged by the 
central bank) or an opportunity cost (when liquidity is obtained 
against a pledge of collateral). So, even though just a little liquidity 
could generate a large volume of exchanges, it is unclear who should 
provide it. Banks are thus faced with a dilemma: to act as liquidity 
providers by acquiring costly funds, or to wait for liquidity to arrive 
from other banks. In the first case a bank does not depend on its 
partners, and it can promptly execute payments. In the second case, a 
bank benefits from a free source of liquidity, but is exposed to the risk 
of delaying payments while waiting for funds to arrive. 
  This paper develops a dynamic model of liquidity provision in a 
payment system, where banks face a choice between: a) the costs of 
borrowing liquidity, and b) the cost of delaying payments. In more 
detail, the model is a sequence of days. At the beginning of each day, 
every bank chooses how much liquidity to borrow from external 
sources. This liquidity is then used to execute payment orders which 
arrive throughout the day in a random, exogenous fashion (these 
orders can be interpreted as being commissioned by a bank’s external 
clients, or by some area of the bank, different from the treasury). As 
long as the bank has sufficient funds, payments are executed as soon 
as they are received; when instead a bank’s liquidity balance reaches 
zero, payments are queued until incoming payments provide the bank 
with new funds. Finally, at the end of the day banks receive profits, 
which depend on the liquidity borrowed, and on the delays suffered in  
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executing payment orders. Day after day, banks adapt their liquidity 
choices following a particular learning process. As a consequence, the 
banks’ behaviour eventually stabilises, and the banks end up providing 
an equilibrium amount of liquidity. 
  The system’s equilibrium level depends on the model’s 
parameters. By changing these, we look at the amount of liquidity 
absorbed by the system in a variety of scenarios, drawing conclusions 
on the efficiency of the system. We find that, for a wide range of 
costs, efficiency could be enhanced if banks were to commit more 
liquidity than they do in equilibrium. This might constitute a rationale 
for imposing measures that encourage liquidity provision (for 
example, throughput guidelines). From a different perspective, 
systems with fewer participants are found to be more liquidity-
efficient than larger ones, due to the emergence of ‘liquidity pooling’ 
effects, as described by previous studies. These results are found by 
varying the size of the system but not its structure: it is outside the 
scope of this work to look at how liquidity choices are affected by 
changes in the extent of ‘tiering’ of a payment system (that is, we do 
not fully investigate the case of banks ‘moving out’ of the system, and 




Virtually all economic activity is facilitated by transfers of claims by 
financial institutions. In turn, these claim transfers generate payments 
between banks whenever they are not settled across the books of a 
(perhaps third) institution. These payments are settled in interbank 
payment systems. In 2006, the annual value of interbank payments 
made in the European system TARGET totalled €533 trillion (about 
$670 trillion). In the corresponding US system Fedwire, the amount 
was $572 trillion, while the UK system CHAPS processed 
transactions for a value of £59 trillion (about $109 trillion). In 
perspective, these transfers amounted to 24 to 40 times the value of 
the respective countries’ GDPs. The sheer size of the transfers, and 
their pivotal role in the functioning of financial markets and the 
implementation of monetary policy, make payment systems a central 
issue for policymakers and regulators. 
  At present, most interbank payment systems work on a real-time 
gross settlement (RTGS) modality. That is, settlement takes place as 
soon as a payment is submitted into the system (real time); also, a 
payment can be submitted only if the paying bank has enough funds to  
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deliver the full amount in central bank money (gross settlement). 
Because no netting takes place, RTGS modality imposes high liquidity 
demands on the banks, making RTGS systems vulnerable to liquidity 
risk, ie to the risk that liquidity-short banks are unable to send their 
own payments. This may create delays and possibly cause gridlocks in 
the system (see eg Bech and Soramäki, 2002). Hence, liquidity is one 
of the central issues in RTGS payment systems; as such it attracts the 
attention of central banks and stimulates a large amount of research. 
This paper aims at contributing to this knowledge, offering a model of 
liquidity demand and circulation in an RTGS system. To our 
knowledge, this is the first paper that explores this question using an 
‘agent-based’ approach, ie combining elements of game theory and 
numerical simulations. 
  The amount and the distribution of liquidity in a payment system is 
the result of a complex interaction between the system’s participants. 
Indeed, during the day, each bank has to make a stream of payments, 
that can only be partly predicted. To cover the liquidity needs 
generated by these payments, banks typically rely on two sources: a) 
reserve balances or credit acquired from the central bank and b) funds 
received from other settlement banks during the course of the day. The 
first source can be seen as providing external (to the system) liquidity, 
while the second is a source of internal liquidity. In normal conditions 
a bank can draw freely on external liquidity. This however has a cost, 
which gives incentives to economise on its use.
1 Internal liquidity on 
the other hand carries no cost, but its arrival is out of the bank’s 
control. Hence, reliance on internal liquidity exposes the bank to the 
risk of having to delay its own payment activity – something which is 
also costly.
2 As a consequence, a bank has to optimally decide how 
much external liquidity to acquire, trying to forecast when and how 
much internal liquidity it will receive, trading off external liquidity 
costs against (expected) delay costs. The fact that banks i) delay some 
payments, and yet ii) do not wait till the very end of the day to make 
all their payments, shows that this trade-off indeed exists. 
  Two main difficulties emerge when studying the behaviour of 
banks in a payment system. First, when modelled in sufficient detail, 
liquidity flows in RTGS systems follow complex dynamics, making 
                                          
1 The costs of acquiring liquidity are opportunity costs (returns that the bank would obtain 
if it could employ this liquidity differently), and interest costs (costs from borrowing the 
liquidity itself). 
2 Delays usually carry two types of cost. First, formal agreements often penalise late 
delivery; if a delay extends over the end of the due day, penalties may apply. Second, 
delays may entail reputational costs, which are difficult to quantify but potentially large.  
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the bank’s liquidity management problem anything but trivial. Indeed, 
recent work by Beyeler et al (2007) shows that, when the level of 
external liquidity is low, payments lose correlation with the arrival of 
payment orders; as a consequence, it is difficult to gauge the precise 
relationship between liquidity and delays, making it hard to determine 
the optimal usage of external funds. Second, the actions of each bank 
produce spillover effects on the rest of the system, so no system 
participant can solve its optimal liquidity demand problem in 
isolation. As strategic interactions are widespread, banks interact in a 
fully fledged ‘game’, jointly determining the performance of the 
system. 
  This paper studies this liquidity game, putting particular effort into 
modelling liquidity flows. We thus build a payments model where 
external liquidity is continuously ‘recycled’ among many banks, with 
delays and costs generated in a non-trivial way by a realistic 
settlement process. Such realism will inevitably force us to abandon 
the analytical approach and instead to use simulations. In particular, 
we use numerical methods to compute a crucial element of the game, 
the pay-off function, or a relationship between i) a bank’s own 
external liquidity, ii) the external liquidity of other banks, and iii) the 
resulting settlement delays and costs. 
  We are interested in the equilibria of the liquidity game, or the 
choices that banks may be seen to adopt in a consistent fashion. To do 
so we solve the model adopting a dynamic approach. That is, we 
assume that banks change their actions over time, using an adaptive 
process whereby actions are chosen on the basis of past experience. 
We then simulate the resulting dynamics and we look at the limit, or 
equilibrium, behaviour. This depends on the specific form of the 
adaptive rule, so we choose the learning process in such a way that, on 
the one hand, it embeds some rationality on the part of the banks; on 
the other, it leads to a meaningful equilibrium. A convergence point of 
our dynamics will be a Nash equilibrium of the liquidity game. 
  Given its game-theoretic approach, this paper is related to recent 
work by Angelini (1998), Bech and Garratt (2003, 2006), Buckle and 
Campbell (2003) and Willison (2005). These papers model various 
‘liquidity management games’ with a few agents and a small number 
of periods (respectively, two and three). While these models improve 
our understanding of the incentives in payment systems, the actual 
pay-off functions may be too simple to describe costs in real payment 
systems accurately. As we said, in RTGS systems liquidity can 
circulate many times and between many banks, generating dynamics 
that cannot be captured by these simple, but analytically tractable, 
models.  
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  Recently, a growing literature has used simulation techniques to 
investigate efficiency and risk issues payment systems (see eg James 
and Willison (2004) and the volumes edited by Leinonen (2005, 
2007)). Simulation studies have been widely used in comparing 
alternative central bank policies, or testing the impact of new system 
features before their implementation in payment systems. A common 
shortcoming of such studies has been, however, that participant 
behaviour is rarely endogenised in the models. The behaviour of 
banks has either been assumed to remain unchanged across alternative 
scenarios, or to change in a predetermined manner, leaving aside (or 
largely simplifying) the strategic aspects studied by the game-theoretic 
studies. 
  Recognising the strengths and disadvantages of these two 
approaches, the present paper tries to build a bridge between them, 
combining the strength of each of them. Of course, we have to leave 
something behind: the realism of historical data (which may however 
be inappropriate to study counterfactual scenarios), and the sharpness 
of analytical results. 
  The paper is organised as follows: Section 11.2 provides a formal 
description of the model, describes some properties of the cost 
function, and illustrates the tatônnement process towards equilibrium. 




11.2 Description of the model 
The model is a stylised representation of a day in RTGS, where the 
banks (players) engage in the following game. 
 
 
11.2.1  Banks and liquidity choices 
At the beginning of the day, each of N banks (denoted by i = 1...N) 
chooses its reserves, say li(0), to be used in the course of the 
settlement day.
3 To simplify, we assume that these reserves, the 
external liquidity, can only be acquired once, at the beginning of the 
day. Once reserves have been (simultaneously) chosen, the settlement 
day begins: banks start receiving payment orders, and execute them 
                                          
3 In the simulations, we assume that li(0) is an integer between 0 and some large L.  
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using available liquidity. In game-theoretic terms, li(0) is bank i’s 
action and the vector l = (l1(0), l2(0)...lN(0)) is an action profile. The 
next subsection illustrates how payments are received and executed, 
generating the outcome of the game. 
 
 
11.2.2  Payments and delays 
The outcome of the day-game is determined as follows. The day is 
modelled as a continuous time interval [0,T]. Payment orders arrive 
according to a Poisson process with parameter λ = 1, so the system as 
a whole receives, on average, T orders per day. The payor and the 
payee of these payment orders are determined by (uniform) random 
draws: for any order, the probability that banks i and j  ≠ i  are 
respectively the payor and the payee is (1/N)(1/(N–1)). Equivalently, 
each single bank receives payment orders according to a Poisson 
process with parameter λ = 1/N, and the payee of each such order is 
determined by a random (uniform) draw. These orders can be seen as 
generated outside the bank, by a bank’s clients, or within the bank, by 
some area which is different from the treasury department. Whatever 
the interpretation, payment orders are exogenous for the agent 
choosing li(0). 
  Let us call zi(t) the number of payment orders received by bank i 
up to time t, and xi(t) the number of payment orders executed by i up 
to t. At t, bank i's queue (its backlog of outstanding orders) is therefore 
 
qi(t) = zi(t) – xi(t) 
 
where we set zi(0) = xi(0)  =  0. Payments orders are executed using 
available liquidity. Bank i's available liquidity at time t is defined as 
 
li(t) = li(0) – xi(t) + yi(t) 
 
where yi(t) is the amount of payments that i has received from other 




                                          
4 Such a rule is optimal for the cost specification given in the next section: banks need to 
pay upfront for liquidity, so they have no incentive to delay payments if liquidity is 
available. Under other cost specifications (eg heterogeneous payment delay costs) this 
would, however, not be the case.  
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Bank i’s incoming payments yi(t) are just other banks’ outgoing 
payments, so the settlement process is fully described by the above 
equations. 
  As mentioned in the introduction, even this simple model 
generates extremely complex dynamics of liquidity li(t) and queues 
qi(t).
5 However, the model can be simulated numerically. A given 
action profile l = (l1(0),...,lN(0)) pins down the initial conditions of the 
system; from there, the exogenous arrival of payment orders 
mechanically generates liquidity fluxes, queues and delays. All this 
can be numerically simulated, to determine how delays depend on 
liquidity choices. For example, Figure 11.1 shows the (average) 
amount of delays obtained for different levels of total liquidity in the 
system, when li(0) is the same for each i.
6 
 

































As system liquidity is reduced, delays increase non-linearly due to 
what are often referred to as ‘deadweight losses’ (Angelini, 1998) or 
                                          
5 Queues do not form only when li(0) is very high. Then, Δx = Δz so executed payments 
essentially follow a Poisson process which mirrors the arrival of payment orders. 
6 Delays are normalised such that 1 reflects a situation where all payments are delayed 
until the end of the day, and 0 a situation where no delays take place.  
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‘gridlocks’ (Bech and Soramäki, 2002). Intuitively, a bank that 
reduces its liquidity holdings might have to delay its outgoing 
payments; as a consequence, the receivers of the delayed payments 
may in turn need to delay their own payments, causing further 
downstream delays and so on. These delay chains are more likely and 
more extended the lower the liquidity in the system. Thus, the total 




At the end of the settlement day, banks receive pay-offs that depend 
on the liquidity posted at the beginning of the day, and on the delays 
generated by the settlement algorithm illustrated in the above section. 
More precisely, we assume that acquiring initial liquidity li(0) imposes 
a liquidity cost equal to 
 
C(li(0)) = λli(0),     λ > 0  (11.2) 
 
This is the first component of a bank’s pay-off (cost). We then 
suppose that a payment order received at t and executed at t’ carries a 
penalty equal to 
 
c(t’,t) = κ(t’ – t),     κ > 0  (11.3) 
 
Such penalties are summed over all received payment orders of the 
day, to give a bank’s delay cost. A bank's total pay-off is then the sum 
of delay and liquidity costs. 
  The random arrival of payment orders generates random delays; 
hence, pay-offs too are a random function of the action profile l(0). As 
anticipated above, the analytical form of this pay-off is exceedingly 
complex to determine; hence, we simulate the settlement process 
many times for every action profile, to obtain a numerical estimate of 
expected costs, as a function of l(0).
7 The resulting pay-off function is 
plotted in Figures 11.2 and 11.3 for two levels of delays costs; ‘low’ 
(11.2) and ‘high’ (11.3). 
 
                                          
7 We assume banks are risk-neutral, ie they care about expected pay-offs.  
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Figure 11.2  Costs as a function of own initial funds – 

























Figure 11.3  Costs as a function of own initial funds – 

























The simulations also show an interesting fact: 
 
Remark 1 Bank i’s cost is (essentially) a function of its own action 
and of the sum of others’ actions.  
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This important empirical finding, which probably depends on the fact 
that the day is ‘long’, greatly simplifies the analysis.
8 First, in certain 
respects it leaves us with a game with only two players: bank i playing 
against ‘the rest of the system’. Second, it allows us to derive some 
analytical results, to be discussed in the next section.
9 
  We find this result by comparing two sets of simulations. In the 
first set, we vary the total amount of liquidity, while spreading it 
uniformly across banks (ie we simulate the settlement day for different 
values of Σli(0), imposing every time li(0) = (1/N)Σli(0)  ∀i). In the 
other, we change again the total liquidity, but we distribute it 
randomly across banks, so li(0) varies across banks. Comparing the 
total costs in the two sets, we found that the differences are small – 
around 2% or less. We suspect this can be explained by two facts: i) 
the assumption of a complete symmetric network (every bank 
exchanges payments to any other with similar intensity), and ii) the 
relatively large number of payments quickly redistributes liquidity, 
flushing out the initial conditions. Both assumptions are realistic in 
many systems, for example in the UK CHAPS system (see Soramäki 




To find the equilibrium of the liquidity game, we use the so-called 
fictitious play tatônnement process (Brown, 1951). Largely studied in 
evolutionary game theory, fictitious play is a specification of how 
players change their actions in time, learning from experience. A 
precise description of this process is in the appendix; the reason to 
adopt this particular dynamic is twofold. First, despite its simplicity 
the fictitious play rule is in a sense rational and thus not too 
unrealistic, corresponding to Bayesian updating of beliefs about 
others’ actions.
10 Second, fictitious play can indeed be a useful tool to 
compute equilibria. Indeed, when fictitious play converges to a stable 
                                          
8 We do not have a rigorous proof, but we suspect the following. When many payments 
are made (ie the day is ‘long’), liquidity is soon spread among banks according to a stable 
distribution. Hence the initial distribution does not matter, only the total liquidity does. 
9 Games with this property are known as aggregation games. They have the convenient 
feature that a number of adjustment dynamics applied to them are ‘well behaved’ (see eg 
Mezzetti and Dindo, 2006). 
10 See eg Fudenberg and Levine (1998, page 31) for details.  
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action profile, this is a Nash equilibrium of the underlying game.
11 
Summing up, fictitious play can be seen either as a computational 
device, or as a ‘story’ with an appealing economic meaning. 
  A key question is whether the game has a unique equilibrium and, 
if not, which equilibrium will be uncovered with fictitious play. The 
appendix discusses this in more detail. The bottom line is that, 
although our model does have different equilibria (depending on the 
initial conditions the simulations will pick one or the other), all 
equilibria are characterised by exactly the same total level of liquidity 
Σili(0), which can therefore be rightly called the equilibrium liquidity. 
This allows us to perform comparative statics, where we change 




11.3.1  Liquidity demand and efficiency of the equilibrium 
We start with a base case scenario with 15 banks; this number is 
chosen so that our system ‘looks like’ the UK CHAPS.
12 In all of the 
simulations banks interact in a complete network, ie each sends 
payments to every other bank in the system – another fairly realistic 
assumption for CHAPS. 
  First, we obtain a ‘liquidity demand function’, relating the 
(equilibrium) amount of external liquidity Σili(0) to unit delay costs κ, 
for λ normalised to 1.
13 As expected, the amount of liquidity acquired 
by the banks is low for relatively inexpensive delays (Figure 11.4). 
When k grows, so does liquidity demand, roughly following a 
logarithmic pattern up to a certain point. However, as liquidity grows, 
delays become increasingly rare. As a consequence, decreasing returns 
on liquidity eventually prevail, causing liquidity demand to eventually 
flatten out. 
 
                                          
11 It is well known that fictitious play may fail to converge. However this is not the case 
here, as shown by the simulations. Interestingly, convergence in aggregation games was 
shown by Kukushkin (2004) for a dynamic similar to fictitious play. 
12 The length of the day is 3,000 ‘time ticks’, so on average each bank makes 200 
payments a day. 
13 Only λ/κ matters for the banks’ decisions; hence our demand function is essentially 
equivalent to a ‘traditional’ liquidity demand, where the demand Σili(0) depends on the 
cost λ.  
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Figure 11.4  Equilibrium external liquidity as a function 






























An important question is whether the equilibrium of the liquidity 
game is efficient; that is, whether the self-interested behaviour of 
banks can be improved upon by some co-ordinated action. To answer 
this question, one should ideally compare the equilibrium outcome of 
the game, to what would result if banks were jointly minimising the 
total costs of the system. To simplify computations, we search for 
optimal liquidity levels under the constraint li(0) = lj(0) ∀i,j – all banks 
are given the same amount of funds.
14 We find that the equilibrium 
outcome roughly coincides with the collective cost minimising choice 
for extreme values of k (delay costs), as shown in Figure 11.5 (the 
continuous line represents the liquidity minimising total cost). 
However, for intermediate unit delay costs, the outcome reached by 
independent banks is dominated by the co-ordination outcome, where 
more liquidity is provided as a whole. 
 
                                          
14 This constraint should not be binding: returns to own liquidity are decreasing, so 
redistribution from a liquidity-rich to a liquidity-poor bank should on average reduce total 
delays. Hence, an efficient allocation of liquidity should assign the same li(0) to all banks.  
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Figure 11.5  Cost-minimising common action (dashed) 
































At the origin of such inefficiency are positive externalities in liquidity 
provision: external liquidity is used by all banks, but of course an 
individual institution only cares about private costs and benefits. 
Competitive banks then free-ride on others, leading to insufficient 
provision of external liquidity. 
 
 
11.3.2 Relative  efficiency  of different size networks 
Is a system with more participants preferable to a smaller one? This 
question can be considered from different points of view: from a risk / 
financial stability perspective,
15 or from a cost-efficiency perspective. 
Here, we concentrate on the second aspect. We then run experiments 
varying the number of banks in the model. In the first experiment, we 
increase the number of participants while keeping the number of 
payments per bank constant. In the second experiment, we increase 
the number of participants while keeping constant the system-wide 
number of payments (so per-bank payments are decreased). We 
measure efficiency using the netting ratio, that is the average amount 
of external liquidity required for each payment: 
                                          
15 For example, fewer participants could imply that the failure of one bank implies 
disruption of a larger share of payments. On the other hand, fewer participants might also 





ratio netting =  
 
The lower the netting ratio, the higher is the level of ‘liquidity 
recycling’ in the system. 
  A caveat: while we change the size of the system, we maintain the 
assumption of a complete and symmetric payment network. This type 
of change (a pure ‘rescaling’) is convenient to analyse, but is just a 
simplified description of what happens in real payment systems. 
There, changes in the number of banks are usually accompanied by 
changes in the topology of the system, as some banks de facto merge 
their payment activity with others (giving rise to the so-called 
‘tiering’). When this happens, liquidity demand is influenced in a 
complex way by a number of factors, that we do not need to consider 
in our simplified ‘rescaling’ case. The interaction of liquidity demand 
(and costs) and tiering is outside the scope of this paper; it is instead 
studied in Jackson and Manning (2007). 
 
 
11.3.2.1  Size effects I – constant individual bank payments 
Here we vary N (the number of banks), while keeping the number of 
payments per bank constant – so the number of system-wide payments 
changes accordingly. The number of system participants has a 
dramatic effect on liquidity choices and efficiency. As the system size 
increases, liquidity demand grows while efficiency falls, and 
increasingly so as delays become expensive. As Figure 11.6 shows, 
for low delay costs the netting ratio
16 is virtually unaffected by the 
network size. But, at higher unit delay costs, differences are amplified 
and systems with fewer participants are more liquidity-efficient than 
systems with a higher number of participants. 
 
 
                                          
16 The average liquidity required for each payment, or the ratio (total bank external 
liquidity) / (total payments).  
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Figure 11.6  Equilibrium external liquidity with 
      alternative system sizes and fixed 





The following is an intuitive explanation of this result (as we said, 
liquidity flows are too difficult to be described analytically, so we can 
only rely on intuition to interpret the simulations). Consider a bank i 
and suppose N is increased from, say, 2 to 3. Because the number of 
payments per bank are kept constant and equally distributed over all 
banks, both outgoing and incoming expected payments remain 
constant for i in any time interval.
17 However, the variance of i’s 
incoming payments increases: at each t, a bank i can now receive 0, 1 
or 2 payments instead of only 0 or 1. Faced with a more unstable 
source of internal liquidity, the banks find it convenient to rely more 
on external liquidity. 
 
 
11.3.2.2  Size effects II – constant total volume 
In a second experiment, we keep constant the system total volume, 
distributing it over a varying number of banks. Note however that we 
keep constant the number of payments between banks. The results, 
illustrated in Figure 11.7, show a pattern similar to the previous case: 
systems with fewer members are seen to absorb less liquidity. 
                                          
17 If Z is the number of a bank’s outgoing payments, the total outflow out of all j ≠ i is 
(N–1)Z. By construction, i captures a fraction 1/(N–1) of this flow, ie Z, which is kept 
constant.  
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Figure 11.7  Equilibrium external liquidity with 
      alternative system sizes and fixed total 






























Our (again, intuitive) explanation of this finding is as follows. A 
reduction of the number of banks from N to say N’ can be seen as 
taking place in two ‘steps’: first, a reassignment of the payments as to 
involve N’ banks only; second the elimination of the banks left with 
no payments. The second stage is neutral, as the eliminated banks are 
‘dummy’. Instead, the first stage brings about liquidity savings, due to 
the so-called liquidity ‘pooling effect’ (see eg Jackson and Manning, 
2007). In turn, the liquidity pooling can be explained as follows: 
suppose the payments to/from two different banks are settled by one 
bank only. The volatility of the liquidity balance of this one bank 
increases, but by a factor less than two. Thus, a liquidity buffer of less 
than two times the original liquidity buffers is sufficient to settle all 




In this paper we build and simulate an agent-based model of an RTGS 
system, paying special attention to the complex liquidity flows 
exchanged by the participating banks. The simulations demonstrate 
that a complete, symmetric RTGS system can be described as an 
aggregation game, whose convenient features allow us to compute the  
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equilibrium behaviour of the system, and to perform various 
comparative statics exercises. 
  First, we retrieve a liquidity demand function, relating the system’s 
liquidity to the costs faced by banks in their payment activity 
(liquidity versus delay costs). Then we consider the question of 
whether such liquidity demand, expressed by non-cooperating banks, 
is efficient. We find that, for a wide range of costs, efficiency 
(measured by the netting ratio) could be enhanced if banks were to 
commit  more liquidity than they do in equilibrium. This might 
constitute a rationale for imposing measures that encourage liquidity 
provision (for example, throughput guidelines). From a different 
perspective, systems with fewer participants are found to be more 
liquidity-efficient than larger ones, due to the emergence of ‘liquidity 
pooling’ effects, as described by previous studies. We privileged 
complexity and realism, over analytical solvability. Consequently, we 
used a numerical, agent-based approach. Besides being useful when 
closed-form results are difficult to obtain, our approach is flexible and 
modular, allowing the present work to be extended to alternative 
scenarios. Further research may look at different network structures, at 
more elaborated liquidity management rules, at banks that differ in 
their costs or payment orders. Finally, our model of a ‘vanilla’ RTGS 
system could be easily extended to ‘hybrid’ systems like the European 
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Consider a sequence of daily games (settlement days) running from 








t l ,..., l , l l = .
18 Fictitious play assumes that, over the sequence of 
days, every i forms a belief of what others will play next, choosing 
t
i l  
as a best reply to such belief: 
 






i = , where 
t
i p (x) is 
the probability that i attaches to  x l
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t
j = ∑ ≠  being played at t. 
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 where  Λ =  NL (N being the number of banks, L the maximum 
liquidity each can post), and Ik(s) is defined to be 1 if  k l
i j
i
j = ∑ ≠ , 
and zero otherwise.
19 










=  – where fi(l,x) is 
the cost incurred by i playing l, if the others play  x l
i j
t
j = ∑ ≠ . 
 
 
Equilibria in the simulations 
 
Most of the equilibria found with the simulations have banks 
switching between two or more actions, depending on the evolution of 
their beliefs. This is due to the fact that, in the simulations, liquidity 
choices are discrete. For example, at the lowest delay price level 
banks oscillate between l = 0 and l = 1, chosen with probabilities 8.6% 
and 91.4%, respectively. As banks become sufficiently confident that 
                                          
18 Here li
t denotes the action li(0) chosen at time zero in day t. We are not interested in the 
intraday timing now, but rather in sequence of days, so we slightly change notation. 
19 On the first day (t=0), all banks believe that each Σj≠ilj
i is equally likely: pi⁰(k) = 1/Λ. 
Then, the more frequently a Σj≠ilj
i is played, the more frequently it is ‘believed’ to be 
played again.  
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other banks chose l = 1 each, the best reply is l = 0. As the probability 
of others choosing l = 0 is thereby increased, banks switch back to 
l = 1. In this case, the game is a classic ‘hawk-dove’ game. If no one 
commits any liquidity, all will experience very high delays as no 
payments can be settled. If everyone commits one unit of liquidity, 
payment settlement can take place. From an individual bank’s 
perspective, however, a better outcome would be not to commit any 
liquidity while others do. As the cost for delays is increased, the 
probability of banks committing no liquidity is reduced gradually 
until, at delay price of one, a pure equilibrium emerges, where each 
bank chooses l = 1. At higher cost levels banks either reach a pure 
equilibrium, or a mixed equilibrium where they mix between a narrow 
range of different liquidity levels. 
 
 
Uniqueness of equilibrium liquidity level 
 
We now show that all equilibria feature the same level of aggregate 
liquidity. This allows us to speak about the equilibrium liquidity, even 
though the game may possess many different equilibria. 
 Recall  that 
 
•  f(li,l–i) is the expected pay-off (cost) of bank i at strategy profile 
(li,l–i). 
 
By Remark 1 (page 325), we can also consider f(li,l–i) a function of 
two variables. So, from now on l–i is no longer a vector but a scalar,  
l–i = Σj≠ilj. We need some new notation: 
 
•  ) l ( l i
*
i −  is bank i's best reply to l–i. 
•  Δi =  i
'
i l L − , to be used when 
'
i l−  and l–i are clear from the context. 








i − − − = Δ , and  ∑ ≠ − − = Δ
i j j
'
j i ) l l (  and 
) l l ( i
'
i N i − = Δ ∈ . 
•  z(li,l–i) is the amount of delays suffered by i at strategy profile   
(li,l–i), so total pay-offs are f = λli + κz(li,l–i). 
 
We can now prove our result: 
 
Theorem 1 All equilibria feature the same total liquidity. 
 
Proof. The argument proceeds in two steps.  
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Step (1) For each l–i and 
'
i l− , we have  i
*
i − Δ − ≤ Δ . 
 
That is, a bank optimally ‘under-reacts’ to a change in others’ 
liquidity. To show this, first note that when we take second derivatives 
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20 The diagram on next page shows how the 
liquidity balance of a bank may evolve in time (kinked line). Delays z 
are measured by the area below the zero liquidity line (balances 
cannot become negative, so the ‘depth’ below the zero line represents 
the length of a queue). From the picture it is evident that 
0
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∂ − , as also found in the simulations (Figure 11.1). Hence, 
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which is the statement of Step (1)
21 
 




To reach a contradiction, suppose l and l’ are equilibria but 
∑∑ > i
'
i l l  ie Δ > 0. If it were so, there should be a non-empty set of 
banks S: Δk  >  0 for all k  ∈  S. By Step 1) we can write   
Δk = –(Δ–k + εk) (with εk ≤ 0), so the total change in liquidity between 
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20 Strictly speaking, we should not be using derivatives, as payments and liquidity choices 
are discrete. The argument in terms of difference is similar, just more cumbersome. 
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Now, given a set S  =  {x1,x2,x3,...} it is clear that Σi∈Sx–i =  
(|S| – 1)Σi∈Sxi. Similarly, if x–i comes from a larger set R ⊇ S, then 
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ε − Δ + Δ − − = Δ
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But ε ≤ 0, so this contradicts Δ > 0. 
 
 
System size and pooling effect 
 
In the main text we said that when payments are distributed over more 
banks, the liquidity needs of the system increase. This is due to the 
liquidity pooling effect, that we now illustrate for the (simpler) case 
where liquidity is abundant, so queues do not form. 
  When liquidity is abundant, a bank’s net liquidity balance is a 
random walk: over a time interval Δt, on average, pΔt payments are 
made (pushing ‘down’ the liquidity balance), and pΔt payments are 
received (pushing ‘up’ the balance). Hence, the average balance 
change is zero, with a standard deviation  t pΔ = σ . Suppose the 
number of participants N is increased to N’ =  Nx (with x  > 1), but 
turnover is kept constant. Payments are now distributed over more 
banks, so their arrival rate is reduced from p to p/x. As a consequence, 
the variance in a bank’s balance is reduced to  x / 1 t x / p ' σ > Δ = σ . 
  Suppose now that a bank’s optimal liquidity li is proportional to its 
balance variance (say li = zσ, which is exactly the case if a bank 
chooses li as to cover z standard deviations from the average balance). 
Then, the fall in variance (factor  x / 1 ) is not enough to offset the 
increase in system’s size (factor x), so the larger system absorbs more 
liquidity: N’zσ’ = (Nx)zσ x / 1  > Nzσ. 
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